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Legislative Constitutionalism
Because Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vests in Congress
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article," ' the great rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment are enforced by both Congress and the Court. How to conceive
of the relationship between the legislative power established in Section 5
and the judicial power authorized by Section 1 is one of the deep puzzles of
American constitutional law. This Article argues that Section 5 is a
structural device that fosters the democratic legitimacy of our constitutional
order. It links the legal interpretations of courts to the constitutional
understandings of the American people, as expressed through their chosen
representatives.
The history of Section 5 doctrine has been one of turmoil and revision.
In the early years of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court was quite hostile
to Section 5 power, fearing that it might "authorize Congress to create a
code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights" that would
displace "the domain of State legislation. ' '2 In the 1960s, during the so-
called Second Reconstruction, the Court adopted a deliberately permissive
stance and began to review Section 5 legislation with the same deference
that it extended to every other exercise of national authority in the aftermath
of the New Deal. In recent years the Rehnquist Court has turned the tables
once again. In addition to reviving concerns about federalism, it has
discovered an entirely new reason to renew judicial hostility to Section 5
authority: separation of powers.
The Rehnquist Court now views Section 5 power as a potential threat to
the Court's role as "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.
'A
Beginning with its 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,5 the Court has
repeatedly 6 affirmed that Section 5 does not authorize Congress "to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation" 7 or "to rewrite the
Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court." 8 The Court has held
that authority to pronounce constitutional law lies exclusively with the
judicial branch of the federal government, which possesses "the duty to say
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
2. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Reconstruction Court waged a
campaign of "virtual nullification" on Section 5 legislation. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 205-06 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Key provisions
were declared unconstitutional or given an unduly narrow construction wholly out of keeping with
their purposes." Id. at 206.
3. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
4. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
6. For some subsequent cases, see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); and Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
7. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
8. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
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what the law is." 9 Condemning Section 5 legislation that might establish
Congress as an independent interpreter of the Constitution, the Court has
announced that "Congress' power under § 5 ... extends only to
'enforc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is."'
We call this view of separation of powers the "enforcement model."
The Rehnquist Court has used the enforcement model to strike down path-
breaking civil rights legislation enacted under the quite different
understanding of Section 5 that prevailed during the thirty years that
preceded Boerne." The enforcement model draws authority from Cooper v.
Aaron,12 from the Court's bold claim that the federal judiciary must be
"supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"13 if it is to protect
precious constitutional rights from the depredations of majoritarian politics.
Disagreement with the enforcement model would seem possible only on the
basis of a popular constitutionalism that would virtually abandon judicial
review.14 It is no surprise that the enforcement model presently enjoys
widespread support on all sides of the political spectrum.
We contend, however, that there is no need to choose between judicial
review and innovative Section 5 legislation based on congressional
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both are possible, but only if
we can break the hold that the enforcement model has on our common
sense. The model seeks to exclude Congress from the process of
constitutional lawmaking because it regards the integrity of our system of
constitutional rights as dependent upon its complete insulation from the
contamination of politics. Although we agree that there are many
circumstances when constitutional law requires separation from politics, we
also believe that a legitimate and vibrant system of constitutional law
requires institutional structures that will ground it in the constitutional
culture of the nation.' 5 Our Constitution contains a variety of structures and
arrangements that facilitate these necessary connections between
constitutional law and constitutional culture. These mechanisms range from
9. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
10. Id. at 519 (second alteration in original).
11. The Rehnquist Court's new jurisprudence of Section 5 has led it to strike down such
significant Section 5 legislation as Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330, in Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, and provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902, in Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. ld. at 18.
14. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
15. For a full discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 17-29 (2003).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112: 19431946
Legislative Constitutionalism
the amendment procedures of Article V to the political appointment of
Article III judges. Section 5 is best conceived as another such mechanism.
We therefore propose an account of Section 5 power that would enable
it to perform this function. We call this account the model of policentric
constitutional interpretation. The policentric model holds that for purposes
of Section 5 power the Constitution should be regarded as having multiple
interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal interpretive
authority to Congress and to the Court. The model thus entails (1) that
Congress does not violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts
Section 5 legislation premised on an understanding of the Constitution that
differs from the Court's, and (2) that Congress's action does not bind the
Court, so that the Court remains free to invalidate Section 5 legislation that
in the Court's view violates a constitutional principle requiring judicial
protection. This account of Section 5 power combines a robust legislative
constitutionalism with a vigorous commitment to rule-of-law values.
In advancing the policentric model of Section 5 authority, we do not
understand ourselves to be proposing some novel or innovative
constitutional regime. To the contrary, the policentric model more
accurately reflects the understandings and practices that make up our
constitutional practice than does the enforcement model. During the period
between the Second Reconstruction and Boerne, for example, Section 5
doctrine actually fostered a policentric practice of Section 5 authority. Our
thesis in this Article is that Section 5 jurisprudence has been, and ought to
remain, policentric. We draw on both history and theory to show that
Section 5 legislation has in the past helped to establish democratic
foundations for the Court's own articulation of constitutional rights.
We develop the history and theory of Section 5 power in the context of
a specific case, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,16 which
the Court will decide in its 2002 Term. At issue in Hibbs is the question of
whether the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA)1 7 are a valid exercise of Section 5 power. The question
arises because Congress cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states except when it acts pursuant to its authority under
Section 5.18 The family leave provisions at issue in Hibbs require employers
to permit eligible employees to take (unpaid) leave totaling twelve weeks
16. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub nom. Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000).
18. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Thus private litigants cannot enforce the FMLA against states that have not waived their Eleventh
Amendment immunity if the FMLA is a statute enacted pursuant only to federal Commerce
Clause power.
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per calendar year to care for ill family members. 9 Congress believed that
the FMLA was a valid exercise of its Section 5 authority. It announced that
the purpose of the FMLA was
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of
families, to promote the stability and economic security of families,
and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity;
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for... the care
of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition;
(4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2)
in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave
is available for... compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral
basis; and
(5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for
women and men, pursuant to such clause. 0
The essential question posed by Hibbs is whether the right to
employment leave to care for a sick family member established by the
FMLA is "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty is that the family leave
provisions of the FMLA do not seem to resemble any Section 1 right that
the Court currently enforces. The Court now interprets the Equal Protection
Clause to prohibit state action that discriminates on the basis of sex;21 it
19. The statute provides that an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of twelve work
weeks of leave during any twelve-month period for one or more of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for
such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or
foster care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if
such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform
the functions of the position of such employee.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
20. Id. § 2601(b).
21. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
The Court describes the Section 1 right in this way:
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of
review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.
"[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 686 (1973)
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does not read the Clause as a means to "promote the goal of equal
employment opportunity." The family leave provisions of the FMLA are
thus an ideal vehicle to explore the basic question posed by the enforcement
model: What is the relationship between legislative and judicial
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Our discussion proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, we describe the
enforcement model on which Section 5 doctrine currently rests. The model
does not require Congress to enact Section 5 legislation containing rights
that are identical to judicially enforceable rights. But it does require that
Section 5 legislation create rights that can be explained as efforts to remedy
or deter violations of judicially enforceable rights. In this way the
enforcement model seeks to maintain symbolic judicial control over the
articulation of constitutional law. The model asserts that Congress can use
its Section 5 power only to enforce constitutional meanings that the Court
itself is prepared to enforce pursuant to Section 1.
We subject the enforcement model to two kinds of critique. We show,
first, that the model does not offer a coherent framework for distinguishing
between Section 5 laws that unconstitutionally "interpret" the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 5 laws that merely "enforce" it. Without guidance
from the enforcement model itself, the decisions of the Rehnquist Court
have been driven by implicit policy preferences. We argue, second, that
even if it were possible to repair the internal inconsistencies of the
enforcement model, it would be a mistake to do so because the model
misconceives the systemic conditions that conduce to the well-being of our
constitutional order.
We begin this critique in Section I[.A, where we argue that the
ambition of the enforcement model to require Congress to enforce the
"same" rights as courts enforce is theoretically incoherent. Rights
articulated within an adjudicatory context are not readily transposed to the
circumstances of a legislature. Because the enforcement model does not
acknowledge the many ways in which the nature of rights depends on the
institutional context in which they are articulated, the model cannot explain
when legislative rights are sufficiently similar to judicial rights that they
can be counted as "enforcing" them. The enforcement model can resolve
this question only by invoking principles that are extrinsic to the model
itself.
We illustrate these points in Section I.B, which discusses how the
enforcement model might be applied in the case of the FMLA. The model is
consistent either with the Court upholding the family leave provisions of
(plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes
distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.
Id. (alterations in original),
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the FMLA because they "enforce" Section 1 rights that can be asserted in
adjudication, or with the Court invalidating the family leave provisions of
the FMLA because they improperly "interpret" these rights. The theoretical
indeterminacy of the enforcement model has great practical significance,
for it leaves the Court ample room to decide cases on the basis of implicit
and unexamined concerns like federalism, distrust of Congress, or hostility
to the substantive agenda of the FMLA.
Even if it were possible to rehabilitate the enforcement model,
however, we argue in Parts III and IV that the Court would weaken our
constitutional order if it prevented Congress from enacting Section 5
statutes based upon legislative interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although legislative constitutionalism is assuredly fraught
with risk, it also provides an indispensable resource for maintaining the
legitimacy of our constitutional order, including the institution of judicial
review itself.
In Section III.A, we address the fundamental premise of the
enforcement model, which is that the Court must keep constitutional law
wholly isolated from politics. We argue that this premise misconceives the
nature of constitutional law, which requires forms of democratic
legitimation that cannot be confined to the rare moments when
constitutional text is ratified. The American Constitution is not merely a
limitation on popular will, but also its deepest expression. Questions of
constitutional law involve profound issues of national identity that cannot
be resolved merely by judicial decree.
History demonstrates that constitutional law is in continual dialogue
with the constitutional culture of the nation.22 Congress and the Court each
possess distinct institutional perspectives, competencies, and purposes, and
these differences affect how each branch responds to constitutional culture.
Because of Congress's democratic responsiveness, it has at times expressed
shifts in the way the nation understands the Constitution through legislation
premised on constitutional interpretations that differ from the Court's.
Although the enforcement model would condemn such legislation as a
threat to separation of powers, we argue that congressional lawmaking of
just this sort can serve positive systemic purposes, and that it has in fact
played a significant role in the development of core understandings of our
modem constitutional tradition.
We develop this claim in Section III.B, where we recount how a social
movement seeking equal citizenship for women prompted sustained
constitutional lawmaking by Congress in the early 1970s, which in turn
influenced the development of the Court's own sex discrimination
22. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002).
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jurisprudence. The feminist movement at that time argued that women
could be recognized as equal to men only if the family and other basic
social institutions were reformed so as to allow all adult members of society
to participate equally in activities that mark full citizenship: work,
education, and politics. Congress responded to the movement's advocacy
with the legislative enactment of the ERA, Section 5 legislation, and a
variety of other statutes. It was only after Congress used its lawmaking
powers to validate the movement's understanding of equality that the Court
proved willing to modify its own Section 1 doctrine to protect citizens
against state action that discriminates on the basis of sex. The Court altered
its jurisprudence to reflect the evolving constitutional culture of the
country, as that culture was evidenced by congressional lawmaking.
While Section III.B demonstrates the important structural role that
congressional lawmaking can play in informing the nation's, and the
Court's, understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, Section III.C
considers how legislative enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause may
vary from adjudicative enforcement. It examines some of the distinctive
features of legislative constitutionalism by extending our case history over
the next two decades, until it ultimately culminates in passage of the
FMLA. Repeatedly over this twenty-year period, the claims of citizens
seeking to alleviate conflicts between work and the family collided with the
concerns of other citizens, who resisted federal regulation of the workplace
or of the family. These conflicts influenced the institutional form in which
Congress chose to vindicate the value of sex equality. By reconstructing
debates about the ways in which federal law would structure childcare,
define pregnancy discrimination at work, and provide a right to family
leave in employment, Section III.C illustrates how Congress can give
practical content to constitutional values through processes that differ from
adjudication and that reflect the distinct institutional capacities and
perspectives of a legislature. We argue that the difference between
legislative and judicial constitutionalism strengthens, rather than weakens,
our constitutional order, because it connects constitutional law to the
changing constitutional understandings of the American people.
The need for such structural linkage is at the core of our case for the
model of policentric constitutional interpretation. In Part IV we propose the
policentric model as the best historical and normative account of
congressional Section 5 power. Our discussion of constitutional history
suggests that the Court is misguided to depict judicial control of
constitutional meaning as an unalloyed systemic good and contamination of
constitutional interpretation by politics as an unalloyed systemic harm. To
the contrary, Section 5 legislation based upon policentric interpretation can
substantially contribute to the well-being of our constitutional order. The
development of Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination jurisprudence,
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for example, was stimulated by acts of legislative constitutionalism, which
illustrates how the structural connection between judicial and legislative
interpretation can actually enhance the Court's ability to construe the
Constitution.
We argue that there are both legal and political dimensions of the
American Constitution, and that these must remain in dynamic tension if
the legal Constitution enforced by courts is to retain legitimacy and
authority. The enforcement model would suppress this tension, whereas the
policentric model would facilitate it. The policentric model poses no threat
to judicial protections for individual constitutional rights or for other
constitutional principles. Instead the model authorizes courts to impose the
same restrictions on Section 5 power that they would impose on any
otherwise legitimate exercise of federal power. The model fully preserves
the values of the rule of law while liberating Congress to deploy its broad
range of legislative competence to interpret and enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We conclude our discussion in Part V by briefly addressing the
challenge to the policentric model posed by the Rehnquist Court's
commitment to the values of federalism. The enforcement model has been
justified almost entirely in terms of separation of powers, but the theoretical
incompleteness of the model gives good reason to believe that the Court's
decisions have also been driven by a silent and unaccountable agenda that
sounds in federalism. Although we ourselves strongly disagree with this
agenda, we argue that the federalism principles that propel the Court's
decisions should explicitly be named and defended. This would most easily
be accomplisked if the Court were sharply to distinguish the question of
whether Congress has power to enact Section 5 legislation from the
question of whether Section 5 legislation impermissibly infringes on
essential postulates of federalism. Requiring the Court to justify federalism
limitations on Section 5 power in this way would force greater
accountability on the Court.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL AND SECTION 5 LEGISLATION
The enforcement model is a recent innovation. In the nineteenth century
the Court severely restricted Section 5 power in order to maintain what it
believed were proper principles of federalism.23 But in 1997 the Rehnquist
Court added an entirely new chapter to the interpretation of Section 5.24 It
declared that the reach of Section 5 power was constrained not merely by
federalism, but also, and primarily, by the requirements of separation of
23. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
24. The key decision is City ofBoerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1952 [Vol. 112: 1943
Legislative Constitutionalism
powers. Because the Court understood Section 5 to regulate the
relationship between Congress and the Court, it held that Congress had
power to "enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not to
"interpret" their meaning:
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It
has been given the power "to enforce, not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what
Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any
meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]. 26
We call this account the "enforcement" model. At the heart of the
enforcement model lies a particular view of separation of powers, which
holds that the constitutional function of courts is to declare the substance
and nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whereas the constitutional
function of Section 5 legislation is to "enforce" those rights. The central
premise of the enforcement model is that courts are the only legitimate
source of authoritative constitutional meaning. Courts hold this privilege
because the Constitution is a form of law and "the province of the Judicial
Branch... embraces the duty to say what the law is."
27
To evaluate the enforcement model, we will be using a nomenclature
that clearly distinguishes among the different kinds of rights that are
relevant to the new Section 5 jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court:
Rj: Rights established in the Constitution, as the judiciary interprets
the Constitution.
R,: Rights established in the Constitution, as Congress interprets the
Constitution.
R,: Rights established in congressional Section 5 statutes, which
"enforce" constitutional rights (which are either R, or Rj).
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Using these terms, we can succinctly restate the enforcement model: Under
Section 5, Congress has authority to enact R, that enforce Rj, but Congress
may not enact R, that enforce R,.
The simplest example of Section 5 legislation that fits the enforcement
model is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ...28
Section 1983 contemplates that courts will define the "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution." The statute adds to these
judicially defined rights both federal court jurisdiction and enumerated
judicial remedies, like damages or injunctive relief. Although § 1983
assumes that Congress can specify the appropriate remedies for
constitutional violations, the statute makes no effort to define the rights
whose violation will trigger these remedies.2 9
Section 1983 is unusual in this regard because most Section 5
legislation enacted in the twentieth century specifies statutory rights that
differ from rights that courts will enforce directly under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Rehnquist Court accordingly does not require
that rights created by Section 5 legislation (R,) be identical to constitutional
rights enforced by courts (Rj). It does not assume that Congress is "limited
to merely providing a forum in which aggrieved plaintiffs may assert rights
under the Civil War Amendments." 30 To the contrary, it is the very object
of the enforcement model to regulate the scope of Section 5 power in a
world in which legislative and judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment diverge.
In this sense the enforcement model preserves the conclusions of the
most significant decisions of the twentieth century addressing the nature of
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). On the status of§ 1983 as Section 5 legislation, see Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) ("[Section 1983] came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act
of April 20, 1871.... It was one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power vested in it
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment." (citation
omitted)).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000), which imposes criminal penalties for the willful deprivation,
under color of state law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution," has a similar structure, attaching criminal sanctions to judicially defined rights. In
Screws v. United States the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 52, an earlier version of § 242, was not
unconstitutionally vague. 325 U.S. 91, 100 (1945). On the Section 5 status of§ 52, see id. at 98.
30. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Congress's power under the Reconstruction Amendments. These decisions
were promulgated by the Warren Court during the 1960s. At that time the
Court exercised the same deference toward congressional Section 5 power
as it did to the exercise of all federal power. When the Warren Court
encountered a variance between legislative and adjudicative enforcement of
the Reconstruction Amendments, it asked whether Congress might have
had a rational basis for enacting the statute in question.
Consider, for example, the first major case of the twentieth century to
address Congress's enforcement powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments, South Carolina v. Katzenbach.31 Although South Carolina
technically concerned Congress's enforcement power under Section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment, 32 "the nature of the enforcement powers
conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been
treated as coextensive. 33 At issue in South Carolina were provisions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)34 that prohibited the use of literacy tests
and similar devices to restrict voting.35 The constitutional puzzle posed by
these provisions was that the Court had itself already held that such literacy
tests were not "in themselves contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment."
36
South Carolina solved this problem by explicitly rejecting the idea
"that Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of
the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms-that the task of fashioning
specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must
necessarily be left entirely to the courts. 37 Instead, the Court announced
that "Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." 38 Because the Court
itself had acknowledged that literacy tests could be applied in ways that
perpetuated the "'discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was
designed to uproot,"' 3 9 and because Congress had found that the literacy
tests banned by the VRA in fact were used in this way, the rule prescribed
by the VRA "was clearly a legitimate response to the problem." 40 South
31. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
32. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides, "The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. Section 1 of the
Fifteenth Amendment provides, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Id. amend. XV, § 1.
33. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 208 n. I (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)-(d), 1973c, 1973d(b), 1973g, 19731(b) (2000). The Act was passed
pursuant to Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
35. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 319.
36. Id. at 333; see also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
37. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 327.
38. Id. at 326.
39. Id. at 333 (quoting Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53).
40. Id. at 328.
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Carolina characterized the statutory prohibitions of the VRA as a "rational
means" 4 1 of satisfying "the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment."
42
The logic of South Carolina is that Congress can enact Section 5
legislation establishing statutory rights (Ri) that differ from rights that the
judiciary would enforce under Section 1 (Ri), so long as R, can be
characterized as a means of enforcing Ri. Congress has Section 5 power to
enact R, if such rights are a "rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting" (Rl). 43 Fourteen years later, in
City of Rome v. United States,an the Burger Court reiterated the conclusion
that Rs could diverge from Rj, so long as Congress "could rationallyA
5
conclude that Rs were an "appropriate method of enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment, '46 holding:
41. Id. at 324.
42. Id. at 309.
43. Id. at 324 (emphasis added); see also id. at 331. The language of "rational means" was
meant to signal the theoretical equivalence of Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and its power under any other clause of the Constitution, including Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The same kind and quality of deference were due to every exercise of
congressional power:
The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is
the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the
reserved powers of the States. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic formulation,
50 years before the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421.
The Court has subsequently echoed his language in describing each of the Civil War
Amendments:
"Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 345-346.
This language was again employed, nearly 50 years later, with reference to Congress'
related authority under § 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment. James Everard's Breweries
v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 558-559.
Id. at 326-27. In assessing the constitutionality of the VRA, South Carolina demonstrated how
thoroughly it meant to rely on the analogy to congressional commerce power by relying on cases
like Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949). See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:
The Supreme Court's New "'On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328, 359-67 (2001).
44. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
45. Id. at 177.
46. Id. at 175. City of Rome also stressed the equivalence of Congress's power under Section
2 of the Fifteenth Amendment and Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of "Congress' broad power to enforce the Civil War Amendments." Id. at
176; see also id. at 175 ("'Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the [Civil War] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
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It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not
violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking
racial discrimination in voting are "appropriate," as that term is
defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte Virginia.
47
The Court in the 1960s applied this same logic to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan41 the Warren Court
explicitly rejected the proposition that "an exercise of congressional power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits the enforcement of a
state law can only be sustained if the judicial branch determines that the
state law is prohibited by the provisions of the Amendment that Congress
sought to enforce. 49
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination
that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress
violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the
congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional
resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing
the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this
context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws
that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or
of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizinA the "majestic generalities" of § 1 of the
Amendment.
At issue in Morgan was the validity of section 4(e) of the VRA, which
prevented the state of New York from applying its literacy requirements to
prohibit persons from voting who had successfully completed a sixth-grade
education in a Puerto Rican school in which the language of instruction was
not English.51 The Court held that the question before it was not whether
brought within the domain of congressional power."' (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345-46 (1879)) (alteration in original)).
47. Id. at 177 (citation omitted). The Court reached the same conclusion in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a fractured and complex case. For a discussion, see City of Rome,
446 U.S. at 176-77.
48. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
49. Id. at 648.
50. Id. at 648-49 (footnote omitted). At issue in Morgan was whether Congress could prohibit
the use of a literacy test. The Court framed the question this way:
Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause
itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress
prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment? In answering this question, our task is limited to determining whether
such legislation is, as required by § 5, appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause.
Id. at 649-50.
51. Id. at 643-44.
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this application of the New York literacy requirements violated the Equal
Protection Clause, but rather whether section 4(e) was "appropriate
legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause."5 2 The Court reasoned
about this question in a manner that self-consciously tracked South
Carolina. It announced that the test for determining "appropriate
legislation" was the "McCulloch v. Maryland standard, ' 53 which authorized
"Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
54
52. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 651. The Court explained:
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The classic formulation of the
rcach of those powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional."
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 345-346, decided 12 years after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, held that congressional power under § 5 had this same broad
scope:
"Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power."
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 311; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318.
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress a similar power to enforce by
"appropriate legislation" the provisions of that amendment; and we recently held in
State of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 326, that "[t]he basic test to be
applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases
concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the
States." That test was identified as the one formulated in McCulloch v. Maryland. See
also James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 558-559 (Eighteenth
Amendment). Thus the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what
constitutes "appropriate legislation" under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 650-51 (footnote omitted, alteration in original). These passages virtually reproduce the
logic and language that the Court had adopted three months previously in South Carolina. See
supra note 43. Morgan cited both the Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), and United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), to emphasize that the deference extended by the Court to Congress
in defining the scope of congressional Commerce Clause power should also be the measure of the
deference extended by the Court to Congress in defining the scope of congressional Section 5
power. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652 n. 11.
54. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651. Morgan offered two explanations of how the R, contained in
section 4(e) of the VRA might be connected to Rj so as to render them a constitutional exercise of
Section 5 power. The first was that Congress "might well have questioned," id. at 654, whether
"the application of New York's English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person
with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was
other than English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause," id. at 656. The Court reasoned:
We are told that New York's English literacy requirement originated in the desire to
provide an incentive for non-English speaking immigrants to learn the English
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language and in order to assure the intelligent exercise of the franchise. Yet Congress
might well have questioned, in light of the many exemptions provided, and some
evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the
requirement, whether these were actually the interests being served. Congress might
have also questioned whether denial of a right deemed so precious and fundamental in
our society was a necessary or appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn
English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise. Finally,
Congress might well have concluded that as a means of furthering the intelligent
exercise of the franchise, an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as
ability to read English for those to whom Spanish-language newspapers and Spanish-
language radio and television programs are available to inform them of election issues
and governmental affairs. Since Congress undertook to legislate so as to preclude the
enforcement of the state law, and did so in the context of a general appraisal of literacy
requirements for voting, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, to which it brought a
specially informed legislative competence, it was Congress' prerogative to weigh these
competing considerations. Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English
literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in
Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than English
constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 654-56 (footnotes omitted). The second was that "§ 4 (e) may be viewed as a measure to
secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by
government-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration
of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement." Id. at
652. The Court explained:
Section 4 (e) may be readily seen as "plainly adapted" to furthering these aims of
the Equal Protection Clause. The practical effect of § 4 (e) is to prohibit New York
from denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community.
Congress has thus prohibited the State from denying to that community the right that is
"preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370. This enhanced
political power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public
services for the entire Puerto Rican community. Section 4 (e) thereby enables the
Puerto Rican minority better to obtain "perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws." It was well within congressional authority to say that this need
of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state
interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch
that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations-
the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the
effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of
dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the
nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification
of the English literacy requirement as applied to residents who have successfully
completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the
congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. There plainly was such a
basis to support § 4 (e) in the application in question in this case. Any contrary
conclusion would require us to be blind to the realities familiar to the legislators.
Id. at 652-53 (footnotes omitted). In explaining this second rationale, the Court referred to
the settled principle applied in the Shreveport Case (Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v.
United States, 234 U. S. 342), and expressed in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100,
118, that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce "extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end ... " Accord, Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258.
Id. at 652 n. I I (alteration in original).
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In City of Boerne v. Flores55 and subsequent cases, the Rehnquist Court
reinterpreted precedents like South Carolina, Rome, and Morgan in light of
its new concern with separation of powers. The Rehnquist Court accepted
the holdings of these cases that rights established by Section 5 legislation
(R,) can diverge from rights that a Court will enforce in litigation under
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (Rj). 56 But the Rehnquist Court
sought to limit this divergence in ways that established the Court's
symbolic and practical control over the articulation of constitutional rights.
The Rehnquist Court was determined to prevent Congress from enacting
Section 5 legislation that enforced Congress's independent interpretation of
constitutional rights (R).
In marked contrast to the Warren Court, which repeatedly deferred to
Congress in ways that blurred the relationship between R, and RJ, 57 the
Rehnquist Court has aggressively deployed the enforcement model to
measure and monitor discrepancies between R, and Ri in order to affirm the
Court's role as "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.""8 As the
Court explained in Boerne and subsequent cases, there are at least three
forms of connection between R, and Ri that can justify divergence between
statutory and judicial rights in this way. We call the principles underlying
these forms of connection the "remedial," "prophylactic," and "identity"
principles.
The remedial principle is satisfied if R, are justified as curing "the
effects of prior discrimination." 59 Just as a federal court enforcing Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment retains authority to issue remedies "designed
as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct,'
60
so Congress has analogous remedial power in exercising its Section 5
authority to enforce Section 1.61 Congress can establish R, that diverge from
Ri if their purpose and function is to repair the present "effects" 62 of past
violations of R. 63 The prophylactic principle, by contrast, is satisfied if R,
55. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
56. See id. at 518.
57. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 34-38.
58. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
59. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
60. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 746 (1974)).
61. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483 ("It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or
federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly
charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce equal protection
guarantees.").
62. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I conclude.., that the Enforcement Clauses of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable
remedies to advance the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination.").
63. Thus in Gaston County v. United States, the Court upheld provisions of the VRA
prohibiting the use of literacy tests on the grounds that " [i]mpartial' administration of the literacy
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are justified as "deterring" or "preventing" future violations of Rj. "The
power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations
which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt
prophylactic rules to deal with those situations. 64 The identity principle is
satisfied if facts establish that R, are actually equivalent to Rj. Because Rj
are rules promulgated to decide specific cases, they frequently take the form
that particular practices, although not unconstitutional on their face, are
unconstitutional if definite factual circumstances obtain. R, satisfy the
identity principle if they are based upon legislative findings that establish
these circumstances.
65
test today would serve only to perpetuate" the effects of past constitutional violations that
compelled "black children... to endure a segregated and inferior education." 395 U.S. 285, 297,
295 (1969); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (reasoning that the
South Carolina "holding makes clear that Congress may, under the authority of § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative of § 1, perpetuates
the effects of past discrimination"). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court upheld a federal statute
requiring that at least ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works projects must be
used to procure services or supplies from minority-owned businesses on the grounds that the set-
aside was necessary "to eradicate [the] continuing effects" of past "unlawful discriminatory
practices." 448 U.S. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.). Thus in City of Rome v. United States, the Court considered
Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enact the preclearance
provisions of the VRA, which applied to jurisdictions with a history of discrimination, and which
prohibited changes in the electoral practices or procedures of such jurisdictions that had a racially
disparate impact unless these changes had been approved by the Department of Justice. 446 U.S.
156. Although the Fifteenth Amendment itself barred only electoral practices or procedures
enacted with a discriminatory purpose, the Court nevertheless held that "Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of
intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was
proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact." Id. at 177; see also Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-84 (1999) ("Recognizing that Congress has the
constitutional authority to designate covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give
rise to a discriminatory effect in those jurisdictions, we find no merit in the claim that Congress
lacks Fifteenth Amendment authority to require federal approval before the implementation of a
state law that may have just such an effect in a covered county."); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 178
("We find no reason... to disturb Congress' considered judgment that banning electoral changes
that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing States from undo[ing] or
defeat[ing] the rights recently won by Negroes." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted,
alterations in original)); id. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress has power under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enact "a prophylactic measure"). Similarly, in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld Congress's Section 5 power to prohibit New York's
literacy requirements on the ground that R, were a means to ensure future "nondiscriminatory
treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community." 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966);
see also supra note 54.
65. So, for example, although the Court has held that literacy tests and similar devices are not
unconstitutional on their face, it has also held that in particular circumstances they can "be
employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to
uproot." Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959). Whether such
circumstances obtain is a question of fact. In South Carolina the Court upheld Congress's
prohibition of literacy tests on the ground that Congress had found that these circumstances
existed because "in most of the States covered by the Act" literacy tests and similar devices "have
been instituted with the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, have been framed in such a way as
to facilitate this aim, and have been administered in a discriminatory fashion for many years."
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966); see also Gaston County, 395 U.S. at
295-97. Because of Congress's factual findings, the R, of the VRA were equivalent to the Rj
enforced by courts. Morgan similarly relied upon congressional fact-finding to determine that
Congress was authorized to employ its Section 5 power to set aside New York's literacy
requirement because Congress might have found that "prejudice played a prominent role in the
enactment of the requirement." 384 U.S. at 654; see also supra note 54. The existence of this
prejudice would itself constitute a violation of Rj. A splintered but unanimous Court upheld
Congress's ban on literacy tests in Oregon v. Mitchell on the analogous grounds that Congress had
found facts establishing that the actual application of literacy tests was a violation of Rj. 400 U.S.
112 (1970). Thus Justice Black concluded:
There is substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence from which Congress could have
concluded that it is a denial of equal protection to condition the political participation of
children educated in a dual school system upon their educational achievement....
Faced with this and other evidence that literacy tests reduce voter participation in a
discriminatory manner not only in the South but throughout the Nation, Congress was
supported by substantial evidence in concluding that a nationwide ban on literacy tests
was appropriate to enforce the Civil War amendments.
Id. at 133; see also id. at 146-47 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly,
Justice Stewart explained:
Because literacy and illiteracy are seemingly neutral with respect to race, creed, color,
and sex, we upheld a literacy requirement against a claim that it was invalid on its face
under the Fifteenth Amendment. But... we made it clear that Congress has ample
authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to determine that literacy requirements
work unfairly against Negroes in practice because they handicap those Negroes who
have been deprived of the educational opportunities available to white citizens....
.In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush
than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding
individual cases and controversies upon individual records. The findings that Congress
made when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a
nationwide ban on literacy tests.
Id. at 283-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). The most
explicit and systematic theoretical attention to the question of congressional fact-finding may be
found in Justice Brennan's opinion:
[Q]uestions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of
fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion of state power is challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For although equal
protection requires that all persons "under like circumstances and conditions" be treated
alike, Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S., at 71, such a formulation merely raises, but does
not answer the question whether a legislative classification has resulted in different
treatment of persons who are in fact "under like circumstances and conditions."
... The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the
determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in
constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative determination
of a factual question only if the legislature's finding is so clearly wrong that it may be
characterized as "arbitrary," "irrational," or "unreasonable."...
Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have no
application to Congress. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in order to
determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative
discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable
men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its
own determination on the matter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-656
(1966). It should hardly be necessary to add that if the asserted factual basis necessary
to support a given state discrimination does not exist, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
vests Congress with power to remove the discrimination by appropriate means. Id., at
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The Rehnquist Court has incorporated the remedial, prophylactic, and
identity principles into its construction of the enforcement model. It has
repeatedly affirmed that "[Ijegislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States.' 66 It has announced that
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation
that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourtecnth
Amendment. Rather, Congress' power "to enforce" the
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter
violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not
itself forbidden by the Amendment's text.
67
Rehnquist Court decisions have also reiterated that sufficiently persuasive
congressional fact-finding can establish that R, are equivalent to Rj.
68
The remedial, prophylactic, and identity principles derive from
opinions authored by the Court in the period between South Carolina and
656-657; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S., at 282-283; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
347-348 (1880).
The scope of our review in such matters has been established by a long line of
consistent decisions. "It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of these
legislative findings and reject them." Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U. S., at
94. "[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before
them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary... our
investigation is at an end." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304 (1964);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 653; see Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 529
(1954).
Id. at 246-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted, fifth, sixth,
and seventh alterations in original). By contrast, Justice Harlan's opinion in Oregon seemed to
turn not on the conclusion that Congress's factual findings had established that R, were equivalent
to Rj, but instead on the fact that these findings had established that R, were necessary to prevent
future violations of R. Justice Harlan wrote:
Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or
effect, Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the
Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application,
either conscious or unconscious. This danger of violation of § 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment was sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power under § 2.
Id. at 216 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). For references to the "remedial and preventive nature of
Congress' enforcement power," see id. at 524, 532.
67. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
68. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-70 (2001) ("The
legislative record of the ADA... simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern
of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."); Kinel, 528 U.S. at 89
(finding that Congress can constitutionally enact Section 5 legislation prohibiting age
discrimination if it can identify "any pattern of age discrimination by the States" that rises "to the
level of constitutional violation").
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Boerne,69 but they serve a purpose that is entirely alien to the spirit and
intention of earlier precedents. During the Second Reconstruction the Court
assumed that Congress was a coequal branch of the federal government
whose "broad power to enforce the Civil War Amendments" 70 warranted
respect and deference. The Court was not concerned to determine why
legislative and adjudicative enforcement of Section 1 rights varied; it was
content to apply a rational basis standard to Section 5 legislation and hence
to speculate about possible justifications for that legislation. 71 These
speculations were not intended to serve a regulatory purpose; if anything,
the Warren Court's open-ended observations about the multifaceted
character of the enforcement power liberated rather than restrained
Congress in legislating under Section 5. Although the Rehnquist Court has
drawn the remedial, prophylactic, and identity principles from language
contained in these early speculations, it has fashioned the principles to serve
a new objective, which is to constrain the exercise of Section 5 power in
order to maintain judicial control over constitutional meaning. It has
deployed the principles to prevent Congress from enacting R, unless R, can
be justified in terms of their subordination to Rj.
As the Rehnquist Court has begun to insist that the term "enforce"
excludes the power to "interpret," it has also begun decisively to repudiate
the deferential McCulloch standard.72 In its place, the Rehnquist Court has
adopted a new standard of review that requires Section 5 legislation
containing R, to be congruent and proportional to Rj. 73 The Court created
the congruence-and-proportionality test to determine if congressional
69. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
70. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980).
71. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. In the words of the modem Court, rational
basis review requires that "legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). "Where there are 'plausible reasons' for
Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end."' Id. at 313-14 (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). The one exception to the generalization in the text is Oregon v.
Mitchell, in which the Court found that a statute authorizing eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds to
vote in state elections was beyond the Section 5 power of Congress. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The
Court's vote on this question was five to four. Although there was no opinion for the Court in
Oregon, the decisive opinion was by Justice Black, who rested his judgment on the federalism
implications of the statute. See id. at 128-30 (Black, J.). We discuss the complex interrelationship
between federalism and separation of powers infra Part V.
72. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958-59 (3d ed. 2000).
73. "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The
Court explained:
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must
be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved, The
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.
Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to
another, lesser one.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
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judgments are supported by more than a rational basis. 74 The test authorizes
the Court independently to determine whether R, are sufficiently connected
to Rj to satisfy the remedial, prophylactic, or identity principles. Refusing to
defer to Congress on this question, the Court has explained that R, without
congruence and proportionality to Rj "may become substantive in operation
and effect ',75 and hence violate the separation-of-powers requirement that
Congress refrain from exercising "a substantive, non-remedial power" to
define the nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 76 The function of the
congruence-and-proportionality test is to prohibit Congress from enforcing
Rc.
77
Four years after Boerne the Court emphasized its repudiation of the
McCulloch standard by holding in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett78 that Congress could not rely on the remedial,
prophylactic, or identity principles to create R, unless it had first "identified
a history and pattern of unconstitutional ... state transgressions., 79 The
Court would not assume the existence of such a history or pattern; it instead
required Congress to document these transgressions in its legislative
deliberations. Garrett seems to suggest that the Court will recognize R, as
74. Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481, 523-35 (2002). Section 5
legislation must pass the congruence-and-proportionality test even if Congress has documented
extensive violations of Rj. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 475 (2000).
75. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. The complete passage reads:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions
and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation
and effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent from
the text of the Amendment.
Id. at 519-20.
76. Id. at 527.
77. To the extent that the congruence-and-proportionality test was meant to protect
constitutional values other than separation of powers, like federalism, it would also apply to
Article I legislation. But the Court has refused to apply the congruence-and-proportionality test
"outside the § 5 context; it does not hold sway for judicial review of legislation
enacted... pursuant to Article I authorization." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003).
The Court declared:
Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment. Amdt. 14, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." (emphasis added)).
The Copyright Clause, in contrast, empowers Congress to define the scope of the
substantive right. Judicial deference to such congressional definition is "but a corollary
to the grant to Congress of any Article I power." It would be no more appropriate for us
to subject the CTEA to "congruence and proportionality" review under the Copyright
Clause than it would be for us to hold the Act unconstitutional per se.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
79. Id. at 368.
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enforcing Rj only if Congress develops a record establishing infringements
of Rj. This inverts the McCulloch standard because it explicitly places the
burden of proof for establishing the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation
squarely on Congress.
The upshot of both the congruence-and-proportionality test and the
Garrett requirement is that Section 5 legislation is now as a practical matter
far more closely tied to the Court's interpretation of judicially enforceable
Fourteenth Amendment rights than at any previous time in the nation's
history. The Rehnquist Court has explicitly and repeatedly explained the
necessity for such a stringent connection in terms of the need to maintain
judicial control over the meaning of the Constitution.
11. THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL AND INSTITUTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION
The enforcement model directs courts to uphold Section 5 legislation
that "enforces" Fourteenth Amendment rights, and to invalidate Section 5
legislation that seeks to "interpret" those rights. The model seeks to ensure
that Section 5 legislation enforces Rj but not R,. The enforcement model
accordingly requires criteria for determining whether Congress is enforcing
R. In this Part of our Article we closely examine the possible nature of such
criteria. In Section II.A we argue that institutional distinctions between
legislatures and courts render the notion of Congress's "enforcing R;' so
crude and abstract as to undermine the theoretical coherence of the
enforcement model. The result is that courts applying the model will be
able to decide cases only by deploying supplemental principles, like
federalism, that are logically distinct from the model itself. The model
disguises the use of these principles and renders their application implicit
and unaccountable. We illustrate this point in Section II.B by discussing the
application of the enforcement model to the family leave provisions of the
FMLA.
A. Institutional Differentiation and
Constitutional Interpretation
Both the Court and Congress interpret the Constitution from the
perspective of a particular institution. The point is not immediately obvious
only because we tend to accept uncritically the fiction that the Constitution
speaks abstractly, as though pronounced on high by some ideal interpreter
in some unspecified space. When we accept this fiction, we ask whether the
Court or Congress is more likely to read the Constitution accurately, to
ascertain its "true" meaning. But once we see that interpretation is always
practiced by particular persons who seek to understand the Constitution in
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particular institutional settings and for particular institutional purposes, we
can see that claims about constitutional meaning are always embedded in
contexts.
This insight allows us to recognize a deep confusion in the enforcement
model. The model requires Congress to enact Section 5 legislation that will
implement constitutional meaning as that meaning is determined from the
institutional perspective of a court. Courts construe the Constitution in
order to pursue the practice of adjudication, which accordingly establishes
the pragmatic framework within which courts conceive and articulate
constitutional rights. The essential thesis of the enforcement model is that
this framework should dominate and control the exercise of congressional
power under Section 5. We can begin to sense the implausibility of this
thesis when we notice the circumstances in which it leads to patent
absurdity. In two recent decisions, for example, the Court addressed the
question of whether Congress can exercise its Section 5 power to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of classifications that the Court has held should
in adjudication receive only rational basis review.80 The Court has applied
the standards of rational basis review to determine if Congress was
redressing constitutional violations.
Rational basis review, however, explicitly defines a constitutional right
in terms of the specific institutional purposes of the judiciary. The Court
has explained that rational basis review is "a paradigm of judicial
restraint"8' because it reflects the principle that courts should be "very
reluctant... in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of
powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices."8 2 Rational basis review
thus articulates the substance of the right to equal protection of the law by
reference to the deference that the judiciary should adopt vis-A-vis the
democratically accountable branches of government. It does not define the
substance of the right in a way that can coherently be applied to Congress.
It is easy to see that the thesis of the enforcement model makes little
sense when it requires Congress to enforce rights that are defined in terms
of institutional values pertinent to courts, but logically irrelevant to
Congress. The fundamental cause of this anomaly is the failure of the
enforcement model to account for the pervasive ways in which
constitutional meaning is determined by reference to what we may call the
pragmatic horizon of institutions. Rights are not abstract statements of
principle, but constitutional conclusions articulated in ways designed to
80. Id. at 356 (concerning discrimination based on disability); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (concerning discrimination based on age).
81. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (emphasis added). For a
discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 462-63.
82. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); see also Post
& Siegel, supra note 74, at 459-67.
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make sense within particular institutional frameworks. We can, therefore,
ask how rights defined in terms of the specific institutional characteristics
of courts can be translated into the distinct institutional framework of a
legislature. And we may further ask why a legislature should be constrained
by the distinct institutional purposes of courts. Both questions are well
illustrated by the Garrett requirement that Congress cannot exercise its
Section 5 power to remedy or deter violations of constitutional rights until it
has first "identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional ... state
transgressions. 83
The analytic question of translation becomes visible if we ask what the
Garrett requirement means by the term "transgressions." It is clear enough
what this term means for a court. It signifies that particular state actions are
unconstitutional. Courts make such determinations by holding adversarial
hearings designed to ascertain all facts that are legally relevant to the
characterization of the particular actions alleged to be unconstitutional. This
procedural framework pervasively informs judicial definitions of what it
means to violate a constitutional right. So, for example, courts define a
constitutional right in terms of what a full evidentiary record will reveal
about the purpose or motivation of a particular government action. Or they
define a constitutional right in terms of whether a plaintiff has overcome his
burden of proof to negate "any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis" for a classification. 4 Courts thus
characterize the substance of constitutional rights in ways that are
thoroughly intertwined with the procedural context of adjudication.
Constitutional meaning and institutional function are utterly interdependent.
For this very reason, however, it is fundamentally unclear what it might
mean for Congress as a legislature to find that there is a pattern of "state
transgressions." Congress does not investigate specific incidents. It does not
create complete evidentiary records about particular actions. Instead, like
any legislature, Congress makes general findings about social conditions
and trends. We would actually regard it as both infeasible and improper for
Congress to conduct the mini-trials that would be necessary to find
constitutional violations in the technical sense ordinarily required in the
framework of litigation. 85 Given the distinct institutional characteristics of
courts and legislatures, it is difficult to know what it would actually mean to
require Congress to enact Section 5 statutes that enforce constitutional
rights as courts conceive and enforce those rights in the context of
adjudication.
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The analytic deficiency exposed by this reasoning goes very deep. The
Court's recent decisions speak as if the question of Section 5 power can be
settled by the application of the enforcement model. The application of the
model is supposed to determine whether Congress has rewritten "the
Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court."86 But if the fact of
institutional differentiation means that Congress must (in some nontrivial
sense) always rewrite the Court's version of Fourteenth Amendment law,
then the model is not going to be particularly helpful in deciding which
forms of R, should survive constitutional scrutiny. Because the whole point
of the enforcement model is to suppress the fact of institutional
differentiation, and because distinctions between R, and Rj are commonly
caused by institutional differentiation, the model cannot itself create an
account of when such distinctions are acceptable.
The determination of whether R, should count as the enforcement of Rj
will therefore be heavily influenced by perspectives that are extrinsic to the
model, like the values of federalism, or the Court's confidence in
congressional bona fides, or the Court's attitude toward the substantive civil
rights agenda reflected in Section 5 legislation. 87 That is why the
enforcement model is capable of justifying such radically different results
depending upon which supplementary principles a court is willing to bring
to bear in its application. The model could even duplicate the outcomes of
policentric constitutional interpretation if it were to be applied with
sufficient deference, as for example by using the McCulloch standard that
the Court employed in the years between South Carolina and Boerne. The
enforcement model is thus theoretically incomplete. The heavy lifting in
deciding the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation must be done by
supplemental principles that are typically tacit and unarticulated.
Even if we could clarify the analytic confusions at the heart of the
enforcement model, moreover, we would face a second and more
fundamental normative question: Why should the specific procedural
framework of adjudication control and limit Congress's Section 5 power?
This question is also raised by the Garrett requirement, which expresses a
principle that makes perfect sense in the context of litigation. We all
understand that courts are not authorized to remedy past constitutional
violations or to deter future constitutional violations unless they have first
determined that a plaintiff is entitled to redress. A plaintiff is entitled to
redress by the judiciary only if a court has found that her constitutional
rights have been infringed. 88 We take this limitation on judicial authority
for granted because it is rooted in the "case or controversy" requirement of
86. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
87. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, I1I YALE L.J. 1141
(2002).
88. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992).
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Article 11I 89 that expresses our fundamental understanding of judicial
power. 90 We do not conceive courts as freestanding boards of inquiry, but
as institutions designed to adjudicate disputes between parties. 9' This
function underlies our understanding of the scope and nature of judicial
authority.
92
By prohibiting Congress from using its Section 5 power to remedy or
deter violations of constitutional rights until it has first "identified a history
and pattern of unconstitutional. state transgressions,",93  Garrett
essentially subjects Congress to this paradigm of judicial power. Garrett
holds that Congress has no power to deter future constitutional violations
unless it first finds that constitutional rights have been violated. We may
ask, however, why Congress should be constrained by limitations that
derive from the particular institutional function of courts. What principle of
legislative power would prohibit Congress from preventing future
violations of constitutional rights, even if the record of actual or potential
violations were inadequate to authorize a court to exercise equitable
jurisdiction to order declaratory or injunctive relief? Congress does not
derive its legitimacy from the practice of adjudication; it is not an
institution designed to settle disputes between parties. Congress is instead a
legislature that derives legitimacy from its democratic responsiveness to the
values and commitments of the nation. Section 5 is a grant of legislative
power, not a grant of judicial power. Why, then, should congressional
authority under Section 5 be constrained by the limitations that reflect the
specific institutional characteristics of Article III courts?
The enforcement model, in short, is rendered highly vulnerable once we
understand that constitutional interpretation always proceeds within specific
institutional contexts that inform both the substance of constitutional rights
and the procedural framework within which they are enforced. The thesis of
the enforcement model is that Section 5 power should be circumscribed by
the pragmatic horizon of adjudication. But because Section 5 is a grant of
legislative power, rather than of judicial power, it is puzzling why the
89. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990).
90. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989).
91. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 487-90 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
92. As the Court explained in Bell v. Wolfish:
[U]nder the Constitution, the first question to be answered is not whose plan is best, but
in what branch of the Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan.
This does not mean that constitutional rights are not to be scrupulously observed. It
does mean, however, that the inquiry of federal courts into prison management must be
limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the
Constitution or, in the case of a federal prison, a statute. The wide range of "judgment
calls" that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials
outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.
441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
93. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
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enforcement model would limit Section 5 authority by the institutional
norms applicable to courts, rather than by the institutional norms applicable
to legislatures. Even if this normative constraint could be justified,
moreover, there would remain the conceptual difficulty of articulating
exactly what it might mean for a legislature to act according to norms
appropriate for courts. In many circumstances it may be both incoherent
and improper to require Congress to behave in this way. Because it does not
take account of institutional differentiation, the enforcement model will
typically import extrinsic principles to determine when legislative action is
sufficiently "like" judicial action to count as the enforcement of judicially
defined rights.
B. The Enforcement Model, Institutional Differentiation,
and the FMLA
The analytic and normative deficiencies of the enforcement model
become apparent if we attempt to apply the model to the family leave
provisions of the FMLA at issue in Hibbs. The FMLA establishes a right to
employment leave to care for sick family members94 that no court would
likely recognize under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute
thus contains R, that significantly diverge from R. The enforcement model
requires courts to decide whether this variance is constitutionally
permissible because justified by the remedial, prophylactic, or identity
principles, 95 or instead constitutionally forbidden because based upon an
independent congressional interpretation of the Constitution. In Section II.A
we argued that the enforcement model provides no coherent way of
answering this question. In this Section we illustrate the point by
demonstrating how a court, appealing to the remedial or prophylactic
principles, could either uphold or invalidate the family leave provisions of
94. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
95. This point may be elementary, but it suffices to demonstrate the patent inadequacy of at
least two district court opinions holding that the family leave provisions of the FMLA cannot be
justified under Congress's Section 5 power. In McGregor v. Goord a court held that because the
provisions create a right to twelve weeks of leave, and because "no such entitlement is found in
any of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment," the provisions went beyond Congress's
authority under Section 5. 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). In Thomson v. Ohio State
University Hospital a court held that because "the FMLA does not merely make it illegal for
employers to treat requests for leave differently on the basis of gender, but instead mandates that
employers provide employees with a new and valuable benefit," it is "patently the sort of
substantive legislation that exceeds the proper scope of Congress' authority under § 5." 5 F. Supp.
2d 574, 579-80 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff'd, 238 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000). Both McGregor and
Thomson seem to assume that if Section 5 legislation creates rights that differ in any way from Rj,
the legislation is beyond the Section 5 power of Congress. But this assumption is false. All
Section 5 legislation need not resemble § 1983. The dispositive question is instead whether the
FMLA creates rights that can be justified under the remedial, prophylactic, or identity principles.
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the FMLA, depending upon which tacit extrinsic principles it brings to
bear.
Even if the family leave provisions of the FMLA at issue in Hibbs
establish R, that diverge from Rj, they might nevertheless be constitutional
under the enforcement model if they are understood to remedy violations of
Rj. The provisions of the FMLA can in fact be justified in this fashion,
because during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century there were in
place "state-imposed systemic barriers to women's equality in the
workplace that, under recent constitutional doctrine, were undoubtedly
unconstitutional., 96 These barriers sustained, and were intended to sustain,
"stereotypical beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women." 97
Although the legislative history of the FMLA does not inventory the
existence and nature of these constitutional violations, as Garrett might
seem to require, they were nevertheless open and notorious, a matter of
uncontroversial history. Congressional documentation would seem
superfluous.
The question, therefore, is whether the family leave provisions of the
FMLA can properly be characterized as redressing the ongoing effects of
these past violations, which reinforced traditional gender roles that
conceived of men as workers and women "as the center of home and family
life."98 When it enacted the FMLA, Congress explicitly found that these
stereotypical roles persisted into the 1990s: "[D]ue to the nature of the roles
of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility for family
caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the
working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of men."
99
The persistence of these roles means that women feel more compelled than
men to care for sick family members. The failure of employers to offer
adequate family leave consequently affects women more harshly than men
because it forces women, more than men, to choose between work and the
family. Any cure for the present effects of past unconstitutional gender
stereotyping, therefore, must require that employers offer their employees
adequate family leave.
96. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 860 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom.
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002). The Ninth Circuit specifically invoked
this account of the remedial principle to uphold the family leave provisions of the FMLA as an
exercise of Section 5 power "that recognizes and seeks to cure the continuing negative impact of
pervasive past unconstitutional state discrimination." Id. at 869. For a summary of this
discrimination, see Brief of Women's History Scholars Alice Kessler-Harris, Linda Kerber et al.
at 18-30, Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs (U.S. Oct. 25, 2002) (No. 01-1368).
97. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 864.
98. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961); see also Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 865-67.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 260 1(a)(5) (2000). "Two-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for older,
chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women, the most common caregiver being a child
or spouse." H.R. REP. No. 103-8(1), at 24 (1993); see also S. REP. No. 103-3, at 7 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 9.
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These effects cannot be redressed by offering adequate family leave
only to women. Apart from the fact that such a gender-specific remedy
might itself violate the Equal Protection Clause, Congress also found that
"employment standards that apply to one gender only have serious potential
for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees and
applicants for employment who are of that gender." 10 Extending leave only
to women makes women more expensive employees, and hence less
desirable. Any cure for the present effects of past unconstitutional gender
stereotyping, therefore, must be gender-neutral, rather than sex-specific.
The FMLA meets these prerequisites because it mandates that employers
extend adequate family leave to all employees.
Under the McCulloch v. Maryland standard, which the Court used in
the years between 1964 and 1997, the family leave provisions of the FMLA
would certainly have been upheld as a constitutional exercise of Section 5
power. The provisions are rationally related to the purpose of undoing the
present effects of past constitutional transgressions. The modem Court,
however, does not employ this standard. It asks instead whether R, are
"congruent and proportional to the targeted violation."' '° Whether R, are
"congruent and proportional" to Rj, however, is not a question that can be
answered in the abstract. Once it is agreed that R, can diverge from Rj, the
decision of how much divergence is acceptable can be made only in light of
the impact of R, on the constitutional values that the congruence-and-
proportionality test is meant to protect. The Court has so far articulated two
such values: separation of powers and federalism.1
0 2
With respect to federalism, the family leave provisions of the FMLA
require "state employers" to "provide a valuable benefit to their employees
that is entirely foreign to the employment agreement reached between the
individual and the state."'10 3 It therefore imposes a financial burden directly
upon states. The congruence-and-proportionality test, however, does not
inquire into the nature and extent of this burden. Instead, it asks about the
nexus between past constitutional violations and the FMLA's family leave
provisions. The congruence-and-proportionality test can therefore appeal to
federalism only as an implicit principle of decision that is silently
incorporated into the very definition of Section 5 power. This illustrates
how the enforcement model will typically be supplemented by principles
that are external to the model. We shall defer a full discussion of the
complicated issues posed by this doctrinal structure to Part V, where we
100. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6).
101. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
102. In Boerne the Court referred to the congruence-and-proportionality test as designed to
protect the "vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
103. Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff'd, 238
F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000).
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shall argue that the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence would be better served
if federalism concerns were instead conceived as independent limitations on
the exercise of an otherwise existing and valid congressional power. Only
in this way can federalism values be openly named and adequately
assessed.
With respect to separation of powers, the congruence-and-
proportionality test allows Congress to justify R, by the remedial principle
only if R, are closely enough connected to violations of Rj to count as
enforcing Rj. The enforcement model articulated in Boerne locates the
separation-of-powers values at stake in this determination in the need to
prevent Congress from enacting Section 5 legislation that enforces its own
independent interpretation of constitutional rights (Re). But in contrast to
cases like Kimel or Boerne, where there was a real question whether Rj had
actually been violated, the version of the remedial principle that we have
sketched seeks to cure the effects of statutes that were undoubtedly
unconstitutional.
The formal requirements of the enforcement model would thus appear
to be satisfied.10 4 The family leave provisions of the FMLA (R,) can be
logically explained as redressing the ongoing effects of past judicially
redressable violations of Section 1 (R1). Yet the normative and analytic
ambiguities of the enforcement model persist. Do the family leave
provisions of the FMLA constitute a "remedy" in any sense in which a
court might order relief? An overpowering barrage of objections would
crush any plaintiff brash enough to sue for redress for the ongoing effects of
the sex stereotyping caused by the long-deceased statutes that sustain this
version of the remedial principle. A court would in all likelihood find that
her claim was barred by statutes of limitations, or that the imposition of
twelve weeks of unpaid family leave for all workers was too intrusive and
far-reaching to be regarded as a plausible judicial remedy, and so on.
Thinking of the family leave provisions of the FMLA as a remedy
demonstrates how the very concept of "remedy" has a different meaning in
the context of legislation than in the context of adjudication. Within
adjudication, the notion of a remedy is infused with norms that reflect our
understanding of the "permissible scope of federal judicial power."' 5
The enforcement model thus faces a dilemma. The Court can interpret
the model to invalidate legislative remedies that are beyond the equitable
104. We might ask the slightly different question of whether Congress, in enacting the family
leave provisions of the FMLA, intended to remedy the present effects of past violations of Rj. As
to this question, Part III demonstrates that Congress plainly intended to ameliorate the
disproportionate harm to women caused by employment practices based upon stereotypical beliefs
about gender. These stereotypical beliefs both caused and were caused by the unconstitutional
state statutes that violated R.
105. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n. 11 (1976); see also Spallone v. United States,
493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990).
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power of courts, in which case it must address the normative question of
why standards appropriate to Article III courts should limit the legislative
power created by Section 5. Or the Court can embrace the holdings of
precedents like City of Rome v. United States106 and interpret the model to
permit legislative rights that plainly surpass anything that a court might
order, in which case the Court must offer some principle of decision to
determine whether R, are sufficiently congruent and proportional to Rj to
"count" as enforcing Rj. Because the enforcement model is dedicated to
suppressing the very fact of institutional differentiation, it lacks the
resources to generate any such principle. Whatever principle the Court
ultimately adopts, therefore, must come from a source external to the
enforcement model itself.
One such principle that seems to be driving the Rehnquist Court's
Section 5 decisions is a distrust of Congress's good faith in upholding
constitutional values.10 7 This suspicion of Congress may well explain the
Court's recent decisions more cogently than any of the separation-of-
powers values that the enforcement model purports to protect. The legal
subordination of women in the United States has been explicit and
pervasive for centuries, so that it is exceedingly easy to characterize any
contemporary disparity between women and men as caused by past
constitutional violations1 °8 Because the remedial principle is so
indeterminate, and because the scope of accumulated constitutional
violations is so great, it is unclear how a court can possibly determine
whether Congress is enforcing or interpreting constitutional rights. The
question can only be resolved by reference to some supplemental principle,
like a mistrust of Congress's bona fides.
If the Court suspects that Congress is not remedying past constitutional
violations but is instead creating new rights that respond to Congress's
106. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
107. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 87, 136 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity,
and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 719-27 (2000). Justice Antonin
Scalia, for example, has recently taken the extraordinary step of publicly accusing Congress of
"increasingly abdicating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful to the
Constitution." Editorial, A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, at A22. Scalia
added:
My court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the court with the
presumption of constitutionality.... [But] if Congress is going to take the attitude that
it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the
Constitution... then perhaps that presumption is unwarranted.
Id.; see also Tony Mauro, Court Declares Constitutional War on Congress, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2000, at 5; Robert Stacy McCain, Scalia Disses Congress, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2000, at A6.
108. For a discussion of this logic in the context of race, see Charles Lawrence, "One More
River To Cross "-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New
Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 63 (Derrick
Bell ed., 1980).
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independent interpretation of Section 1, it might be tempted to apply the
congruence-and-proportionality test with the kind of strictness that it has
used in the context of suspect classifications to flush out improper
motivations.10 9 Such a result would be truly ironic. Not only would the
Court be treating Section 5 as a form of judicial power, it would be treating
Congress as less trustworthy than lower federal courts, which are accorded
broad discretion to remedy the current effects of past discrimination." 0
The family leave provisions of the FMLA can also be justified by
reference to the prophylactic principle. This is because "the legislative
history of the FMLA contains substantial evidence of gender discrimination
with respect to the granting of leave to state employees, and... it therefore
justifies the enactment of the FMLA as a prophylactic measure." '' Unlike
the remedial principle, which justifies R, as an effort to redress the effects
of past violations of Rj, the prophylactic principle justifies R, as an effort to
prevent or deter future violations of Rj.
The violations of Rj that would be at issue in applying the prophylactic
principle are not the old-fashioned, sex-based, labor-protective statutes that
we have discussed in the context of the remedial principle. The relevant
violations of Rj would instead be unconstitutional policies and practices that
extend maternity and early childcare leave to women, but not to men. These
practices make women more expensive as employees than men, and they
109. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995).
110. The Court's decisions concerning remedies for school segregation hold that if a school
district has been found guilty of a constitutional violation, persisting racial separation that is
otherwise constitutionally inoffensive is presumed to constitute an ongoing effect of the original
violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971); cf Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1979) (discussing the "affirmative duty" to
rebut the Swann "continuing systemwide effects" presumption (intcrnal quotation marks
omitted)); Owen M. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1974) (observing that the burden to rebut the Swann presumption "is a most difficult
one"). Although the Court in recent years has signaled that it will not penalize district courts for
rebutting this presumption, see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), it has never
repudiated either the Swann presumption or the "affirmative duty" established in Brinkman. The
Court has also accorded great remedial discretion to lower-court judges to find ways to locate and
eradicate prejudice and stereotyping. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279, 288 (1977);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16, 19, 25, 27, 30. If the Court were to recognize a similar need in the
context of Section 5 legislation, it would uphold the family leave provisions of the FMLA on the
remedial principle. It would presume the existence of a causal nexus between past
unconstitutional state statutes and subsequent disparate impacts, and it would accord Congress
great remedial discretion to find ways to locate and eradicate these impacts. But if the Court were
to apply the congruence-and-proportionality test to screen Section 5 legislation for inappropriate
motivation, it would deny Congress the very generous remedial authority that the Court has ceded
to federal courts. The irony of such an outcome would well illustrate the theoretical inadequacy of
the enforcement model.
111. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub
nom. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002). This was also the reasoning of
Judge Dennis's dissenting opinion in Kazmier v. Widmann. 225 F.3d 519, 549 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he FMLA was a rational means of deterring and preventing sex
discrimination by governmental employers and thus was enacted pursuant to [Congress's]
section 5 powers.").
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also reinforce the traditional stereotype that women ought to care for their
families more than men. These practices are almost certainly
unconstitutional. 
12
Insofar as the congruence-and-proportionality test is designed to protect
the separation-of-powers values advanced by the enforcement model, the
test should be applied to ask whether there is a sufficiently close connection
between Rj, which prohibit sex discrimination, and R,, which include twelve
weeks of unpaid family leave, to permit the conclusion that Congress was
actually trying to deter future violations of Rj. We believe that R, and R are
sufficiently connected to authorize this conclusion. Congress may
reasonably have concluded that it was not effective to deter future
violations of Rj simply by prohibiting sex discrimination in the provision of
family leave. Such prohibitions might encourage employers to provide less
leave to all employees or to eliminate their leave policies altogether, which
would disproportionately harm women. Persistent role stereotyping means
that women feel more compelled than men to care for ill family members,
and thus leave policies that are sex-neutral but inadequate would aggravate
the difficulties of women by forcing them more than men to choose
between family and work. If it is proper for Congress to prevent future
violations of Rj in a way that does not disproportionately harm women, then
it is proper for the FMLA to require a decent minimum amount of leave,
like twelve weeks.
Although this application of the prophylactic principle is consistent
with the abstract logic of the enforcement model, the same normative and
analytic difficulties arise as we have already discussed in the context of the
remedial argument. It is questionable whether a court, if confronted by a
plaintiff alleging unconstitutional sex discrimination in the distribution of
family leave, could order the FMLA's requirement that twelve weeks of
unpaid leave be extended to all employees. 13 We are therefore brought face
to face with the disparity between a court's equitable power to deter future
violations' 14 and a legislature's power to deter such violations. This
disparity not only raises the normative question of why constraints
applicable to Article III courts should be used to limit the legislative power
of Section 5, but also the analytic question of exactly when legislative
power should count as "deterring" violations of Rj.
112. Technically speaking, such classifications are unconstitutional unless supported by "an
exceedingly persuasive justification" to which they are "substantially related." United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. See, e.g., Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699, 717
(D. Md. 2002) (finding that equitable relief must be "necessary to prevent ... harm"). Something
like this insight must underlie the easy conclusion of McGregor and Thomson that the R, of the
FMLA cannot be justified as an exercise of Section 5 power. See supra note 95.
114. On a court's equitable power to deter future constitutional violations, see, for example,
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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The analytic indeterminacy of the enforcement model is most clearly
shown in the context of the Garrett requirement, which prevents Congress
from prophylactically preventing future violations of Rj unless it can first
identify "a history and pattern of unconstitutional... state
transgressions."' 15 There is evidence in the legislative record of the FMLA
that shows that both private- and public-sector employers offered maternity
leave policies about twice as frequently as they did paternity leave
policies.' 16 Given the heavy burden of proof that must be overcome to
115. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). We should note at
the outset that the FMLA was enacted long before Garrett's remarkable doctrine was announced,
and indeed before the Court had overturned its own precedent to hold that Congress could no
longer abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its commerce power. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). When the FMLA was enacted, any judicial
requirement that "Congress ... make specific factual findings" would have been regarded as "an
unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a co-ordinate branch of Government,"
warranted neither by "the Constitution nor our democratic tradition." See Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 43,
at 362-67. The Congress that enacted the FMLA could have had no inkling that the
constitutionality of its legislation would subsequently be made to turn on legislative findings of
state constitutional violations. The legislative record of the FMLA is accordingly quite sparse
when measured by the rule set forth in Garrett.
116. The Hibbs court summarized the legislative record regarding parental leave in this way:
The FMLA's legislative history reflects that a 1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics (the
"BLS") survey found that 37 percent of surveyed private-sector employees were
covered by "maternity" leave policies, while only 18 percent were covered by
"paternity" leave policies. S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 14-15, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 17. The numbers from a similar BLS survey the previous year were 33 percent and
16 percent, respectively. Id. Thus, while these data show that a larger percentage of
employees were covered in 1990 than in 1989, they also show a widening of the gender
gap in leave policy during the same period. In addition, while the BLS surveyed only
private employers, an extensive study of the private and public sectors done by the Yale
Bush Center Infant Care Leave Project revealed that "[t]he proportion and construction
of leave policies available to public sector employees differs little from those offered
private sector employees." The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcommittee on
Labor Standards of the Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 33 (1986)
(prepared statement of Meryl Frank, Director of the Yale Bush Center Infant Care
Leave Project); see also id. at 29-30 ("We did a survey of the public sector, a survey of
Federal employees, all 50 States, and of the military. We have studied small businesses,
mid-size businesses and large businesses to find out what they are offering.... We
found that public sector leaves don't vary very much from private sector leaves.")
(testimony of Meryl Frank, Director of the Yale Bush Center Infant Care Leave
Project).
Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 859 (alterations in original). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis of the Fifth
Circuit also surveyed the relevant legislative record:
It appears clear from the legislative history that Congress perceived sex
discrimination in the granting of family and medical leave, notably in favor of granting
such leave to women, and was acting accordingly in enacting the FMLA....
Testimony in hearings throughout the legislative process demonstrated that such
discrepancies occurred in both the private and public sectors. See, e.g., Parental and
Medical Leave Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 4300 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
Management Standards, 99th Cong., 30, 147 ... (statement of the Washington Council
for Lawyers that "men, both in the public and private sectors, receive notoriously
discriminatory treatment in their request for such leave."); Parental and Medical Leave
Act of 1987: Hearings on S.249 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and
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sustain overt gender classifications, this explicit distinction between men
and women by state employers would most probably violate the
Constitution.
The difficulty, however, is that the FMLA provides leave for
employees who are new parents and those who need to care for sick family
members in separate statutory sections.' 17 Whether or not the Garrett
requirement has been satisfied therefore requires a determination of
whether infringements of Rj documented in the legislative record of the
FMLA should be characterized as constitutional violations only in the
provision of parental leave, or instead as constitutional violations in the
provision of family-related leave more generally. This is not a question that
can be settled either by the Garrett requirement or by the enforcement
model. It is not a question that involves, much less imperils, any principle
of separation of powers.
It is, to put the matter bluntly, a question that turns on the sympathy
with which a court applying the enforcement model will regard Congress's
efforts to combat sex discrimination. Because the enforcement model does
not supply a basis for determining whether the prophylactic argument is
adequate, it is possible that the Court will decide the case on the basis of its
attitude toward the substantive civil rights agenda advanced by the FMLA.
The issue is whether the hostility to national antidiscrimination norms
expressed in Kimel and in Garrett will extend to the core area of sex
discrimination. 1 8 The scope of congressional power will depend upon
whether the Court applies to Section 5 legislation the same generous
Alcoholism, 100th Cong., 364-74 (testimony of Elaine Gordon, Member of the Florida
House of Representatives, that leave is only granted to female [public] employees in
Florida and that Florida rejected extending such leave to men); id. at 385 (testimony of
Gerald McEntee, International President, American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees that "the vast majority of our [public employment] contracts,
even though we look upon them with great pride, really cover essentially maternity
leave, and not paternity leave. And this is so key to the bill that it opens up the eyes of
employers and opens up the eyes of America."); Family and Medical Leave Act of
1989: Hearings on H.R. 770 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations,
101st Cong. 271 (statement of the Concerned Alliance of Responsible Employers that
13 states grant family leave to women and not men).
The House Report on the 1993 FMLA indicates that Congress was aware of such
testimony and at least partially relied on this testimony in enacting provisions of the
current FMLA. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 103-8(1) (1993) ("Meryl Frank, director of the
Infant Care Leave Project of the Yale Bush Center in Child Development and Social
Policy, reported to the committee on the 1986 conclusions and recommendations of the
Project's Advisory Committee on Infant Care Leave.").
Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 548 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted, third and fourth alterations in
original).
117. The question of parental leave is addressed in § 2612(a)(1)(A), whereas the family leave
provisions are found in § 2612(a)(1)(C). See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l)(A), (C) (2000).
118. See Rubenfeld, supra note 87 (arguing that many recent Rehnquist Court opinions that
are ostensibly rooted in constitutional doctrine may actually be motivated by an underlying
hostility to antidiscrimination law).
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presumptions that justify heightened scrutiny in the Court's own Section 1
jurisprudence, or instead expresses skepticism toward new forms of
antidiscrimination law and toward Congress's capacity to make
constitutional judgments.
III. THE FMLA AND THE RISE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW:
A SOCIAL MOVEMENT HISTORY
We have so far argued that the enforcement model suffers from grave,
one might almost say fatal, analytic deficiencies. Without offering a
theoretically cogent basis for decision, the model instructs courts to
invalidate Section 5 legislation that "interprets" the Constitution, but to
uphold Section 5 legislation that "enforces" the Constitution. It thus not
only allows unexamined policy preferences an unacceptably large role in
determining the constitutionality of the nation's civil rights laws, but it also
fails to implement the separation-of-powers values that are its own raison
d'etre.
Our primary case against the enforcement model, however, is more
fundamental. Even if judges could distinguish among Section 5 statutes as
the enforcement model directs, imposing such restrictions on legislative
constitutionalism would not conduce to the systemic well-being of our
constitutional order. This is because the connections between politics and
constitutional law that the enforcement model seeks to expunge have great
structural value.
To test the systemic assumptions of the enforcement model, we
reconstruct a recent chapter in modem constitutional history in which the
ERA was proposed by Congress to the states, the Court created modem
Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination doctrine, and Congress passed
the FMLA. By considering the connections among mobilized citizenry,
Congress, and the Court that gave rise to modem sex equality
jurisprudence, we demonstrate that core elements of the modem equal
protection tradition grew out of the kind of structural relationships the
Court now condemns. An encounter with this history suggests that the
enforcement model rests on a simplistic and sociologically implausible
conception of constitutional rights, and that it inadequately appreciates the
kinds of institutional relationships required to preserve the legitimacy of
constitutional governance in a democratic state.
A. The Enforcement Model and American Constitutionalism
The enforcement model would entrust the articulation of constitutional
law exclusively to courts. The model imagines constitutional law as
divorced from the project of democratic self-government except during the
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rare moments of ratification contemplated by Articles V and VII. The
model holds that once the political process has exhausted itself by ratifying
constitutional text, the authoritative meaning of that text should be
determined solely by the legal discipline and professional integrity
characteristic of courts. Constitutional law should not be corrupted by the
ephemeral and self-interested desires characteristic of legislative
processes. 119 At the root of the enforcement model thus lies a stark
dichotomy between constitutional law and politics. The model prohibits
congressional interpretation of the Constitution because it seeks to preserve
constitutional law from the contamination of politics.
There are circumstances when constitutional law requires protection
from politics, as we discuss in Part IV of our Article. But the enforcement
model is misguided to believe that constitutional law can or should be
hermetically insulated from constitutional politics. By examining the
genesis of the sex equality norm in our modem equal protection tradition,
we seek to demonstrate that the actual relationship between constitutional
law and constitutional politics is more complex and dialectical than the
enforcement model imagines.
Although the Constitution is a form of law, it is a very special kind of
law. Americans understand the Constitution to be both the kind of law that
courts declare and also the kind of law that conveys our deepest national
commitments. When the Court speaks for the Constitution, it often speaks
for the identity of the nation itself. Constitutional issues frequently involve
questions of profound political moment and controversy. This has important
consequences for understanding the relationship between constitutional law
and constitutional politics, for questions like school desegregation or
119. Thus we read in City ofBoerne v. Flores:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like
other acts, . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Marbury v.
Madison, I Cranch, at 177. Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle
that would limit congressional power. .. . Shifting legislative majorities could change
the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V.
521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (first alteration in original). Justice Scalia has expressed this idea quite
succinctly:
A democratic society does not, by and large, need constitutional guarantees to insure
that its laws will reflect "current values." Elections take care of that quite well. The
purpose of constitutional guarantees-and in particular those constitutional guarantees
of individual rights that are at the center of this controversy-is precisely to prevent the
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting the
Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the
society to devote to the subject the long and hard consideration required for a
constitutional amendment before those particular values can be cast aside.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989). For a full
discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 17-29.
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abortion are not to be settled merely by judicial decree.' As Woodrow
Wilson put it, "[T]he Constitution of the United States is not a mere
lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of
the age."' 2' Wilson reminds us that constitutional law is not solely a limit
on democratic will, but also its truest expression, and not merely at rare
moments of ratification.
That is why in America elected officials and ordinary citizens, as well
as judges and courtroom lawyers, regularly make claims about
constitutional law. Sometimes they follow the Court's reading of the
Constitution, and sometimes they mobilize vigorously to contest it.' 22 The
enforcement model prohibits Congress from exercising its Section 5 power
to represent the considered constitutional views of the American public on a
subject about which citizens may, and often do, have strong beliefs. The
model is premised on the juricentric assumption that passionate political
engagement is inconsistent with constitutional deliberation, rather than one
of its paradigmatic forms.
123
While Americans revere the Court and respect its authority to
pronounce constitutional law, they also expect their own constitutional
beliefs to matter, and will, in extraordinary circumstances, mobilize to
secure recognition of their views. In the American tradition, the authority of
120. For a discussion of how the Court's school desegregation decisions required the active
support of the political branches of the federal government in order to ensure their full realization,
see Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 27-31. For a discussion of how the Court's constitutional
understandings in the area of abortion have been modified in response to developments in the
nation's political culture, see NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED
GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996).
121. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69
(1908).
122. "In our constitutional tradition, a network of understandings about the Constitution as
text authorizes nonjuridical speakers to make claims about the Constitution that diverge from the
Court's. Americans act on these understandings through a variety of practices, including, but not
limited to, Article V amendments." Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (2001). Sanford Levinson
describes this body of understandings as the "Protestant" strain in the American constitutional
tradition. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27 (1988) (discussing "the legitimacy of
individual (or at least relatively nonhierarchical communitarian) interpretation as against the
claims of a specific, hierarchically organized institution"). Hendrik Hartog describes these
understandings as "a faith that the received meanings of constitutional texts will change when
confronted by the legitimate aspirations of autonomous citizens and groups." Hendrik Hartog, The
Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All, " 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1014
(1987); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (2000) ("What the American People have said and
done in the Constitution is often more edifying, inspiring, and sensible than what the Justices have
said and done in the case law.").
123. For a contrasting view of the Constitution, as arising out of the political life of the
nation, see, for example, 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
TUSHNET, supra note 14; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History ofthe Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); and Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001).
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the Constitution is sustained through attitudes of veneration and deference,
but it is also sustained through the quintessentially democratic attitude in
which citizens know themselves as authorities, as authors of their own
law.124 When citizens engage in constitutional interpretation, they enact the
Constitution's democratic authorship. Mobilizing over questions of
constitutional meaning performs the understanding that the Constitution is
yet, in fact, the People's.
Paradoxically, this form of decentered participation may well be an
important dimension of the Constitution's democratic authority--or at least
it may play as important a role in establishing the Constitution's authority
as the forms of top-down control that the Court would assert in its role as
"the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."'125  Contesting
constitutional questions may well produce fidelity to constitutional values
in ways that passive obedience to the Court will not. Constitutional
contestation is an immensely generative practice in which the nation
explores conflicting claims about the evolving meaning of its constitutional
values. Constitutional contestation is a bridge that links the constitutional
law enforced by officials in the legal system to norms that emerge from
institutions, understandings, and practices that are outside the formal legal
system but that are nevertheless part of the nation's constitutional culture. 1
26
The enforcement model imagines the Court as the sole expositor (or,
perhaps latently, as the sole author or sole arbiter) of constitutional law. But
in fact the Court's articulation of constitutional law is in continual dialogue
with the developing norms of American constitutional culture.12 7 In Section
124. Siegel, supra note 122, at 320.
125. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
126. One of us has previously argued:
Polyvocality in matters of constitutional interpretation regularly occurs in our
constitutional culture. When citizens engage in constitutional interpretation, they enact
and reinforce understandings of the Constitution's democratic authorship. The fact that
elected officials and ordinary citizens are making multiple and conflicting claims about
the Constitution's meaning need not be a threat to the Court's authority and, in our
democratic constitutional culture, may well be a necessary condition of it. If citizens
and elected officials concern themselves with constitutional questions, they are engaged
in a common enterprise with the Court, even when they are in disagreement with the
Court. Active engagement with constitutional questions may well produce fidelity to
constitutional values in ways that passive obedience to the Court's authority cannot.
Further, when the Constitution has multiple and socially dispersed interpreters, the
Court is likely to interpret the Constitution in ways that are informed by evolving
popular judgments about the Constitution and issue judgments that find support among
a diverse array of social actors. The fact that the Court must often decide cases in ways
that run against popular sentiment does not mean that it can dispense with the need for
popular support. In matters that genuinely arouse popular passions, the Court requires
popular engagement with constitutional questions to secure its authority.
Siegel, supra note 122, at 350-51 (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002) ("[M]ost
twentieth century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were driven by or in
response to the great identity-based social movements... of the twentieth century.").
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III.B we offer a case study of exactly how a mobilized citizenry can
generate changes in the nation's understanding of its own constitutional
law. Although no one case study can adequately address the full range of
relationships between constitutional law and politics, our hope is that the
history recounted in Section II.B will raise questions about the specific
structural implications of the enforcement model. Our purpose is to ask
what it would actually mean to shut down Congress as a focal point for
constitutional claims. The belief and expectation that a system is open
underwrites fidelity, energizes mobilization, funds creativity, and creates a
dynamic and responsive constitutional order. The enforcement model puts
these values at serious risk.
To understand how this might be so, we offer in Sections III.B and
III.C a case study of the FMLA that explores the Constitution as it lives
outside the courts, in social movements and in Congress. Our history is not
organized merely to answer the doctrinal question posed by the
enforcement model, which is whether Congress was enforcing the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution when it enacted the FMLA. Instead we
look behind that question, at the institutional relationships that give rise to
constitutional law, in order better to understand the connections between
constitutional law and constitutional politics.
Whereas the enforcement model would begin the constitutional story of
the FMLA in 1986, when Congress first held legislative hearings on the
statute, we instead locate the FMLA in the constitutional mobilization of
the second-wave feminist movement. Breaking the periodization that the
enforcement model would impose on the history of the FMLA gives us a
much richer picture of the constitutional claims to which the statute was
responsive; it also provides a highly relevant genealogy of the sex equality
norm that the FMLA seeks to vindicate. Examining this history allows us to
see how constitutional norms can migrate across institutions in our
constitutional order, from social movements to Congress to the Court. It
makes visible how the FMLA and Frontiero128 are each responses to the
same constitutional mobilization, but whereas the latter speaks in the
distinct accents of judicially enforceable rights, the former involves
Congress working out the meaning of a constitutional principle of equal
citizenship from a distinctly legislative standpoint.
B. Equal Citizenship and the Family
Although Americans have long understood themselves as committed to
principles of equality, they hold this commitment in the form of a long-
running debate about its practical implications. In what follows we offer a
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brief glimpse of events that changed the ways that Americans understood
constitutional values of equality during the 1970s and thereafter. These
events remind us that the nation's constitutional convictions are dynamic
because regularly contested, and they suggest the many ways in which
constitutional contestation can become a rich source of creativity in
constitutional culture.
Today the sex equality norm is so central a part of our Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence as to be unremarkable; but, of course, it only
came to be so as the result of a remarkable act of jurisgenesis that
transformed the way the nation understood its own constitutional
commitments. Working with a variety of resources inside and outside the
formal legal system-with principles, precedent, collective memory, social
movement organizing, the party system, congressional legislation,
constitutional lawmaking, and litigation-feminism in the 1970s helped to
change the meaning of the Constitution. Although constitutional theorists
endlessly debate the sources of constitutional law, searching for a rule of
recognition in official locations like Article V amendments or judicial
precedents that supply criteria for heightened scrutiny, we demonstrate in
this Section that constitutional law has also arisen from shifts in
fundamental constitutional values held by dominant segments of the
population and registered by legislative constitutionalism. These shifts are
propelled by common practices of popular political debate and
mobilization.
The change in constitutional law effected by the women's movement in
the 1970s represented a remarkably creative reinterpretation of existing
constitutional principles. This may be difficult to recognize in retrospect,
because the Court has since revised its understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause to incorporate so many of the movement's key claims.
But we can begin to appreciate the innovative quality of the movement's
constitutional advocacy when we focus on the aspects of its constitutional
vision that the Court has refused to incorporate into law. Few now recall
that in the 1960s and 1970s, even the so-called liberal wing of the women's
movement understood equal citizenship in terms of an antidiscrimination
principle that authorized far-reaching structural change in the name of
"equal opportunity." In advancing the claim that women should be treated
as equals of men, the movement argued that those with family
responsibilities should be entitled to participate on the same terms as all
others in the core activities of citizenship, including work, education, and
politics.
Although the Court has never been particularly receptive to this
constitutional vision of equal opportunity, it did prove highly influential
with Congress, which in the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century
repeatedly legislated to support it. This constitutional vision in fact
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ultimately gave rise to the FMLA itself. Reconstructing the history that
links the FMLA to the constitutional advocacy of second-wave feminism
illuminates the multifaceted process through which the nation considers and
revises its constitutive understandings of equality; at the same time, it
demonstrates the institutionally differentiated ways in which Congress and
the Court engage in constitutional lawmaking.
We begin our story in the 1960s, when longtime women's rights
advocates made common cause with a new generation of activists emerging
out of the labor movement, the civil rights movement, and the antiwar
movement. 129 In conversations at work, on campuses, and at dinner tables
across the United States, feminists often disagreed about the conditions of
women's subordination, but there were certain matters about which they
spoke with near unanimity. A core premise of the emergent feminist
movement was that women's claim to equal rights with men entailed a
challenge to the social organization of the family. 130
In 1966, for example, when the National Organization for Women
(NOW) first formed to secure enforcement of the sex discrimination
provisions of the nation's new employment discrimination laws,' it
adopted an inaugural Statement of Purpose that expressed the
organization's commitment to "true equality for all women in America, and
129. On the labor movement, see SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS
IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 14-52 (1998) [hereinafter HARTMANN, OTHER FEMINISTS]. On
the civil rights movement, see SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 24-101 (Vintage Books 1980)
(1979). See also FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA SINCE 1960, at 69-75 (1991); SUSAN HARTMANN, FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM:
AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS SINCE 1960, at 24-41 (1989); RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD
SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 95-115 (Penguin
Books 2001) (2000). On the antiwar movement, see DAVIS, supra, at 76-77; ALICE ECHOLS,
DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967-1975, at 103-37 (1989); JO
FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING SOCIAL
MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 56-62 (1975); and ROSEN, supra, at
115-24.
130. This critique of the family is visible in foundational movement texts, such as Betty
Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, first published in 1963. On Friedan's account, the work of
family maintenance presupposes the dependence, exclusion, and nonparticipation of half the
society's adult members. Friedan observed:
A woman cannot find her identity through others her husband, her children. She
cannot find it in the dull routine of housework: ... The feminine mystique prescribes
just such a living death for women....
The feminine mystique has succeeded in burying millions of American women
alive. There is no way for these women to break out of their comfortable concentration
camps except by finally putting forth an effort-that human effort which reaches
beyond biology, beyond the narrow walls of the home, to help shape the future.
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 336-37 (Dell Publ'g 1983) (1963).
131. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES,
1945-1968, at 192-96 (1988).
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toward a fully equal partnership of the sexes."' 132 Although at that time there
were many overtly discriminatory practices that an organization seeking sex
equality in employment might target for protest, 133 NOW chose to
emphasize that genuine equality of opportunity in employment would
require new and innovative approaches to family life. NOW's founding
documents invited Americans to reimagine the social organization of the
family so that women's participation in family relations would no longer
constitute an impediment to their participation in public life:
WE BELIEVE that this nation has a capacity at least as great
as other nations, to innovate new social institutions which will
enable women to enjoy true equality of opportunity and
responsibility in society, without conflict with their responsibilities
as mothers and homemakers.... We do not accept the traditional
assumption that a woman has to choose between marriage and
motherhood, on the one hand, and serious participation in industry
or the professions on the other. We question the present expectation
that all normal women will retire from job or profession for 10 or
15 years, to devote their full time to raising children, only to reenter
the job market at a relatively minor level. This in itself, is a
deterrent to the aspirations of women, to their acceptance into
management or professional training courses, and to the very
possibility of equality of opportunity or real choice, for all but a
few women. Above all, we reject the assumption that these
problems are the unique responsibility of each individual women,
[sic] rather than a basic social dilemma which society must solve.
True equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for women
132. NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE (1966), reprinted in FEMINIST
CHRONICLES, 1953-1993, at 159, 159 (Toni Carabillo et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter FEMINIST
CHRONICLES] [hereinafter NOW STATEMENT OF PURPOSE].
133. It was, after all, only three years after Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, see DAVIS,
supra note 129, at 37, prohibiting the common practice of paying men and women different
amounts for the same work. The EEOC had yet to enforce the sex discrimination provisions of the
newly enacted Civil Rights Act, id. at 22-24, employers still openly advertised jobs by sex, id. at
59-60, and state labor-protective laws commonly required employers to treat male and female
workers differently in a wide variety of employment contexts, id. at 31-32. State legislation still
regulated the kinds of jobs women could hold, the number of hours they could work, the
conditions in which they worked (barring night work for example), and the wages they received.
This tradition of regulation greatly amplified the gender segregation of the labor force. See JUDITH
A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR
LEGISLATION 42-69 (1978); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 19-63 (2001); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 180-214 (1982); SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR
WOMEN, 1905-1925, at 41-93 (1987); see also LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 72 (1998) (discussing how racial
exclusions made protective labor legislation mark the different identities and positions of white
and black women with respect to wage labor). For a history of the debate over sex-based
protective labor legislation between progressive female reformers and feminist advocates of the
ERA, see NANCY F. COT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 117-42 (1987).
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requires such practical, and possible innovations as a nationwide
network of child-care centers, which will make it unnecessary for
women to retire completely from society until their children are
grown, and national programs to provide retraining for women who
have chosen to care for their own children full-time.
1 34
Remarkably, even as women were organizing to demand equal
enforcement of Title VII's employment discrimination provisions, NOW
insisted that antidiscrimination laws alone were insufficient to secure "true
equality of opportunity" for women. True equality of opportunity required
institutional innovation of the sort that could alleviate the conflict "between
marriage and motherhood, on the one hand, and serious participation in
industry or the professions on the other." This conflict, NOW argued, was
not the "responsibility of each individual woman," but instead was "a basic
social dilemma which society must solve" with institutional innovations
such as childcare and programs for retraining caregivers who have
withdrawn from the labor force. Society needed to eliminate structural
impediments to women's participation in the labor market before it could
make good on its claim to give women an equal opportunity to compete for
market opportunities with men.
NOW's Statement of Purpose thus tied a claim of fight to a claim about
social structure: Vindicating women's right to equality with men required
transforming the social organization of the family. The bundling of the two
claims is characteristic. As Jane Mansbridge has observed of the women's
movement in this era, "Most... women's groups... pushed for reforms-
like day-care centers, shared housework, and legal abortion-that would
help women cast off their traditional role of full-time homemaker and join
the paid labor force." 135 For the second-wave feminist movement, women's
emancipation required fundamental changes in the structure of family
life. 1
36
The movement made this vision the centerpiece of its inaugural
demonstrations. On August 26, 1970, the movement staged a mass strike on
the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment,
134. NOW STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, supra note 132, at 161-62 (emphasis added).
135. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 99-100 (1986). On the range of
women's groups advocating that the polity assume some form of collective responsibility for
childcare in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see LAURI UMANSKY, MOTHERHOOD RECONCEIVED:
FEMrNISM AND THE LEGACIES OF THE SIXTIES 46-50 (1996).
136. For example, when the women in Students for a Democratic Society set out an advocacy
agenda in the summer of 1967, the agenda included: "communal childcare, wide dissemination of
contraceptives, easily available abortions, and equal sharing of housework." FREEMAN, supra note
129, at 58. For a widely circulating critique of the family of the era, see Pat Mainardi, The Politics
of Housework, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 447 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970). For a rich account of the
many voices in which the second-wave movement addressed the institution of motherhood, see
UMANSKY, supra note 135.
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which it dubbed a Women's Strike for Equality. The one-day strike was
staged in some forty cities across the nation under the rallying cry of "Equal
Rights Now!, 137 to publicize three core movement claims: "(1) free
abortion on demand, (2) free 24-hour childeare centers, and (3) equal
opportunity in jobs and education."' 38
The strike demands were structurally interconnected. Their functional
interrelationship was so transparent that even Newsweek's
contemporaneous account of the strike emphasized as much: "job and
educational equality, free child-care to allow them to take advantage of
that, and free abortions on demand."'' 39 Eleanor Holmes Norton, then
chairwoman of the New York City Commission on Human Rights,
explained the logic of the strike's demands in this way: "My mandate to
enforce the law against sex discrimination is an empty mandate unless
women can have twenty-four-hour day-care centers to leave their children
while they work."' 140 The strike's three-prong demands communicated the
simple message that equal educational and employment opportunity
required for its realization transformation of the conditions in which women
bore and raised children. 141
137. Haynes Johnson, "'Equal Rights Now," Exhort Women Protesters, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 1970, at Al.
138. Judy Klemesmd, A Hersiory-Making Event, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 6, 14. On the strike, see FREEMAN, supra note 129, at 84-85; ROSEN, supra note
129, at 92-93; and Bonnie J. Dow, Spectacle, Spectatorship, and Gender Anxiety in Television
News Coverage of the 1970 Women's Strike.for Equality, 50 COMM. STUD. 143 (1999).
139. The Women Who Know Their Place, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1970, at 16, 18 (emphasis
added); see also DAVIS, supra note 129, at 114-16.
140. The Talk of the Town: Liberation, NEW YORKER, Sept. 5, 1970, at 25, 27.
141. The same understandings structure the Bill of Rights that NOW promulgated in 1968,
which opens with a demand for ratification of the ERA and closes with demands for reproductive
rights:
1. That the United States Congress immediately pass the Equal Rights Amendment to
the Constitution to provide that "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex" and that such then be
immediately ratified by the several States.
II. That equal employment opportunity be guaranteed to all women, as well as men by
insisting that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforce the prohibitions
against sex discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 with the same vigor as it enforces the prohibitions against racial discrimination.
Ill. That women be protected by law to insure their rights to return to their jobs within a
reasonable time after childbirth without loss of seniority or other accrued benefits and
be paid maternity leave as a form of social security and/or employee benefit.
IV. Immediate revision of tax laws to permit the deduction of home and child care
expenses for working parents.
V. That child care facilities be established by law on the same basis as parks, libraries
and public schools adequate to the needs of children, from the pre-school years through
adolescence, as a community resource to be used by all citizens from all income levels.
VI. That the right of women to be educated to their full potential equally with men be
secured by Federal and State legislation, eliminating all discrimination and segregation
by sex, written and unwritten, at all levels of education including college, graduate and
professional schools, loans and fellowships and Federal and State training programs,
such as the job Corps.
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The structure of the movement's constitutional argument was, however,
more complex. Its decision to stage its inaugural strike on the fiftieth
anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification located strike
demands in a constitutional framework. In an era when the Court had not
yet recognized sex discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,
or accorded constitutional protections to the abortion right, the strikers
invoked the Nineteenth Amendment to assert that women had a
constitutional right to equal citizenship with men. The Nineteenth
Amendment represented an especially crucial source of constitutional
authority because it was the only constitutional text or history that explicitly
recognized men and women as equal citizens. Yet even as the strikers
invoked the collective memory of the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification,
they did not specifically appeal to the Nineteenth Amendment as law.
Instead they pointed to the suffrage Amendment as a frame of reference, a
point of origin, the beginning of a journey. 42 The strike's message was that
a half-century after the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification, the right to
vote had not proven adequate to make women equal citizens with men.
The strike embraced such a demanding vision of equal citizenship that
not even the Equal Rights Amendment, whose ratification the movement
now sought, 143 could satisfy it. As strike organizer Betty Friedan observed,
I assumed that [the ERA] would pass by Aug. 26 .... They
had to throw us some kind of bone. But if they think that this means
they can keep us quiet and off the streets, they're wrong. The
amendment doesn't begin to deal with the three demands of the
strike.'"
VII. The right of women in poverty to secure job training, housing and family
allowances on equal terms with men, but without prejudice to a parent's right to remain
at home to care for his or her children; revision of welfare legislation and poverty
programs which deny women dignity, privacy and self respect.
VII1. The right of women to control their own reproductive lives by removing from
penal codes the laws limiting access to contraceptive information and devices and laws
governing abortion.
NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, BILL OF RIGHTS IN 1968, reprinted in FEMINIST CHRONICLES, supra
note 132, at 214, 214.
142. For contemporaneous reports on the strike that interpreted its use of collective memory
in such terms, see, for example, Claudia Levy & Ken Ringle, Women Resume Old Fight for
Equality, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1970, at AI0; and Myra MacPherson, A Haif-Century of Suffrage
for Women, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1970, at B).
143. The House enacted the ERA in the weeks before the strike, but at the time of the strike
its fate in the Senate remained unclear. The Women Who Know Their Place, supra note 139, at 18.
President Nixon issued a statement in which he was described as "prepared to sign an equal rights
amendment if it reache[d] his desk." Johnson, supra note 137.
144. Klemesrud, supra note 138, at 16.
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In demanding "Equal Rights Now" in childcare and abortion, 145 as well as
in education and employment, the strike emphasized that women would not
secure equal citizenship with men until family life was organized on terms
that presupposed the equal participation of both its adult members in public
life.
The movement argued that ratifying the ERA was not itself enough to
secure equal citizenship for women, just as enforcing Title VII was not
145. The movement talked about abortion in the language of equal rights throughout the late
1960s and into the era of the strike. Once the ERA was reported out of Congress, feminists
seemed primarily to talk about abortion in the discourse of privacy, in order to litigate the question
under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and to protect the ERA from the abortion
controversy. In this early period, however, plaintiffs and amici made sex equality arguments in
several cases challenging abortion statutes. See Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights for Women,
Inc. at 11-12, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84) (arguing that the statute denies
women, as a class, the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in that it
restricts their opportunity to pursue higher education, to earn a living through purposeful
employment, and, in general, to decide their own future, as men are so permitted, and also arguing
that the abortion statute violates the Thirteenth Amendment, on grounds that "[t]here is nothing
morc dcmanding upon the body and pcrson of a woman than prcgnancy, and the subsequent
feeding and caring of an infant until it has reached maturity some eighteen years later"); Brief of
Amici Curiae Joint Washington Office for Social Concern et al. at 10-i1, Vuitch (No. 84) (arguing
that the abortion statute discriminates against women in violation of their right to equal
protection).
Then-attorney Nancy Steams offered an especially sophisticated rendering of the equality
claim, in Nineteenth Amendment as well as Fourteenth Amendment terms:
[T]he Nineteenth Amendment sought to reverse the previous inferior social and
political position of women: denial of the vote represented maintenance of the dividing
line between women as part of the family organization only and women as independent
and equal citizens in American life. The Nineteenth Amendment recognized that
women are legally free to take part in activity outside the home. But the abortion laws
imprison women in the home without free individual choice. The abortion laws, in their
real practical effects, deny the liberty, and equality of women to participate in the wider
world, an equality which is demanded by the Nineteenth Amendment.
First Amended Complaint at 6-7, Women of Rhode Island v. Israel (D.R.I. June 22, 1971) (No.
4605) [hereinafter Women of Rhode Island Complaint]. In Roe v. Wade itself Steams submitted
an amicus brief challenging the Georgia and Texas abortion statutes in explicit sex equality terms
on Fourteenth Amendment, due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment grounds. There
she argued, with respect to the due process claim, that "restrictive laws governing abortion such as
those of Texas and Georgia are a manifestation of the fact that men are unable to see women in
any role other than that of mother and wife." See Brief of Amici Curiae New Women Lawyers et
al. at 24, 32, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18). She further argued, with respect to
the equal protection claim, that "laws such as the abortion laws presently before this court in fact
insure that women never will be able to function fully in the society in a manner that will enable
them to participate as equals with men in making the laws which control and govern their lives,"
id. at 32, and she contended, with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, that
[s]uch punishment involves not only an indeterminate sentence and a loss of citizenship
rights as an independent person... [and] great physical hardship and emotional
damage "disproportionate" to the "crime" of participating equally in sexual activity
with a man... but is punishment for her "status" as a woman and a potential child-
bearer.
Id. at 42; see also Brief for Plaintiffs, Abramowicz v. Letkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (No. 69 Civ. 4469) (attacking New York abortion laws under a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim, and asserting that abortion laws are "both a result and symbol of the unequal
treatment of women that exists in this society"), cited in DIANE SCHULDER & FLORYNCE
KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP 218 (1971).
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itself enough to secure equal employment opportunity for women. The
movement's insistence that it was not possible to secure equality for women
without fundamental changes in family life reverberated within the debates
over the ERA-so much so that in the imagination of contemporaries, the
ERA was sometimes identified with the changes in family structure
feminists were seeking. Opponents of the ERA, like opponents of the
Nineteenth Amendment, often understood themselves as defending
traditional family roles. 146 In the end, the movement grounded its vision of
equal citizenship in the memory of the Nineteenth Amendment's
ratification and in the hope of the ERA's ratification, all the while making
plain that more was required to realize equal citizenship between the sexes.
By staging the strike and then reconvening successive mass actions to
memorialize the occasion,' 47 the movement succeeded in marking August
146. Popular discussion of the ERA was conducted as a debate over the traditional family
form. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 135, at 105-12. It was not only Phyllis Schlafly who viewed
the ERA as threatening traditional family roles. Senator Samuel James Ervin, Jr., Democrat of
North Carolina, led opposition to the ERA in the Senate. He defended traditionalist views of
womanhood, claiming that the ERA was a "declaration of war on homemakers," would leave
women unprotected in the workplace, and would lead to such horrible results as integrated
restrooms and women serving in combat. DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SI{ERRON DE HART,
SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA 47-50 (1990).
In an internal Justice Department memorandum authored in 1970, then-Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist advised Leonard Garment, a special consultant to President Nixon,
that the ERA would threaten the family. Rehnquist observed that the "consequences of a
doctrinaire insistence upon rigid equality between men and women cannot be determined with
certainty, but the results appear almost certain to have an adverse effect on the family unit as we
have known it," characterizing the "overall implication" of the ERA as "nothing less than the
sharp reduction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination of that unit by no
means improbable." Memorandum from William Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, to
Leonard Garment, Special Counsel to the President, reprinted in Rehnquist: ERA Would Threaten
Family Unit, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 1986, at 4. Discussing the impact of the ERA on coverture
domicile rules, Rehnquist warned that the ERA threatened the transformation of "holy wedlock"
into "holy deadlock." Id. Rehnquist seemed to derive an understanding of the ERA's legal effects
at least in part from a judgment about the aims of the movement supporting the constitutional
amendment. Of the ERA's supporters, he advised Garment:
I cannot help thinking that there is also present somewhere within this movement a
virtually fanatical desire to obscure not only legal differentiation between men and
women, but insofar as possible, physical distinctions between the sexes. I think there
are overtones of dislike and distaste for the traditional difference between men and
women in the family unit, and in some cases very probably a complete rejection of the
woman's traditionally different role in this regard.
Id. Rehnquist testified ambivalently in support of the ERA for the Nixon Administration. See infra
note 177.
There are remarkable structural similarities in the ways that the family figured in debates
over the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment. In each case opponents of constitutional reform
argued that amending the Constitution to recognize women as equal citizens with men would
undermine traditional family relationships. In both debates, opponents of constitutional reform
were more insistent about the connections between Constitution and family than were proponents
of reform, who tended to speak (whether for reasons of prudence or principle) in terms of the
equal citizenship principle. For an analysis of debates over the family in the legislative history of
the Nineteenth Amendment,. see Reva B. Siegel, She the People. The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 977-1006 (2002).
147. See infra note 151.
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26th as a day of historic moment in the struggle for constitutional equality
between the sexes. Remarkably, Nixon's presidential proclamation
recognizing Women's Rights Day148 captures the complex character of the
movement's "Nineteenth Amendment" claim. It emphasizes that "[a]s
significant as the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was, it was not
cause for ending women's efforts to achieve their full rights in our society.
Rather, it brought an increased awareness of other rights not yet
realized."'149  The Proclamation also cautiously endorses movement
demands for reforms that would alleviate conflicts between work and the
family: "Although every woman may not desire a career outside the home,
every woman should have the freedom to pursue whatever career she
wishes."15
Bella Abzug forcefully invoked these themes when she sought to have
Congress recognize a Women's Equality Day,' 5 1 which it did in 1973 and
148. On August 26, 1972, President Nixon issued Proclamation 4147, Women's Rights Day,
which stated, in part:
Fifty-two years ago the Secretary of Statc issued a proclamation dcclaring the
addition of the Nineteenth Amendment to our Constitution. That act marked the
culmination of a long struggle by the women of this country to achieve the basic right
to participate in our electoral process.
As significant as the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was, it was not
cause for ending women's efforts to achieve their full rights in our society. Rather, it
brought an increased awareness of other rights not yet realized.
In recent years there have been great strides in extending the protection of the law
to the rights of women, and in promoting equal opportunities for women. Today more
women than ever before serve in policy-making positions in the executive branch of
our Government. Throughout the Nation, in State and local government and in the
private sphere women are playing a more active role.
Although every woman may not desire a career outside the home, every woman
should have the freedom to pursue whatever career she wishes. Although women today
have a greater opportunity to do that, we still must do more to ensure women every
opportunity to make the fullest contribution to our progress as a Nation.
Proclamation No. 4147, reprinted in 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286, 1286-87 (Aug. 26,
1972) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 4147] (emphasis added). That Nixon memorialized
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment through proclamation was most immediately due to the
work of Virginia Allan, who chaired the President's Task Force on Women's Rights and
Responsibilities, a committee charged with "review[ing] the present status of women in our
society and recommend[ing] what might be done in the future to further advance their
opportunities." 117 CONG. REC. 30,158 (1971). The committee issued a report in April 1970,
entitled A Matter of Simple Justice, the many recommendations of which included one directing
the President to "[c]all a White House conference on women's rights and responsibilities in 1970,
the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the suffrage amendment and establishment of the
Women's Bureau." PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, A
MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, at iv (1976).
149. Proclamation No. 4147, supra note 148, at 1287 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. In 1972, the House and Senate were considering a joint resolution requesting President
Nixon to mark August 26th as a national holiday, which he did. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text. During floor debates in the House, Abzug talked about the importance of
commemorating the occasion as one crucial victory in the continuing journey toward women's
equality:
August 26 has a dual significance. It is the anniversary of the date 52 years ago
when women, a majority of the Nation, won the right to vote after a struggle that took
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1974.152 Abzug celebrated enactment of the ERA, called for its ratification,
but then warned, "[ W]e are not deluding ourselves that mere passage of an
amendment or declaration of a special day will wipe out discrimination. We
know this is a continuing struggle."'53 Abzug thereupon described the
project of "wip[ing] out discrimination" in terms that included a long list of
family-related reforms-with her list of equal citizenship demands
functioning as a working agenda for the Ninety-Second Congress:
Women are rightly concerned with elimination of all forms of
discrimination, with equal pay and job opportunity, equal job
training and promotion, professional recognition and advancement,
with universally available child care programs that are so
necessary for the millions of working women who have young
children, with the accessibility of birth control information, repeal
of antiquated abortion laws, elimination of inequalities from the
social security system and divorce and credit laws, and with equal
representation in the political institutions of the Nation, including
this Congress.
15 4
three-fourths of a century. It is also the date that marks the renaissance of a national
women's movement. Two years ago, on the 50th anniversary of women's suffrage,
women declared a nationwide strike to dramatize their demands.
In New York next Friday, thousands of women will gather for the third successive
year to march down Fifth Avenue in a women's strike for justice and equality.... All
over the country, similar actions will be taking place.
118 CoNG. REc. 29,139 (1972) (statement of Rep. Abzug).
152. Congress enacted Public Law 93-105, a joint resolution "[aluthorizing the President to
proclaim August 26, 1973, as Women's Equality Day":
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That August 26, 1973, is designated as "Women's
Equality Day," and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation in
commemoration of that day in 1920 on which the women of America were first
guaranteed the right to vote.
Women's Equality Day Designation Authorization, Pub. L, No. 93-105, 87 Stat. 350, 350 (1973).
The following year Congress enacted Public Law 93-382, a resolution that tracked the language of
Public Law 93-105. Women's Equality Day Designation Authorization, Pub. L. No. 93-382, 88
Stat. 633 (1974).
153. 118 CONG. REC. 29,139 (1972) (statement of Rep. Abzug) (emphasis added).
154. Id. (emphasis added). Abzug was instrumental in pushing the Ninety-Second Congress's
women's rights agenda. Inserted at the conclusion of her address in the Congressional Record, at
her request, is a list of women's rights bills that she had introduced. These bills illustrate the
character of the movement's constitutional equality claim in this era, and the extent to which it
focused on the family. Id. at 29,140. In particular, Abzug's H.R. 14,715, the Abortion Rights Act
of 1972, illustrates contemporary views of the constitutional rights at stake in the abortion debate,
as well as Congress's power to enforce constitutional rights more generally. As constitutional
grounds for the bill that would have "finally and completely affirn[ed] the right of every
American woman to choose whether or not she will be the mother of a child," Abzug emphasized
both autonomy and equality values. Id. at 15,327 (statement of Rep. Abzug). Abzug located
women's fundamental right to choose within "a constitutional right of privacy," one of the
penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights, and concluded that this right is "fundamental and
binding upon the States under the due process clause of the 14th amendment." Id. at 15,330.
Moreover, "[e]ven if such a right does not exist, State abortion laws are applied in a manner which
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Here as elsewhere, Abzug hammered home the strike's core message: The
ERA alone could not secure equal citizenship for women. For women to
participate as men's equals in the traditional relations of citizenship-in
work, in education, and in politics-it was necessary to change the
conditions in which Americans bore and raised children.
During its Ninety-Second Session, Congress responded to the
constitutional demands of the women's movement by enacting a bundle of
federal protections for women's rights that were without precedent in
American history. Not only did Congress pass the ERA in March 1972,'
but it also drew upon its Section 5 power to apply the employment
discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the states,
emphasizing the urgency of combating sex discrimination 156 although the
Court had not yet declared such discrimination subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
5 7
The Ninety-Second Congress also prohibited sex discrimination in all
educational programs receiving federal funds,15 8 and it enacted a veritable
violates the equal protection clause" by discriminating against the poor. Id. Invoking Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in a detailed exploration of the robust nature of Congress's
power under Section 5 to enforce the guarantees set forth in the Section, Abzug concluded:
Thus, Congress has the power to enact this legislation, which would strike down
State criminal abortion laws, if it can reasonably find that those laws, either on their
face or as applied, violate the constitutional rights of individuals subject to them. I
believe that State abortion statutes violate both the due process and the equal protection
clauses of the 14th amendment.
118 CONG. REc. 15,329 (1972) (statement of Rep. Abzug). It bears observing that Abzug's
abortion argument is predominantly cast in the language of privacy, not equality (except insofar as
she is discussing class inequality); in the years before the ERA was reported out of Congress, the
movement seems to have spoken more confidently about abortion in the language of equality. Cf
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
155. The Senate passed the ERA by a vote of 84-8 and sent it on to the states for ratification
on March 22, 1972. 118 CONG. REC. 9598 (1972); see also MANSBRIDGE, supra note 135, at 12.
156. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103,
103 (extending Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment to the states); H.R.
REP. No. 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141 ("Discrimination
against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be
accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination."); see
also S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 7-8 (1971).
157. See infra notes 267-269 and accompanying text.
158. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373-74
(adding Title IX, which prohibited sex discrimination in all education programs receiving federal
funds). Title IX was enacted to expand the protections of both Titles VI (access to educational
opportunities) and VII (employment) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, Title IX
extended Title VI's antidiscrimination protections to cover discrimination on the basis of sex and
closed a loophole in Title VII, extending its sex discrimination in employment protections to
educational facilities receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to track
and extend Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 523-30 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694-96, 704 (1979). While
Congress invoked the Spending Clause to authorize Title IX, the Supreme Court has since left
open the possibility that Congress was also relying on powers derived from Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992)
(choosing not to reach the question of whether Congress relied on its Section 5 powers in addition
to its Spending Clause powers when it enacted Title IX). For a recent treatment of Title IX's
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cornucopia of legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in public- and
private-sector transactions. 59 In this same session, Congress enacted
childcare legislation plainly responsive to movement demands for reforms
that would alleviate conflicts between work and family.
60
It was to this burst of lawmaking that a plurality of the Court pointed
when it took the first steps toward declaring sex a "suspect" classification
under the Equal Protection Clause in the 1973 case of Frontiero v.
Richardson:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has
itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based
classifications. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor
union, or other organization subject to the provisions of the Act
shall discriminate against any individual on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act "shall
discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex." And § 1
of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22,
1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification,
declares that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon
sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal
branch of Government is not without significance to the question
legislative history, see Christopher Paul Reuscher, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions To
Reform Title I's Inequitable Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 AKRON L. REv. 117,
119-21 (2001).
159. See, e.g., State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122, 86
Stat. 919, 932 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the disbursement of federal funds
for fiscal assistance to state and local governments); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 13, 86 Star. 816, 903 (prohibiting sex discrimination
in any program or activity receiving federal funds under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
or the Environmental Financing Act); Act of Oct. 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-496, § 3, 86 Stat. 813,
813-14 (expanding the mandate of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a study group on the
problems faced by minorities established by Congress in 1957, to include sex discrimination); Act
of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L No. 92-187, §§ 1-3, 85 Stat. 644, 644 (amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108,
5924, and 7152 of Title 5 of the United States Code so as to equalize employment benefits for
married female federal employees); Nurses Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-158, § 11, 85
Star. 465, 479-80 (amending Title VIII of the Public Health Services Act to prohibit sex
discrimination in admissions to all training programs for health professionals receiving funds
under these Titles); Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157,
§ 101, 85 Stat. 431, 461 (amending Title VII of the Public Health Services Act to prohibit the
Secretary from providing grants, loan guarantees, interest subsidy payments, or other contracts
under the title to medical and health-related schools and training centers that discriminate in
admissions on the basis of sex); Act of Aug. 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-65, §§ 112, 214, 85 Stat. 166,
168, 173 (prohibiting sex discrimination in access to all programs or activities funded under the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 and the Appalachian Regional
Development Act of 1965). For further discussion of these and other sex equality legislative
initiatives of the Ninety-Second Congress, see FREEMAN, supra note 129, at 202-04.
160. See infra Subsection III.C.1.
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presently under consideration. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S.
112, 240, 248-249 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and
Marshall, JJ.); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 648-649
(1966).161
From the standpoint of traditional, court-focused constitutionalism,
nothing of moment happened until a plurality of the Court made this
pronouncement in Frontiero-or perhaps until a full Court ratified the need
for elevated scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.162 Indeed, from the standpoint of a
certain kind of constitutional formalism, nothing of moment ever happened;
the Burger Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause was no substitute for the failed ratification of the ERA.
From the standpoint of constitutional culture, however, something
momentous did happen before Frontiero and Craig-a mobilization that
generated a historic shift in the nation's constitutional beliefs.
As the legislative record of the Ninety-Second Congress testifies,
Americans came to understand differently the meaning of equal citizenship
between the sexes, and they associated this changed understanding of the
equal citizenship norm with certain reforms in the structure of work and
family life. How did the movement generate this new constitutional
understanding of men and women as equal citizens? The women's
movement demanded "Equal Rights Now" with resources to hand: It
invoked the collective memory of the struggle for enfranchisement to give
its equal rights claims constitutional foundation, 163 drawing on the
Nineteenth Amendment until its constitutional vision had sufficient
authority to generate new forms of positive constitutional law. 164 And it
161. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (footnotes
omitted, third emphasis added, alterations in original).
162. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
163. On the concept of collective memory, see Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the
Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About "The Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex
Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 163-66 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1999). See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY 203-15 (1998); IWONA IRWTN-ZARECKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE
DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY (1994); Susan A. Crane, Writing the Individual Back into
Collective Memory, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 1372 (1997); Special Issue, Memory and Counter-
Memory, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1989. Feminists pointed toward the Nineteenth Amendment
as a basis for asserting that women were on a journey toward equal citizenship with men-a
journey feminists evoked by diverse means. They referenced this journey by recovering the oral
histories and personal testimonials of surviving suffragists, see, e.g., supra note 142 and
accompanying text, by staging the strike on August 26th, securing recognition of August 26th as a
national holiday called Women's Equality Day, and performing parades in suffrage whites.
164. The movement tended to view the Nineteenth Amendment within an incrementalist or
stage theory of history, as but the first constitutional acknowledgment that women were equal
citizens. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Consistent with this historicist approach, the
movement typically invoked the Nineteenth Amendment within a collective memory framework.
Through the strike and iconography of the parades and other narrative and performative devices,
the movement enacted a constitutional sisterhood across the generations. In this way the
movement sought to draw on the Nineteenth Amendment's constitutional authority and extend it
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1997
The Yale Law Journal
used techniques of mass action, staged for visual and print media,1 65 to
endow its constitutional claims with persuasive force.
66
The Strike for Equality transformed the commemoration of women's
enfranchisement into a wide-ranging and provocative commentary on
relations between the sexes. The threat of women engaging in a nationwide
strike on the anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification seems
initially to have prompted mirth tinged with anxiety (what if women simply
stopped doing what women do?)-a tonal instability for which the
movement itself bears some responsibility. In this constitutional
into new forms of constitutional law-an endeavor in which the movement would seem to have
succeeded. There were, however, some who viewed the Nineteenth Amendment as a source of
law that was adequate to support the second-wave movement's constitutional claims. See, e.g.,
W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History and a New Approach to the
Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26, 46-53 (1970) (arguing that the Nineteenth
Amendment itself supplies a textual basis for the constitutional sex-equality norm); see also
Women of Rhode Island Complaint, supra note 145, at 6 (invoking the Nineteenth Amendment in
a challenge to a criminal abortion statute).
165. On the coverage of the strike on television, see Dow, supra note 138. Dow complains
about the ways TV commentators condescended to and objectified the strikers in their coverage of
the issues. In retrospect, however, it is remarkable how savvy the women's movement was in
anticipating such treatment and in packaging its message about the strike's three demands in
simple "sound bite" units that could survive even the rudest coverage. In surveying major
newspaper and magazine accounts of the strike, we were impressed to discover the extent to
which there was a "standard line" about the strike's message: That is, there was a message that
was communicated to reporters about the strike's three demands that appeared in every story
about the event. This suggests that the strike's organizers saw the media as a major audience for
the strike itself.
166. Betty Friedan recalls the origins of the strike as follows:
The media was still treating the women's movement as a joke .... And fear of
ridicule still kept a lot of women from identifying themselves as feminist, identifying
with the women's movement-especially if they were isolated, in all those cities and
suburbs and offices and universities where there weren't any NOW chapters, or
consciousness-raising groups.... [D]espite the new consciousness, and the media
attention, our real demands weren't being taken seriously as yet, by politicians,
employers, church or state.
We needed an action to show them-and ourselves-how powerful we were. And
if I was right, and all those women across the country were ready to identify with the
women's movement, we needed an action, an issue women could do something about,
originate, without much central organization. A woman from Florida had written me
about a general strike of women that had been proposed in the final stages of the battle
for the vote, reminding me that the fiftieth anniversary of the vote was August 26,
1970.
On the plane to Chicago, I decided to propose such a strike for August 26, 1970
on all the major issues of the unfinished business of women's equality.... [Wie were a
very small organization still to mount such a huge action-but I sensed that the women
"out there" were ready to move in far greater numbers than even we realized[,] that a
loose sort of strike encouraging any women anywhere to get together in their own
place, and strike would give scope to all the ingenuity surfacing in the women's
movement, channel the energies into action, transcend the differences-and kindle a
chain reaction among women that would be too powerful to stop, or divert, or
manipulate-or laugh at, or ignore.
Betty Friedan, Introduction: Call to Strike, in Herstory Part II, at 1, 10-12 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript on file in the Betty Friedan Papers, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, Carton
30, Folder 1010).
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mobilization, stories of bra burning may have been apocryphal, 67 but plans
"to distribute 4,000 cans of contraceptive foam" were not.168 The movement
deliberately exploited tonal and semantic ambiguities in the strike-about
what could or would be withheld and why' 69 -cultivating the element of
167. See Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Urban League Reference Pages, at
http://www.snopes.com/history/american/burnbra.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (quoting Susan
Brownmiller, the author of American Feminine, recounting the genesis of the bra-burning myth);
see also ROSEN, supra note 129, at 160-61 (clarifying that, although no fire had been lit, "[i]nto a
large 'Freedom Trash Can' protesters had thrown "'instruments of torture'-girdles, curlers,
false eyelashes, cosmetics of all kinds, wigs, issues of both Cosmopolitan and Playboy, and, yes,
bras").
168. 116 CONG. REC. 22,216 (1970) (reprinting Margaret Crimmins, Drum-Beating for
Women's Strike, WASH. POST, June 30, 1970, at D3). Crimmins emphasized the national and
international character of the event, writing:
"It's like a tribal drum-it's beating all over the country," chortled NOW (National
Organization for Women) founder Betty Friedan after today's press conference
announcing details of the Women's Strike for Equality Day called for August 26.
Mrs. Friedan... said women in Boston plan to distribute 4,000 cans of
contraceptive foam on the Boston Common and Buffalo, N.Y., women are saying they
won't iron on that day, which marks the 50th annivcrsary of the amendmcnt giving
women the vote.
"We want women to get ideas from others and do their own thing, wherever they
see a need for equality .... "
"We're going to bring babies for a baby-in to sit on the laps of city fathers to show
the need for child care centers in New York."...
Karen DeCrow of Syracuse, N.Y., one of the plaintiffs in the case against
McSorley's saloon (an all-male bar in which women won seating) said friends in
Finland are planning projects to "support their American sisters."
"Freedom trash cans will be set up all over the country, so that women can bring
items that oppress, like aprons, curlers, and hairpins."
Id. at 22,216-17.
169. Betty Friedan's official proclamation of the strike read in major part:
I propose that on Wednesday, August 26, we call a 24-hour general strike, a resistance
both passive and active, of all women in America against the concrete conditions of
their oppression. On that day, 50 years after the amendment that gave women the vote
became part of the constitution, I propose we use our power to declare an ultimatum on
all who would keep us from using our rights as Americans. I propose that the women
who are doing menial chores in the offices cover their typewriters and close their
notebooks and the telephone operators unplug their switchboards, the waitresses stop
waiting, cleaning women stop cleaning, and everyone who is doing a job for which a
man would be paid more-stop--every woman pegged forever as assistant to, doing
jobs for which men get the credit, stop, In every office, every laboratory, every school,
all the women to whom we get word will spend the day discussing, analyzing the
conditions which keep us from being all we might be. And if the condition that keeps
us down is lack of a child care center we will bring our babies to the office that day and
sit them on our bosses' laps. We do not know how many will join our day of abstention
from so-called women's work, but I expect it will be millions. We will then present
concrete demands to those who so far have made all the decisions.
And when it begins to get dark, instead of cooking dinner or making love, we will
assemble, and we will carry candles symbolic of that flame of the passionate journey
down through history-relit anew in every city-to converge the visible power of
women at city hall-at the political arena where the larger options of our life are
decided. If men want to join us, fine. If politicians, if political bosses, if mayors and
governors wish to discuss our demands, fine, but we will define the terms of the
dialogue. And by the time these 24 hours are ended, our revolution will be a fact.
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carnival and of the spontaneous in the event. The strike was exemplary of
the movement's method; it sought to make norms of equal citizenship speak
to the struggles of women's everyday lives.' 70 Feminists were able to move
the electorate in a way that Congress could not ignore because the
movement talked about the meaning of equal citizenship concretely, in
terms of the difficulties and indignities women encountered negotiating
conflicts in their work and family lives, and then moved to organize both
inside and outside the party system.171
Betty Friedan, Call to Women's Strike for Equality (Aug. 26, 1970) (on file in the Betty Friedan
Papers, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, Carton 35, Folder 1186). One female journalist
reported:
Here are some of the things that will happen Wednesday, if Miss Friedan and her
committee have their way: Wives will refuse to cook for husbands. Waitresses will stop
waiting, and cleaning women will stop cleaning. Secretaries will keep their typewriters
covered and close their notebooks, and telephone operators will unplug their
switchboards....
... The issues are so much at the heart of the whole movement, in fact, that
lighthearted attempts by male newsmen to equate the strike with the women's sex strike
in the Greek play "Lysistrata" (411 B.C.) often result in a flurry of four- and 12-letter
words from strike leaders' mouths....
Although some of the feminists have vowed to withhold sex from their men on
Wednesday, most regard abstention as an unimportant part of the day's activities.
Klemesrud, supra note 138, at 14 (interviewing Friedan about the strike).
170. This form of advocacy is "a normal phase of mobilization, which social movement
theorists refer to as frame alignment: a movement's attempt to represent or reinterpret daily life in
terms calculated to move individuals to action." Siegel, supra note 122, at 340; see also David A.
Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51
AM. Soc. REV. 464, 464 (1986) (defining "frame alignment" as "the linkage of individual and
[social movement organization (SMO)] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual
interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and
complementary"). For an overview of recent scholarship that explores how social movements
produce meaning as a predicate to collective action, see FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT
THEORY (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992). For an analysis of the women's
movement that draws on several branches of this scholarship, see Verta Taylor & Nancy Whittier,
Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women's Movement, in
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 163 (Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans eds., 1995).
The first-wave feminist movement also invoked women's daily lives as it sought to mobilize
women in the quest for constitutional rights. In this earlier period, the women's movement
emphasized that voting would enable women to secure marital property rights and rights in their
unpaid family labor. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). Later, in the
Progressive Era, suffragists argued that women needed the vote for "enlarged housekeeping," to
secure public policies that would promote the health and well-being of their families. AILEEN S.
KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 66-71 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1981) (1965).
171. On women's efforts to negotiate the party system in the postsuffrage era, see Jo
FREEMAN, A ROOM AT A TIME: How WOMEN ENTERED PARTY POLITICS (2000); and ANNA L.
HARVEY, VOTES WITHOUT LEVERAGE: WOMEN IN AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1920-1970
(1998). For a study of women in partisan and electoral politics before the New Deal, see KRISTI
ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL POLITICS BEFORE THE
NEW DEAL (1996). On forms of movement organizing outside the party system in the 1970s, see
STEVEN M. BUECHLER, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
EQUAL RIGHTS, AND BEYOND (1990); and Taylor & Whittier, supra note 170.
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The movement thus forged constitutional meaning out of a variety of
resources: constitutional text, collective memory, mass action, the
techniques of social movement organizing, the beginnings of a litigation
campaign,' 72 the apparatus of the party system, and, finally, the lawmaking
resources of Congress itself. These lawmaking efforts, too, were various.
Looking back, we see not one form of lawmaking, but multiple kinds of
statutes, with varying relationships to the constitutional agenda of the
movement.
Versed in judicial constitutionalism, we have long understood the
paradigmatic form of constitutional lawmaking to be Congress's use of
Article V lawmaking procedures to propose the ERA to the states. If
adventuresome, we might also add to the list of Congress's constitutional
lawmaking Section 5 statutes like the 1972 Amendments to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and possibly Title IX (a Spending Clause statute that the Court
itself has ruled might qualify as a Section 5 statute 173). Considered from the
perspective of history, we can see that the Ninety-Second Congress also
used many other dimensions of its lawmaking power to establish a new
constitutional understanding of men and women as equal citizens.
The ERA provides a surprisingly rich illustration of this point. We now
recall the ERA simply as a proposed Article V amendment. But in the
1970s the relationship between Article V amendments and legislative
172. At the same time that NOW was founded during the 1960s to seek enforcement of the
sex discrimination provisions of Title VII, see ROSEN, supra note 129, at 74-81, the movement
was conducting a long, wrenching internal debate about whether to pursue constitutional rights by
means of an amendment or through litigation. The movement ultimately adopted a dual strategy
pursuing constitutional reform through both amendment and litigation, just as nineteenth-century
feminists once had. See Serena Mayeri, Strategic Feminism and the Constitution, 1960-1972
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); cf Siegel, supra note 122, at 334-35
(discussing interpretive and amendatory claims of the first-wave movement). Because many
members of the movement were deeply skeptical about whether constitutional reform of a
magnitude necessary to vindicate women's rights as equal citizens could ever come through the
judiciary unassisted by further acts of lawmaking, efforts at organized constitutional litigation did
not get underway until the ERA was close to passage in Congress.
The ERA first passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 350 to 15 in June 1970 and
again, following further debate, by a vote of 354 to 23 in October 1971. In March 1972, the
Senate passed the ERA 84 to 8, sending it to the states for ratification. See MANSBRIDGE, supra
note 135, at 10-12. It was only in the spring of 1971 that the ACLU enlisted Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to draft the Supreme Court brief in Reed v. Reed, which she did, building upon the work of Pauli
Murray and Dorothy Kenyon. See Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-
4); Mayeri, supra (manuscript at 71). The Court decided Reed unanimously in November 1971, on
narrow "rational basis" grounds; apart from ruling that the state's use of sex distinctions to
distribute the opportunity to administer a decedent's estate was irrational, the Court adopted none
of the brief's path-breaking argument. See Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
In March 1972, the ACLU responded to the ERA's passage by creating the Woman's Rights
Project and appointing Ginsburg to head it. See HARTMANN, OTHER FEMINISTS, supra note 129,
at 82. It was not until January 1973, ten months after the Senate sent the ERA to the states for
ratification, that Ginsburg argued the second major women's rights case, Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), before the Supreme Court in her capacity as head of the
ACLU Women's Rights Project. See Mayeri, supra (manuscript at 73-74).
173. See supra note 158.
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constitutional change was a live and controverted question. Prominent
opponents of the ERA argued that a constitutional amendment was
unnecessary precisely because Congress could use legislation to achieve the
same ends. (Defenders of this position included Professor Paul Freund,
174
Professor Philip Kurland, 175 Senator Sam Ervin, 176 and then-Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist-who, in this earlier period,
recognized a much greater role for Congress in interpreting the Constitution
than he does today.1 77) In 1971, for example, House Judiciary Committee
hearings covered both the ERA and House Bill 916, The Women's Equality
Act of 1971, which reflected the recommendations of the President's Task
Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities. 78 Although Representative
174. Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and Si. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 79 (1970) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Paul A.
Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard University) ("It remains, then, to suggest alternative
approaches. A great deal can be done through the regular legislative process in Congress.").
175. Id. at 87 (statement of Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law, University of Chicago)
("[T]he most appropriate means for securing the desired results on [women's] behalf would be by
way of appropriate legislation rather than constitutional amendment.").
176. Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearings on HJ. Res. 35,208, and Related
Bills and H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 66 (1971) [hereinafter House Hearings] ("Mr. Edwards: You believe
apparently that whatever qualification may exist in equality, be it in education or employment,
will be taken care of by law. Senator Ervin: By statutes.").
177. Id. at 324 (statement of Assistant Attorney Gen. William H. Rehnquist) ("I think one
could do it by statute."). Though testifying on behalf of the Nixon Administration position that
Congress should pass both the ERA and supplemental legislation (he proposed modifications to
House Bill 916), Rehnquist ultimately conceded that he thought a statute was enough to remedy
sex inequality. He was pressed to admit this view when Representative Wiggins asked him
directly, "Do you feel the constitutional amendment is necessary to implement the Federal policy
you have enunciated, that is, no discrimination on the basis of sex?" Id. Rehnquist responded,
"No, I don't. I think one could do it by statute." Id. At no point did Rehnquist indicate under what
constitutional authority he thought Congress could enact such legislation. Rehnquist never
clarified the jurisdictional basis of his claim that Congress could enact House Bill 916-whose
wide-ranging provisions covered both public and private actors in a range of practical situations
from market to family. Several years thereafter, on the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist authored
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), upholding the 1972 Amendments to Title VII (EEOA)
on Section 5 grounds.
178. On the President's Task Force, see supra note 148. House Bill 916 provided for:
amending Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to add sex as a prohibited basis for denying any
rights guaranteed by that title; amending Title VI to prohibit sex discrimination among
beneficiaries of any federal program; amending Title VII to cover hiring by state and local
governments, remove the exemption of educational institutions in hiring instructional employees,
and empower the EEOC to issue cease-and-desist orders; amending Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act to prohibit sex discrimination in the rental, sale, or financing of housing; amending the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to apply its equal pay provisions to women in executive,
administrative, and professional positions; authorizing the Attorney General to bring suits to end
sex discrimination in public facilities and public education; prohibiting intimidation of any citizen
for exercising rights to be free from sex discrimination; enlarging the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights to include sex discrimination; authorizing grants by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to State Commissions on the Status of Women; requiring
legislative recommendations from the Secretary of HEW to equalize treatment of men and women
as dependents and survivors of social security beneficiaries, as recipients of childcare services
under the Family Assistance Act, and as taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code; and
requiring the Commissioner of Education to conduct a nationwide survey of denials of educational
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Mikva, the principal sponsor of House Bill 916, proposed the bill as a
supplement to the ERA, 179 some ERA opponents regarded the legislation as
a substitute for it.
180
Today, as we assess this debate in retrospect, what is striking is that all
sides assumed that Congress could act as an agent of constitutional change.
All participants believed that Congress possessed ample authority, either by
reason of its commerce'' or Section 5 power, 182 to legislate a new
application of equal citizenship principles to women. Those engaged in
debate differed among themselves about whether, and where, federal power
ran out.'8 3 But all assumed Congress's interpretive power was substantial
enough for it to articulate constitutional norms of sex equality at a time
when the Court had yet to subject sex discrimination to heightened scrutiny.
It was to the constitutional deliberations and lawmaking activities of
this Ninety-Second Congress that a plurality of the Court looked in
opportunity to women and to submit to Congress legislative recommendations to eliminate such
denials. See House Hearings, supra note 176, at 96.
179. House Hearings, supra note 176, at 85 (statement of Rep. Mikva).
180. See supra notes 174-177.
181. Discussion seems to have focused exclusively on regulating employment discrimination.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 174, at 84 (statement of Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law,
Harvard University) ("[L]egislation by Congress could do the job so far as the private conduct is
concerned, either under the commerce clause as we now have it, or conceivably under other
clauses of the Constitution, spending power, and so on.").
182. See House Hearings, supra note 176, at 68-69 (statement of Rep. Wiggins) (discussing
Katzenbach v. Morgan and the Section 5 power, and stating: "[B]ecause it is there I think that the
conclusion might be drawn that there is literally plenary power in the Congress under the fifth
section."); Senate Hearings, supra note 174, at 82 (statement of Sen. Ervin) ("I will say that
Congress could enact laws to counteract any laws which make an invidious discrimination
between men and women. I don't think the 14th amendment intended to give the Congress the
power to supersede State legislation in all areas, it only gave it the power to counteract violations
of the 14th amendment of the States because the first section puts certain prohibitions on the State,
says State shall do not certain things."); id. at 85 (statement of Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law,
Harvard University) ("[fln my view, though perhaps not in yours, Senator [Ervin], Congress has
the power under the 14th amendment to deal with discriminatory State laws in the field of family
relationships as they have exercised it in the field of voting rights."); id. at 88 (statement of Philip
B. Kurland, Professor of Law, University of Chicago) ("Section 5 of the 14th amendment plus the
commerce clause gives the Congress an almost unlimited reach in commanding equality between
the sexes.").
183. It is remarkable to appreciate just how differently from the modem Court
contemporaries at that time understood the scope of the "Morgan power." For an example in the
hearings, see House Hearings, supra note 176, at 68-69 (statement of Rep. Wiggins) ("[I] think
that the conclusion might be drawn that there is literally plenary power in the Congress under the
fifth section."). See also Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 119
(1966) ("Here then, as under the commerce clause, in place of the question, what will the Court
permit, the principal issue becomes, how widely should Congress choose to extend federal
regulation. Political opinions upon the wisdom of that transfer of responsibility [to determine
federalism limits under the Commerce Clause] differ widely. In my view it gave the federal
system as a whole the flexibility... to satisfy the material needs of its citizens, without
significantly lessening the power of the states to respond. The recent decisions express a parallel
view of congressional responsibility in the area of human rights."); Post & Siegel, supra note 74,
at 500 & n.274 (locating the views expressed in the Cox Foreword in the understandings of the
era in which Congress had just enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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deciding Frontiero, observing that "Congress itself has concluded that
classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion
of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the
question presently under consideration."'1 84 The exchange is simply
unimaginable today, when the Court conceives of legislative politics as so
debased as to preclude the possibility that Congress is capable of
responsibly deliberating about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But in Frontiero the Burger Court openly acknowledged it was following
Congress's lead.
The burst of legislative constitutionalism in the Ninety-Second
Congress represents an important shift in the way the nation understood
what it meant for men and women to participate in the American polity as
equal citizens. By no means was there social consensus about the change or
its practical reach. But the legislative record of the Ninety-Second Congress
demonstrates that the mobilizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s had
produced substantial support for the sex equality principle. This record
evidenced a widening gap between the nation's understanding of its
constitutional values and the official equal protection doctrine of the Court.
The Court's decision to close this gap is especially striking because it
incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment doctrine not only the
understanding of sex equality that underlay Section 5 legislation amending
the nation's civil rights laws, but also many of the most important ideas of
the unratified ERA.185 Evidently the transformation of the nation's
constitutional culture, as evidenced by the legislative constitutionalism of
the Ninety-Second Congress, was more significant to the Court than the
formal procedures of Article V.
Legislative constitutionalism can thus play a powerful role in
coordinating constitutional politics and constitutional law. Although
Congress can use many of its lawmaking powers to transform constitutional
culture, Section 5 legislation is especially important in this process because
it allows Congress unambiguously to speak the law of the Constitution and
hence directly to express the evolving constitutional beliefs of the nation.
Section 5 statutes are for this reason a precious symbolic resource for those
seeking to transform constitutional culture. They are a particularly valuable
object of social mobilization. When the enforcement model attempts to
block Section 5 legislation based on Congress's independent interpretation
of the Constitution, the Court risks stifling forms of social mobilization and
constitutional contestation that periodically function to align constitutional
law with the lived experiences of the American people.
184. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
185. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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C. The FMLA as Legislative Constitutionalism:
Statutory Aims and Antecedents
In 1993 Congress announced that it was invoking its Section 5 power to
enact the FMLA. 8 6 It declared that the statute was designed "to promote
the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant
to" the Equal Protection Clause. 187 But in what sense exactly was the
FMLA designed to enforce a provision of the Constitution?
To address this issue we need first to consider the nature of legislative
constitutionalism. Section 5 statutes stand in a very different relationship to
constitutional rights than do judicial opinions or remedies. We are
accustomed to imagining judicial judgments as required by constitutional
principles, but no one would contend that the FMLA is required by the
Fourteenth Amendment in the same sense that a judicial judgment
vindicating a right is. The FMLA can be repealed without constitutional
difficulty. How then can the FMLA be said to enforce the higher and
binding law of the Constitution?
Two discrete questions underlie this inquiry. The first concerns the
nature of constitutional rights, the second the distinction between legislative
and judicial power. With regard to the first question, we ordinarily conceive
constitutional rights as possessing definite and mandatory entailments. So,
for example, there are specific requirements that flow from the First
Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination,'
8 8 or from the Due
Process Clause's mandate that government offer medical care to suspects in
police custody who have been injured while being apprehended by the
police. 1 A court must strike down a statute that is improperly viewpoint
discriminatory, and Congress may not enact it; a court must order the
provision of such medical care, and Congress must authorize it. But the
FMLA does not seem to bear this kind of relationship to the Equal
Protection Clause. It is implausible to claim that twelve weeks of unpaid
leave to care for sick family members is required by the Constitution.
Constitutional rights, however, do not always possess specific
entailments. When a court seeks to apply the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to a prison, for example, it will
typically examine the conditions of confinement "taken as a whole"' 
90 to
see if they correspond to constitutional values; a finding that prison
conditions violate the Constitution will not ordinarily yield a judicial decree
186. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2000).
188. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
189. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S, 189, 199 (1989); City
of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
190. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
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that is "logically derived from the substantive liability," but instead will
justify a remedy that is "forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and
broadly remedial lines."' 191 It is generally acknowledged that structural
injunctions require "broad discretionary powers"' 92 and that this discretion
is necessary to "give meaning to" the "public values" contained in the
Constitution. 9 3 Because many different school desegregation plans are
constitutionally compatible with the redress of any given constitutional
violation, the particular elements of any specific judicial plan are not
ordinarily understood to be mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. 1
94
In the context of structural injunctions, therefore, constitutional rights
function as values that courts seek to realize, rather than as principles that
mandate specific remedial entailments. It is in this sense that Section 5
legislation seeks to enforce constitutional rights. The relationship of the
FMLA to the Equal Protection Clause is roughly the same as the
relationship between a particular element of a judicially ordered school
desegregation plan and the Equal Protection Clause. Neither is specifically
required by the Clause, but both are efforts to "give meaning" to the Clause.
Of course there is also a significant difference between judicial
remedies and Section 5 legislation. Although the particular provisions
contained in any given judicial remedy may not be mandated by the
Constitution, courts can issue structural injunctions only if some remedy is
required to vindicate the Constitution. We do not understand Section 5
legislation as required in this same sense. The FMLA is in this respect no
different than the Voting Rights Act or even § 1983, although these statutes
unambiguously enforce the Constitution.
Analysis of this point brings us to our second question, which is the
distinction between legislative and judicial power. The exercise of judicial
power is justified and circumscribed by the need to resolve a particular case
or controversy, which means that courts enforce constitutional rights if and
only if it is necessary in order to decide a case. Legislative power is not
circumscribed in this same way. Congress enacts Section 5 statutes because,
all things considered, such statutes will protect, enhance, or fulfill the
constitutional values that Congress wishes to vindicate. Legislative
191. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1302 (1976). For a discussion of the prison cases, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
192. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635,635 (1982).
193. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court. 1978 Term-Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1,2 (1979).
194. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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constitutionalism is thus inherently aspirational in ways that judicial
constitutionalism is not.
195
This distinction explains many of the differences between legislative
and judicial constitutionalism. Unlike a court, Congress may act
incrementally and incompletely realize its constitutional commitments, or it
may realize its commitments in a course of legislation that evolves over
time, or it may apply constitutional values in a manner that coordinates
multiple and potentially competing commitments.
1 96  Legislative
constitutionalism can be more temporizing or more detailed than judicial
constitutionalism, which is always obligated to provide a remedy that is
legally justified. In addition, because Section 5 statutes derive legitimacy
from Congress's democratic accountability, and because they can establish
comprehensive schemes of regulation and administration, Section 5 statutes
can also address polycentric problems of redistribution that would be quite
beyond the bounds of judicial remedies.
1 97 In all these ways, legislative
constitutionalism assumes forms that differ from constitutional rights and
remedies that are premised on models of judicial power.
In this Section, we shall argue that the FMLA was an attempt to work
out the meaning of the constitutional principle of equal citizenship from the
distinct standpoint of a legislature. We begin by locating the statute's
origins in the explosion of constitutional lawmaking that occurred in the
Ninety-Second Congress. Congress initially responded to movement
demands for legislation alleviating conflicts between work and family by
enacting a federal childcare program that was twice vetoed during the
1970s. Congress then developed a different framework for alleviating
conflicts between work and family. It turned to legislation that directly
regulated the employment relationship itself. During the 1970s, Congress
enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment (PDA), which provides
that employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination
195. As William Forbath argued:
Congress' constitutional duties were not only to safeguard the constitutional bounds
and fairness of social and economic legislation, but also to interpret and secure these
new positive social and economic rights. By contrast, safeguarding the noneconomic
rights inscribed in the Bill of Rights, as well as the rights of racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities, would remain (or become) the special responsibility of the courts. In
championing this vision, the New Dealers carried forward a long tradition of
congressional constitutional argument, interpretation, rights recognition, and precedent-
making-what I shall call the political Constitution.
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 167 (2001).
196. Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81,
112; Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social
Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893, 1898-99 (2001); Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1975).
197. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 308-15 (1994); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:
Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REv. 410,420-22 (1993).
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on the basis of sex for purposes of Title VII. In the 1980s and 1990s
Congress decided to deploy its power under Section 5 and the Commerce
Clause to enact a statutory scheme enabling workers to take time off to care
for their families without losing the right to retain their jobs.
The FMLA is detailed and redistributive in ways that do not easily
correspond to the forms characteristically employed by the judiciary to
enforce constitutional rights. But the history of the FMLA demonstrates
that the statute emerged from a long and slow process in which Congress
coordinated multiple and conflicting normative commitments and in the
process accumulated democratic support for a far-reaching statutory reform
of the workplace. Understanding the historical processes that gave rise to
the FMLA allows us to appreciate the many ways in which a legislature's
efforts to vindicate constitutional equality principles inevitably differ from
a court's work.
1. The Comprehensive Child Development Act
The Comprehensive Child Development Act (CCDA) 198 was a key
piece of sex equality legislation enacted by the Ninety-Second Congress,
but vetoed by President Nixon-despite the fact that federal legislation
providing childcare assistance to households across the income spectrum
was originally proposed by President Nixon's own Task Force on Women's
Rights and Responsibilities. 199 The CCDA would have authorized $2 billion
for Head Start, day care, and supportive education to be provided free to
families below an income threshold and on a sliding scale basis for families
above the threshold z.2 ) The CCDA was born of feminism's constitutional
vision of equal citizenship. In making childcare available to families above
the poverty line, the bill was responsive to the demand for "universally
available, publicly supported child care," as NOW explained on behalf of
the Act.20 1 While nearly all the organizations that testified on behalf of the
198. The Comprehensive Child Development Act, H.R. 6748, 92d Cong. (1971), was added
as a new title to the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971, H.R. 10,351, 92d Cong. Nixon
vetoed the entire set of amendments, including the CCDA.
199. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,158 (1971) (reprinting excerpts from the President's Task Force
on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, which proposed "[a]doption of the liberalized
provisions for child care in the family assistance plan and authorization of Federal aid for child
care for families not covered by the family assistance plan").
200. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, COMPREHENSIVE CHILD DEVELOPMENT ACT, H.R.
REP. No. 92-1570, at 8, 20-21 (1972) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT ON CCDA]; Marjorie Hunter,
14 Senators Back a Child Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1972, at 12.
201. Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971: Joint Hearings on S. 1512 Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty and the Subcomm. on Children and
Youth of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Part 3, 92d Cong. 752 (1971) (statement of
Vicki Lathom, Member, National Board of Directors, Child Care Task Force, National
Organization for Women) ("Although NOW is committed to work for universally available,
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statute emphasized its benefits for the nation's children, NOW instead
emphasized the legislation's emancipatory potential for women:
The National Organization for Women believes that
widespread availability of child care facilities is essential if women
are to have true choice of lifestyles. Child care is also desperately
needed to permit mothers to work who must do so for the survival
of their families, and to provide millions of children with better
care than they are now receiving.
Perhaps the greatest cause of women's second-class status is
the traditional belief that anatomy is destiny. Women will never
have full opportunity to participate in America's economic,
political, or cultural life as long as they bear the sole responsibility
for the care of children-entirely alone and isolated from the larger
world.20 2
The low-key presentation of the statute adopted by most of its
supporters did not succeed in quelling objections. President Nixon vetoed
the CCDA in December 1971, criticizing "the fiscal irresponsibility,
administrative unworkability, and family-weakening implications of the
system it envisions" and complaining that any response to children's needs
must be "consciously designed to cement the family in its rightful position
as the keystone of our civilization." 20 3 The President emphasized that
"[t]here is a respectable school of opinion that this legislation would lead
toward altering the family relationship" and urged that the nation adopt
policies that "enhance rather than diminish both parental authority and
parental involvement with children.,,20 4 He concluded that "for the Federal
Government to plunge headlong financially into supporting child
development would commit the vast moral authority of the National
Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over
against the family-centered approach. 20 5
publicly supported child care, we are in accord with flexible fees on a sliding scale, as an interim
step, to reflect the urgent needs and varied resources of families.").
202. Id. at 751.
203. Veto of the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971, 1971 PUB. PAPERS 1174, 1176
(Dec. 10) [hereinafter Nixon Veto Message].
204. Id. at 1178.
205. Id. Evidence suggests that Nixon vetoed the CCDA and framed his veto message in such
conservative tones in order to win favor with the right wing of the Republican Party. Charles
Colson, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, and speechwriter Pat Buchanan reminded Nixon that his
election depended on his reaffirmation of traditional values following the social change and
upheavals of the 1960s. They knew that some of his constituency would perceive the CCDA as an
attack on the traditional family. Colson advised Nixon to oppose childcare on principle: "[l]t may
be precisely what we need to buy ourselves maneuvering room with the right wing." See MARY
FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE
MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 138 (1993).
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When the House Committee on Education and Labor tried to respond to
Nixon's veto with revised legislation, minority dissenters cited multiple
editorials branding the child development bill as a corrosive threat to the
nation. Columnist James J. Kilpatrick approved of childcare centers that
provided "places where welfare mothers could leave their children while
they went off to work," but he called the proposed bill "the boldest and
most far-reaching scheme ever advanced for the Sovietization of American
youth":
20 6
In the context of a Sovietized society, in which children are
regarded as wards of the state and raised in state-controlled
communes, the scheme would make beautiful sense. But it is
monstrous to concoct any such plan for a society that still cherishes
the values (however they may be abused) of home, family, church,
and parental control. This bill contains the seeds for destruction of
Middle America.
20 7
Despite the fact that in hundreds of pages of testimony only NOW had
uttered a few sentences suggesting that reforming the family might be a
positive aim of the CCDA, the statute was opposed as if its supporters had
mounted a full-scale attack on the traditional family form. In part,
opponents of the CCDA were responding to feminist critiques of the family
well known to those involved in the debate over federal childcare
legislation, even if such critiques had been carefully excluded from the
CCDA's legislative record; in part, they were responding to the provisions
of the CCDA itself. The legislation was understood to make family reform
an aim in its own right precisely because it reached beyond poor households
to offer daycare services to families of Middle America. Nixon's veto
statement made a point of distinguishing the CCDA from Head Start and
other nutritional, medical, and health services targeting poor children:
[U]nlike these tried and tested programs... this legislation would
be truly a long leap into the dark for the United States Government
and the American people. I must share the view of those of its
supporters who proclaim this to be the most radical piece of
legislation to emerge from the Ninety-second Congress.0 8
Congress enacted additional childcare legislation within a few years,
20 9
but in 1976 President Ford vetoed it on federali';m grounds. 210 The
206. HOUSE REPORT ON CCDA, supra note 200, at 45.
207. Id.
208. Nixon Veto Message, supra note 203, at 1177.
209. SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN'S INTERESTS/IOTHERS' RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA'S CHILD CARE POLICY 252 (1999). There was considerable support for federal
childcare legislation in this era. A New York Times editorial responded to the CCDA veto: "[T]his
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presidential vetoes of the 1970s proved decisive in shaping the federal
government's role in childcare. Although the federal government continued
to enact childcare legislation in the years after Ford's veto, the programs
were designed to serve only the nation's poorest households.1 t
After 1976, Congress changed its regulatory focus. Rather than reform
the ways that families arranged to care for their dependent members,
Congress sought to alleviate conflicts between work and family by
reforming aspects of the employment relationship. In the early 1970s, a few
federal courts had ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 212 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had issued guidelines stating that
exclusion from hiring, denial of fringe benefits, and discharge based on
pregnancy amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of
Title VII.213 The EEOC's guidelines translated feminism's vision of equal
employment opportunity into practical legal form. But the Supreme Court
bluntly repudiated the EEOC, ruling in 1974 that states could exclude
pregnancy from disability benefits programs without engaging in sex-based
discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,21 4 and
two years later ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that this
attack cannot obscure the fact that the concept of child care and development enjoys broad
popular support across most of the traditional divisions of politics, class, economics and race."
Editorial, Abandoned Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1971, at 30. Women's support for
childcare crossed political lines: The National Women's Political Caucus proposed
comprehensive childcare programs as well as abortion on demand to the Republican Platform
Committee in 1972. Abortion and Child Care Planks To Be Proposed to the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1972, at 8.
210. Veto of Child Day Care Bill, 1976-1977 PUB. PAPERS 981 (Apr. 6, 1976).
211. MICHEL, supra note 209, at 251-52.
212. See, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield County Sch. Bd., No. 71-1707, 1972 WL 2594, at *2
(4th Cir. Sept. 14, 1972) (invalidating a school board regulation requiring a pregnant teacher to
take an unpaid leave of absence for four months before birth and to continue on leave until she
submitted a doctor's note declaring her fitness), rev'd en bane, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), revd
on other grounds sub nora. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating
the regulation on due process and irrebuttable presumption grounds); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (invalidating a school-board rule requiring pregnant teachers
to take unpaid leaves of absence for five months before birth and to continue on that status until
the beginning of the first school term after the child was three months old), affd, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).
In this era, Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a path-breaking brief for the ACLU Woman's Rights
project arguing that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination. In Struck v. Secretary of
Defense, plaintiffs challenged an air force regulation providing for the termination of pregnant
women on equal protection grounds. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409
U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178) (arguing that the regulation "reflects arbitrary notions of a
woman's place wholly at odds with contemporary legislative and judicial recognition that
individual potential must not be restrained, nor equal opportunity limited, by law-sanctioned
stereotypical prejudgments"). The plaintiffs lost below, Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372
(9th Cir. 1971), and they settled immediately prior to argument in the Supreme Court on mootness
grounds.
213. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972).
214. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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constitutional reasoning should apply to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.215
Congress, however, simply refused to accept the Court's grudging
understanding of the constitutional transformation that had been driving
Congress's legislative efforts to reconstruct the relationship between work
and family.
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment
Without explicitly contradicting the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution, Congress made clear that the Court had mistakenly interpreted
the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2 16 Two years after Gilbert
Congress amended Title VII to declare its understanding that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy was discrimination on the basis of sex.217 While
Congress was careful to confine its dispute with the Court to the statutory
question posed by Gilbert, the debate over the meaning of sex equality in
the pregnancy context had clear constitutional overtones.21 8 This was in part
215. The Court reasoned in Gilbert:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language,
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the similarities between the congressional language and some of those
decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful starting point in interpreting the
former. Particularly in the case of defining the term "discrimination," which Congress
has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law analyzing
and discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which
Congress manifested in enacting Title VII. We think, therefore, that our decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, supra, dealing with a strikingly similar disability plan, is quite
relevant in determining whether or not the pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the
basis of sex.
429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
216. A congressional report argued:
The purpose of H. R. 6075 is to amend Title VII ... [to] clarifly] that the
prohibitions against sex discrimination in the act include discrimination in employment
based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.
In enacting Title VII, Congress mandated equal access to employment and its
concomitant benefits for female and male workers. However, the Supreme Court's
narrow interpretations of Title VII tend to erode our national policy of
nondiscrimination in employment.
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 1-3 (1978).
217. The Act provided:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
218. See, e.g., To Amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 To Prohibit Sex
Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomrn. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 5 (1977) [hereinafter Title VII Hearings]
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because the Court had already held that the application of Title VII to the
states was a legitimate exercise of Section 5 power,21 9 so that the PDA,
insofar as it was applied to the states, was also an exercise of Section 5
power. And it was in part because Congress's decision to enact a statute
reversing the Court's reasoning in Gilbert provided yet another context for
Congress to endorse the movement's constitutional vision of equal
citizenship and to affirm that it was normal and necessary for women to
combine work and parenting. 220 Women were entitled to participate in the
core pursuits of citizenship in work, education, and politics, equally with
men. As one advocate explained the PDA:
The contradictions are striking: We revere motherhood, but
only in its place. We romanticize the Madonna at the hearth, but
when the mother-to-be is in the workplace, she is actually punished
for her pregnancy. For the kind of "labor pains" that trouble the
pregnant worker, an obstetrician will not help. This legislation is
her only delivery.
22 1
(statement of Sen. Javits) ("I personally regret very much that the ERA has not been enacted. I
think it is a shocking thing that we have not yet ratified this amendment. But legislation like this is
one way in which, to some extent, to make up for the fact that we have not ratified the ERA.").
219. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
220. One movement activist testifying on behalf of the PDA bitterly referenced the CCDA's
defeat as she discussed women's struggle to combine work and family responsibilities:
In 1971 .... then-President Nixon vetoed a child care bill on the grounds that it
would "weaken" the family. He imagined that without child care centers, women would
remain at home in their proper role. Invisible were the millions of mothers who worked
not to weaken the family, but to strengthen it, to stave offpoverty and the indignity of
welfare. Invisible too, were the children, cheated of adequate care and left to fend for
themselves.
Th [sic] diehard myth that mothers stay home masks the fact that millions cannot
afford that option. Moreover, the notion that pregnancy automatically signals full-time
motherhood and an end to job and career is not a female reality; it is a male fantasy.
Title VII Hearings, supra note 218, at 451 (statement of Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Editor and Writer,
Ms. magazine). Similarly, the League of Women Voters critiqued the Gilbert decision as
based on the myth that working women can depend on their husband's income, and
participate in the labor force on a temporary and marginal basis ... [when in] 1974, 70
percent of all working women worked to provide financial support which is essential to
support their families ... [and in] 1975, 13 percent of all families were headed by
women.
Legislation To Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and
H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong. 267 (1977) (statement of the League of Women Voters of the United
States).
221. Title VII Hearings, supra note 218, at 450 (statement of Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Editor
and Writer, Ms. magazine).
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3. The Family and Medical Leave Act
The PDA was in some respects an easier statute to enact than the
CCDA: Amending the nation's antidiscrimination laws to make clear that
employers could not discriminate against pregnant workers seemed to
affirm parenting-and thus family values-in a way that the day-care
reform did not. When Congress again attempted to vindicate equal
citizenship values by enacting legislation alleviating conflicts between work
and family, it adhered to the model of regulating the employment
relationship established by the PDA, endeavoring to provide forms of
employment protection that the PDA did not.
Pregnant women and individuals with family caretaking responsibilities
encounter employment conflicts in many forms. Job descriptions and
personnel rules of general applicability, inflexibly imposed, can exclude
employees just as effectively as a rule providing, "No pregnant women or
parents with primary caretaking responsibilities need apply." Although
federal and state antidiscrimination laws provided workers with some
resources for challenging such employment arrangements, the effectiveness
of these laws in the years immediately after the PDA was not clear. In part
this was because disparate impact claims able to address facially neutral
policies that especially harmed pregnant women,222 much less facially
neutral policies that especially harmed workers who assumed caretaking
responsibilities at home, had not yet been recognized under either the PDA
or Title VII. 223 Although the Supreme Court in 1987 upheld a California
222. Courts have now increasingly allowed plaintiffs to bring Title VII challenges to facially
neutral employment policies that have a disparate impact on pregnant employees. But, plaintiffs
did not begin to prevail in many of these cases until after the Supreme Court's decision in
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). When Congrcss first
began hearings on the FMLA in 1986, only one federal court had recognized a disparate impact
claim under the PDA. See Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
See generally Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 940-42 (1985) (analyzing the case for a disparate impact cause of
action in the period just prior to the Cal Fed decision). For some recent cases recognizing the
disparate impact claim under the PDA, see, for example, Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Comm. Consol.
Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988); and EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Il1. 1991). But cf Donneyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner,
C.J.); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.). For further
discussion of disparate impact analysis under the PDA, see Deborah A. Calloway,
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETsON L. REV. 1, 39-48 (1995) (arguing that
"the majority of courts addressing this issue have correctly concluded that disparate impact
analysis is available under the PDA," and examining the elements of a successful claim); and
Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994) (analyzing protections against
pregnancy discrimination in the United States and the European Community).
223. Important recent work on the meaning of equality and discrimination in the area of work
and family conflicts includes Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 642, 644-45 (2001) ("The relationship between antidiscrimination and accommodation is
of course a very large topic. In one form or another, it has been the subject of an old and
expansive debate spanning several decades, dating back at least to the early feminist argument that
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2014 [Vol. 112: 1943
Legislative Constitutionalism 2015
statute that guaranteed pregnant women unpaid maternity leave,224 many in
the feminist movement by this time had become concerned about the
wisdom of a gender-specific strategy for restructuring the workplace so as
to ameliorate conflicts between work and family.225 These concerns played
a prominent role in the genesis of the gender-neutral provisions of the
Family and Medical Leave Act and left a deep impress on the statute that
ultimately resulted.226
In undertaking to regulate the employment relationship, Congress
envisioned a workplace in which employees with primary responsibility for
caretaking at home-who were of course most likely to be women---could
work without penalty or disadvantage. The FMLA approached this problem
in a gender-neutral way because Congress was determined to avoid the
discrimination against women that a gender-specific entitlement might
trigger. Congress specifically found that "employment standards that apply
to one gender only have serious potential for encouraging employers to
discriminate against employees and applicants for employment who are of
antidiscrimination includes an accommodation component related to pregnancy.") and Joan C.Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who AreDiscriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
224. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. 272.
225. Even as the Cal Fed Court gave voice to the feminist aims of the PDA, the feministcommunity was divided about whether, as a matter of principle or prudence, it was wise to allowgender-specific regulation of pregnancy of the sort that the California law countenanced. Criticsof the California statute argued that even if the aim of such regulation was to enhance, rather thanto restrict, women's employment opportunities, a gender-specific entitlement would encourageemployers to discriminate against women in hiring and promotion decisions; gender-specificentitlements might also tend to entrench gendcr-conventional assumptions that women areresponsible for child rearing. For a sampling of this debate, see Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV.1118 (1986); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEYWOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.REV. 513 (1983); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,981 (1984); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); andWendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special TreatmentDebate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 323 (1984-1985).
226. See BERRY, supra note 205, at 159-61. For one quite critical account of the role that theCal Fed debates played in shaping the gender-neutral entitlement of the FMLA, see Christine A.Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense To Talk About "Women"?, I UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 32(1991) (questioning the "content of inclusion and exclusion contained in the FMLA"). Christine
Littleton also states:
[Bly self-consciously shifting the focus from debates over female employees' needsfor, among other things, pregnancy disability leave, to a focus on female and maleneeds for family and medical leave, feminist supporters ironically ended up supportingthe same kind of "half a loaf' measure that they had criticized in the litigation arena-only it was a different "half." My assertion is that, had the bill focused on all women, itwould have included many more people among its beneficiaries. Thus what looked likemore inclusion ("let's add men") could, from a women-centered perspective, be seen asexclusion ("what about the women we've left out?").
Id. (footnote omitted).
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that gender., 22 7 At the same time, Congress was concerned that "[1]eave for
fathers... is rarely available., 2 8 A number of states offered extended
"maternity" leave that greatly exceeded the period of physical disability due
to pregnancy and childbirth, 29 while granting no paternity leave at all. Such
arrangements offered a de facto form of childcare leave to women, not men,
effecting benefits discrimination against men, creating incentives for
discrimination against women in hiring and promotions, and entrenching
stereotypical gender-role expectations about family/work obligations. For
these reasons, Congress was determined to craft a gender-neutral leave
entitlement:
While women have historically assumed primary responsibility for
family caretaking, a policy that affords women employment leave
to provide family care while denying such leave to men perpetuates
gender-based employment discrimination and stereotyping and
improperly impedes the ability of men to share greater
227. Congress worried:
A law providing special protection to women or any defined group, in addition to
being inequitable, runs the risk of causing discriminatory treatment. H.R. 1, by
addressing the needs of all workers, avoids such a risk. Thus H.R. I is based not only
on the Commerce Clause, but also on the guarantees of equal protection and due
process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 29 (1993). Congress described the gender-neutral design of the
legislation in the following way:
The parental leave provided under H.R. 1 is available to any parent. A father as
well as a mother may be granted parental leave so long as the leave is requested to
respond to one of the circumstances specified in the statute. The committee recognizes
that a special "maternity leave" requirement may have the effect of denying women job
opportunities. The knowledge that job-protected leaves were required for working
mothers, and working mothers only, may encourage employing agencies to be reluctant
to hire or promote women of child-bearing age. However, since employers would be
required under H.R. I to provide job-protected leave for all employees, they would
have little incentive to discriminate against women.
Id. pt. 2, at 14 (emphasis added).
228. S. REP. No. 102-68, at 33 (1991); see also S. REP. No. 103-3, at 14-15 (1993), reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16-18 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics figures for 1990 where thirty-
seven percent of employees were covered by maternity policies, while only eighteen percent were
covered by paternity policies). Congress was also aware that a fifty-state survey had established
that "public sector leaves don't vary very much from private sector leaves." The Parental and
Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 29-30 (statement of Meryl Frank, Director, Yale
Bush Center Infant Care Leave Project); see also id. at 147 (statement of Washington Council of
Lawyers) ("Parental leave for fathers or adoptive parents is rare.... Where child-care leave
policies do exist, men, both in the public and in private sectors, receive notoriously discriminatory
treatment in their requests for such leave."); Kathleen Makuen, Public Servants, Private Parents:
Parental Leave Policies in the Public Sector, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS: TOWARD A
NATIONAL POLICY 195, 202-03 tbl.11.1 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1998) (providing
a table of results of the 1985 Survey of Parental Leave Policies for State Employees, which
reveals that 19 out of the 36 states studied provided only mothers with leave without pay for
parenting).
229. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 15, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 17.
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responsibilities in providing immediate physical and emotional care
for their families.30
Thus the FMLA sought both to remedy sex discrimination in the
allocation of leave benefits in a way that would deter sex discrimination in
hiring and promotion, and to disrupt and transform gender expectations
about the allocation of responsibility for family-care obligations as between
men and women. With respect to both ends, the FMLA functioned as a
classic antidiscrimination statute.
Yet in other ways the FMLA was not a conventional antidiscrimination
statute, or so it seemed by the 1980s when it was common to reason about
antidiscrimination statutes as requiring equal treatment only 231 (despite the
fact that Title VII allowed plaintiffs to challenge facially neutral practices if
such practices had a disparate impact on the Act's protected classes). The
FMLA required employers to provide their employees more than equal
treatment; it required employers to provide their workers a fixed number of
weeks of unpaid leave for personal health and family-care reasons.232 It thus
exacted a far more substantial accommodation than a federal court was then
(or is now) likely to require under Title VII.233 This may account for the
230. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 14. The FMLA sought to provide benefits to men, as a
form of equal treatment to which they were entitled, as an emotional good from which they might
benefit, and as a means to women's emancipation. In one senator's words:
The act does not just apply to women, but to men and women, to fathers, as well as to
mothers, to sons as well as to daughters. So to say that women will not be hired by
business is a specious argument, unless you assume that men are not caring parents and
men are not loving sons. I believe that they are.
139 CONG. REC. 1697 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
231. Cf S. REP. No. 102-68, at 39 ('The PDA expanded the rights of pregnant women to
childbirth-related disability leave, but it imposed no requirement on employers to provide leave in
the first place."), The House Report adds:
As important as Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act have been, they
do not address all of the employment related problems of pregnancy and childbirth.
Title VII, as amended, is an anti-discrimination law. Its aim is to prohibit employers
from treating persons differently on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
Compliance with Title VII requires only that employers treat all employees equally.
Specifically, if an employer grants sick leave and provides disability and health
insurance coverage to employees in general, it must, under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, provide equal coverage to pregnant wage earners who become sick
or disabled. If an employer denies benefits to its workforce, it is in full compliance with
antidiscrimination laws because it treats all employees equally. Thus, while Title VII,
as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, has required that benefits and
protection be provided to millions of previously unprotected women wage earners, it
leaves gaps which an antidiscrimination law by its nature cannot fill. H.R. 770 is
designed to fill those gaps.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-28, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1989). For contrary law on the PDA, see supra notes 222-223
and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
233. FMLA leave could theoretically be derived under Title VII using disparate impact
principles. But no federal court has required an employer to provide accommodation of that
degree. For sources exploring the possibility for accommodation under Title VII in pregnancy and
childcare areas, see sources cited supra notes 222-223. See also Deborah Vagins, Note,
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vigorous resistance the FMLA aroused; in the end, Congress enacted the
law only after a lengthy national debate in which constituencies mobilized
in campaigns to block and support the legislation.
Congress debated the equities and scope of FMLA policy during the
very same period that it turned back a major challenge to Title VII's
disparate impact cause of action.3 The business community vigorously
resisted the family leave statute as an unwise intervention in the market,
235
and President Bush twice vetoed the bill.236 But the FMLA was nonetheless
enacted despite President Bush's vetoes. President Clinton campaigned on
the need for the legislation, and it was one of the first bills he signed upon
taking office.
237
The FMLA created minimum federal leave standards for employers of
a certain size, on the model of traditional labor-protective legislation.238
Congress sought to bring into being a new kind of workplace norm that
would fuse family values and equal opportunity norms. As was the case
with the CCDA, Congress testified to the importance of family values in the
act of altering the relationship between work and the family. But Congress
Occupational Segregation and the Male-Worker Norm: Challenging Objective Work
Requirements Under Title VII, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79 (1996).
234. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 5, 9, 28, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (reversing Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and restoring the disparate impact cause of action). For a brief
history of the debate in Congress over the restoration of the disparate impact cause of action in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill, "
a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, orAll of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 287, 304-11 (1993); and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613,640-41 (1991),
235. See BERRY, supra note 205, at 162-64 (discussing cost concerns raised by small
businesses resulting in restrictions on leave for medical care and birth and raising of the employer
exemption from 5 to 15 to 50 employees); Lisa Bomstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-
Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 78 (2000) (discussing business opposition to the Act); Lisa L.
Tharpe, Comment, Analysis of the Political Dynamics Surrounding the Enactment of the 1993
Family and Medical Leave Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 379, 382-83, 394-96 (1998) (same); see also
COMM'N ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE POLICIES 144-46 (1996) (discussing the actual costs of the FMLA to employers).
236. See Message to the Senate Returning Without My Approval the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1992, 1992-1993 PUB. PAPERS 1625 (Sept. 22, 1992); Veto of H.R. 770: Message
from the President of the United States Transmitting His Veto of H.R. 770, The "Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1990," H.R. Doc. No. 10 1-209 (1990); see also BERRY, supra note 205, at
193, 211 (describing Bush's 1990 and 1991 vetoes of the bill).
237. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 3 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).
238. Congress reasoned about the need for minimum federal standards in these terms:
However, H.R. 1 is not just a bill for women; men need the same minimum
protection in our society. Clearly a minimum standard is needed, similar to child labor
laws, the minimum wage, and health and safety standards. The United States is the only
industrialized western nation that still does not offer this minimum protection to its
workers. America's strongest competitors, Japan and West Germany, guarantee three
months paid family leave with full job guarantees.
H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 37 (1993).
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was also clear that the prevailing relationship between work and the family
disproportionately harmed women, and that it was adopting the new law to
advance both the goal of family welfare and the goal of equal opportunity.
As Congress understood the problem, workplace norms were premised
on the assumption that employees had someone at home to care for family
members. Employment policies tended to penalize workers who had no
family members to provide care for household dependents, and who,
therefore, tried to juggle competing work and family-care responsibilities.
Such workers were far more likely to be women. Thus, in enacting the
FMLA, Congress used its Section 5 power to bring into being a workplace
structured on premises that would give women an equal opportunity to
compete with men. Pat Schroeder explained this focus on equal opportunity
on the floor of the House:
Madam Chairman, in the workplace we have never established
a family-friendly standard, and we have never recognized anyone's
care-giver role in the workplace. The answer is always, "If you are
a care-giver, you shouldn't be in the workplace. You should be able
to afford somebody full time to stay home." In other words, get a
wife.
I mean I would like a wife; I think most of the Congresswomen
would like a wife. My husband would like a wife. We are [sic]
going to get one, so let us get real about that and let us realize that
we do have to be both care-givers and good employees. If every
other country can get it, we can get it.
23 9
Congress expressed this same understanding in more formal terms when it
found that "due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our society,
the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and
such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects
the working lives of men."' 40 "In the absence of a family leave standard,
childbirth and the need to care for a sick child or parent have an adverse
impact on women's earnings.
', 241
In creating a statutory right that allowed employees to take unpaid
family leave, Congress was vindicating equal citizenship values that the
movement had been advancing since the late 1960s. It created a legislative
right that protected workers against classic forms of sex-based disparate
treatment in hiring, promotion, and benefits. Conceivably, Congress might
have protected workers by prohibiting employers from discriminating on
the basis of sex in the award of family leave and thus exercised its Section 5
239. 139 CONG. REC. 1981 (1993) (statement ofRep. Schroeder) (emphasis added).
240. 29 U.S.C. § 260 1(a)(5) (2000).
241. S. REP. No. 102-68, at 28(1991).
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power in a manner that would have more closely resembled rights a court
would enforce in litigation. But instead Congress exercised its Section 5
power to confer on employees a gender-neutral right to family leave,
inhibiting disparate treatment in hiring, promotion, and benefits, while at
the same time restraining the operation of employment policies having a
disparate impact on employees with family-care responsibilities. No court
could or would implement equal protection values as Congress did, but then
again Congress was exercising its distinctively legislative power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts, which have only judicial
power, are of course likely to implement constitutional rights in a quite
different manner.
Two decades of social movement activism passed between NOW's
inaugural Statement of Purpose and Congress's initial hearings on the
FMLA. Another seven years of intense opposition and anxiety over the
bill's provisions would pass before the FMLA was enacted into law. In the
end, the nation proved willing to face the practical entailments of its new
understanding of the equal citizenship principle. The lived implications of
these constitutional commitments had become increasingly clear as the
nation struggled to vindicate the sex equality norm in matters of work and
family. As one senator explained Congress's decision to enact the FMLA:
"Mr. President, the days of Ozzie and Harriet are over.
242
IV. BEYOND THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL:
POLICENTRIC CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The history we have just recounted illustrates the complex and
turbulent process by which constitutional law can be created in America.
Although courts play an important part in that process, they are by no
means the only actors. Our equal protection jurisprudence began to address
questions of sex discrimination because a mobilized citizenry advocated a
new understanding of constitutional values, because Congress was
responsive to this new vision, and because, last of all, the Court was willing
to learn from the nation's changing constitutional culture that it was
important to prohibit sex discrimination.
The thrust of this history runs exactly counter to the central premise of
the enforcement model, which claims that constitutional meaning should be
242. Senator Mikulski stated:
Women are usually the ones who must take time off to care for a family member.
The United States depends on women in the work force more than any other Western
democracy except Scandinavia and Canada. But we pretend these women still live in an
Ozzie and Harriet world
Mr. President, the days of Ozzie and Harriet are over.
139 CONG. REC. 1705 (1993) (emphasis added).
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segregated from politics and exclusively controlled by the judiciary.
Something is profoundly wrong with a framework that asks the Court to
closely scrutinize Section 5 legislation addressing issues of sex equality to
ensure that it adequately matches the Court's own jurisprudence of sex
discrimination, when the Court has derived its own jurisprudence from
congressional and popular understandings in the first instance. Yet the
enforcement model requires the Court to do just that.
The history we have examined is strong evidence that the enforcement
model misconceives relationships that are fundamental to our constitutional
order. It also suggests that the Court has imposed unwarranted constraints
on the exercise of Section 5 power. This impression is sharpened by our
historical reconstruction of the origins of the FMLA, which indicates that
its family leave provisions derive from efforts to realign the relationship
between work and family so as to establish what NOW called "true equality
of opportunity for women. 243 This purpose seems to reach beyond the
antidiscrimination agenda of the Court's contemporary sex equality
jurisprudence. The enforcement model would prohibit Congress from
enacting Section 5 legislation to advance this purpose, forcing Congress to
justify the FMLA in terms of the Court's current antidiscrimination
doctrine.
In Section II.B we attempted to sketch such a justification, which is
noteworthy for the extent to which it must ignore or suppress the texture
and richness of the constitutional values that Section III.C demonstrates
actually moved advocates to propose the FMLA. After debating for years
how the nation's normative commitments might practically be embodied,
Congress drew upon its lawmaking powers to vindicate the sex equality
principle in an institutional form that would seem to reach well beyond the
Court's current doctrine. If the creation of constitutional law in the United
States is historically bound up in complex and politically charged processes
of the kind that we have described in Section II.B, why then should
Section 5 power be confined to the enforcement of specifically judicial
constitutional understandings?
The instinctive and immediate answer of lawyers brought up on
Marbury v. Madison2" is that Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the
Constitution, and the Constitution is what courts say it is. There is an
important sense in which this answer is true, if trivially so. Courts enforcing
the Constitution necessarily act on their view of what the Constitution
requires. This follows from the fact that courts are obligated to decide cases
according to law and hence according to their view of the law of the
Constitution. In the context of adjudication, therefore, the Constitution
243. NOW STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, supra note 132, at 161-62,
244. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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necessarily and properly is what courts say it is, even if courts say that a
particular constitutional provision is a political question that is best
interpreted by another branch of government.245
There is another sense, however, in which the lawyer's instinctive
answer is plainly false. Any historian or political scientist will tell you that
the Constitution lives a vibrant and consequential life outside the courts.
Not only do the popular branches of the federal government actively
participate in the construction of constitutional law,246 but American
politics is permeated by constitutional claims of all kinds.247 The
"Constitution" which thrives in American culture, which is a crucible for
national values and commitments, and for which Americans fought a civil
war, is assuredly not merely what courts say it is. The American
Constitution far transcends the legal Constitution construed in adjudication.
It is an open question, therefore, to which Constitution Section 5 refers.
The enforcement model answers this question by requiring Section 5 power
to enforce only the Constitution that courts would implement in
adjudication. Not only is this answer inconsistent with our history, where
Section 5 power has regularly been used to enforce the Constitution as it
exists within the general constitutional culture of the nation, but there are
also strong independent reasons for affirming Congress's authority to
employ Section 5 power to enforce its own constitutional understandings.
We thus argue in this Part that the Court ought to reject the enforcement
model and embrace an alternative account of Section 5 power. We call this
account the model of policentric constitutional interpretation.
By "policentric" we do not refer to the "polycentric" tasks analyzed by
Lon Fuller, 24  which concern problems that contain multiple and
interdependent solutions. We use the term "policentric" instead to refer to
245. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
246. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 207-28 (1999).
247. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION
IN AMERICAN CULTURE, at xi (1986) (exploring the cultural significance of the U.S. Constitution
in terms of "the perceptions and misperceptions, uses and abuses, knowledge and ignorance of
ordinary Americans"). For another account that analyzes nonjuridical constitutional claims, see
Siegel, supra note 122, at 321 ("Beliefs about the Constitution's democratic authorship authorize
and empower citizens to make claims about the Constitution's meaning that diverge from the
ways judges have interpreted it. The text of the Constitution thus elicits and channels dispute
about the forms of freedom and unfreedom in American life."); and id. at 345 ("In our
constitutional culture, elected officials and ordinary citizens understand themselves as authorized
to make claims about the Constitution's meaning and regularly act on this understanding in a wide
variety of social settings and through an array of practices, only some of which are formally
identified in the text of the Constitution itself. Considered from this positive standpoint, courts are
not the Constitution's sole expositors; instead, as judges interpret the Constitution they are
regularly informed by, and intervene in, controversies about the Constitution that are proceeding
outside of the courts.").
248. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 393-405
(1978) (written in 1961).
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the distribution of constitutional interpretation in our legal system across
multiple institutions, many of which are political in character. A central
premise of the policentric model is that both Congress and the Court should
be regarded as having independent authority to ascertain constitutional
meaning for purposes of delineating the parameters of Section 5 power. The
policentric model holds that Congress can exercise Section 5 power to enact
legislation establishing statutory rights (R,), even when Congress is acting
to enforce an understanding of constitutional rights (Re) that differs from
judicial interpretations of constitutional rights (Rj). 24 9 The policentric model
holds that courts can also act upon their own constitutional understandings
(Rj) to subject Section 5 legislation to judicial review. Courts can invalidate
Section 5 legislation that violates judicially enforceable rights or that
impermissibly impairs other constitutional values such as federalism. 250 The
policentric model insists, however, that congressional enforcement of R, is
not itself a sufficient reason to render Section 5 legislation unconstitutional
as a violation of separation of powers.
A. The Model of Policentric Constitutional Interpretation
The mere mention of independent congressional authority to interpret
the Constitution raises the specter of constitutional anarchy and collapse.
Justice Rehnquist's early and influential dissent in City of Rome v. United
States251 expressed this fear: To permit Congress to employ its Section 5
power to remedy its own interpretation of constitutional rights (R), where
R, differ from "judicially established substantive" interpretations of the
Constitution (Rj), would authorize "Congress by a legislative
Act... effectively [to] amend the Constitution., 252 Seventeen years later
the full Court adopted this reasoning, holding in Boerne that allowing
Congress to enforce R, would undermine the Constitution's status as
"superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means," relegating it to
the same "level with ordinary legislative acts alterable when the
249. This nomenclature is explained supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
250. The policentric model, in other words, emphasizes the importance for Section 5
jurisprudence of Larry Kramer's distinction between allowing the Court to have "the last word" in
a particular constitutional controversy, and granting the Court authority to pronounce "the only
word" about the Constitution's meaning. Kramer, supra note 123, at 13. Kramer correctly
observes that there is "a world of difference" between these two positions, which he identifies as
that "between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty." Id. Kramer offers a wide-ranging
history of the doctrinal arrangements that have accommodated the twin ideals of judicial
supremacy and popular constitutionalism, observing, "We may choose to accept judicial
supremacy.... But it does not follow either that the Court must wield its authority over every
question or that, when it does, the Court can dismiss or too quickly supplant the views of other,
more democratic institutions." Id.
251. 446 U.S. 156, 206-10 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 210.
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legislature shall please to alter it.... Shifting legislative majorities could
change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V."
253
There are at least two aspects to this fear of constitutional
disintegration. The first is a concern that congressional power to interpret
the Constitution would reduce the Constitution to the status of a mere
legislative act, without paramount authority. This conclusion, however,
does not follow. The Constitution is a form of higher law for Congress, just
as it is for the Court. Whatever interpretation Congress makes of the
Constitution is binding on Congress, just as whatever interpretation the
Court makes of the Constitution is binding on the Court. We do not think
that the Constitution is demoted to the same status as "ordinary legislative
acts" merely because courts retain the authority to interpret Article III
restrictions on their own power. By parity of reasoning, Congress's
authority to interpret the constitutional nature of its own power does not
logically relegate the Constitution to that inferior status. Along similar
lines, potential changes of congressional interpretation no more "amend"
the Constitution than do potential changes of judicial interpretation.25 4 In
either case, the Constitution remains theoretically paramount and binding.
There is, however, a second aspect to the fear of congressional
authority to interpret the Constitution. There is an intuitive sense that such
authority may be practically inconsistent with constitutionalism, as we have
come to know it. This point sounds in the mechanics of practical
government. It has been argued that the undisciplined nature of a legislature
253. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
254. It is true that judicial interpretations of Article III may follow the form of stare decisis
and thus be law in a different sense than congressional interpretations of the Constitution, which
do not on the whole understand themselves to be bound by precedent in the same way. But stare
decisis is only one form of constitutional interpretation. Originalism, for example, is
"fundamentally inconsistent" with stare decisis because it requires a court in each case to make a
new judgment about the question of original intent. Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 925 (1998). If one were a thoroughgoing originalist,
therefore, there would be no difference between congressional and judicial judgments of
constitutional meaning. This suggests that stare decisis is not essential to constitutional
interpretation, but instead to rule-of-law values, which can reach no further than our commitment
to the Constitution as law. Even within judicial interpretations of the Constitution, however, rule-
of-law values are limited by a fidelity to the Constitution itself. Robert Post, Theories of
Constitutional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at 13, 27. For a discussion of the
tension between originalism and stare decisis, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1772-74
(1997); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723 (1998); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV, 1587,
1591 (1997); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 139-40 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power To Enact Color-
Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 491-94 (1998); and Ernest
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,
72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 674 n.274 (1994).
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(as distinct from a court) would lead Congress to interpret the Constitution
in self-serving and political ways that would (in Justice Rehnquist's careful
choice of words) "effectively" reduce the Constitution to the status of
ordinary legislation. We agree that there are circumstances in which courts
should vindicate constitutional values by imposing on congressional action
an external restraint like judicial review. But we vigorously contest the
Court's premise that politics is a sphere so debased that it can only corrupt
constitutional deliberation. As we demonstrated in Part III, it is misguided
to believe that it always serves our constitutional order to keep
constitutional law and constitutional politics rigorously segregated.
Our contention in this Part is that there are important advantages to
establishing a relationship between constitutional law and constitutional
politics in the specific context of Section 5, and that this can be
accomplished without harm to the rule-of-law values that are traditionally
protected by the institution of judicial review. We propose a model of
policentric constitutional interpretation that does not disable courts from
interpreting the Constitution in ways that are binding on Congress. The fact
that Congress is authorized to pass Section 5 legislation enforcing R, does
not mean that courts are also required to enforce R,. To the contrary, courts
are obligated to enforce the law of the Constitution, as courts understand
that law. The policentric model holds only that courts applying the law of
the Constitution should interpret Section 5 as authorizing Congress to act
on its own independent understanding of the Constitution. Courts remain
free to strike down Section 5 legislation that violates judicially enforceable
rights or that impermissibly infringes other constitutional values like
federalism.
Our discussion proceeds in four stages. First, we advance the positive
case for congressional interpretive authority in the context of Section 5
power. This case depends upon the important advantages of
institutionalizing what we have previously called "the subtle but
fundamental interconnections between the constitutional dimensions of our
political life and the democratic dimensions of our constitutional
culture." 255 We next discuss the potential disadvantages of explicitly
recognizing independent congressional authority to interpret the
Constitution in the exercise of Congress's Section 5 power. We then
evaluate the limitations that ought to circumscribe Congress's power to
interpret the Constitution when exercising its authority under Section 5 to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, we discuss how the family
leave provisions of the FMLA would be analyzed under the policentric
model.
255. Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 3.
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B. The Affirmative Case for Policentric Constitutional
Interpretation
There are several distinct grounds on which one can build the
affirmative case for independent congressional interpretive authority in the
context of Section 5 power. There is strong evidence, for example, that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for Congress to possess
something like this authority.256 There is, moreover, a forceful textualist
argument for such authority. The Court's own claim to the prerogative of
constitutional interpretation in Marbury v. Madison257 rests on the premise
that courts must decide cases, and hence that courts must interpret and
apply pertinent law, including the law of the Constitution. Judicial power to
interpret the Constitution thus derives from the judicial obligation to
enforce the law.258 But if judicial authority to interpret flows from judicial
power to enforce, the explicit text of Section 5, which authorizes Congress
"to enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, would seem to
endow Congress with equal interpretive authority. In the context of Section
5, the judicial prerogative to interpret the Constitution asserted in Marbury
stands on exactly the same footing as a congressional prerogative to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.
We do not in this Article pursue either of these lines of argument.
Instead, building on work we have previously published 259 and on the
history recounted in Part III, we argue that attributing independent
interpretive authority to Congress in the context of Section 5 is an important
way of ensuring that constitutional law remains in touch with the
constitutional beliefs and experience of the American people. Like Article
V, legislative constitutionalism is a structural mechanism of democratic
accountability. Among other functions, it serves to underwrite the
256. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 794-817 (2002); James W. Fox Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings:
Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67
(2002); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Comment: Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174-83 (1997);
Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v.
Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 141-45 (1999); cf Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 822-25 (1999) (arguing that a broad
understanding of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment throws into question City of Boerne's
narrow reading of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and positing that the legislative
history of the latter supports an intermediary congressional power of interpretation located
between a plenary and remedial power); Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends
Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1158-66 (2001).
257. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
258. Id. at 177 ("Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule.").
259. The discussion of this Section draws heavily on the reasoning and evidence presented in
Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 17-33.
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continuing legitimacy of the very constitutional law that courts seek to
enforce.
The enforcement model justifies restrictions on legislative
constitutionalism by appealing to the common intuition that the
Constitution will suffer if it is contaminated with politics. The sources of
this intuition are various. Congressional authority to interpret the
Constitution threatens the idea that the Constitution is singular, so that its
"real" provisions must inhere in the judgments of one branch of
government. The fear is that authorizing Congress to enforce R,, when R,
differ from Rj, will shatter the unity of the Constitution and thus undermine
the legitimacy of constitutional law. Congressional interpretive authority
would also seem to legitimate Congress's inherently more fluid and
political perspective on constitutional meaning, which may seem to
undercut the stability required by the rule-of-law values associated with
judicial review. Our point, however, is that these various objections
fundamentally misconceive the nature of our constitutional order, which is
neither narrowly legal nor singular and static.
The Constitution is not an exclusiveiy legal document. It is not
addressed only to courts. From the very founding of the republic, the
Constitution has been viewed by Americans as the preeminent and all-
encompassing symbol of American nationhood. Part III demonstrated how
Americans of all political persuasions, ranging from mobilized citizens to
government officials, have debated the most profound and divisive
questions of national identity and purpose through the medium of
constitutional law.260  "For us," Franklin Roosevelt observed, "the
,,261Constitution is a common bond. It is the compendium of values and
commitments that holds us together despite our diversity and differences.
As a matter of simple historical fact, the Constitution has been subject to
policentric interpretation, meaning that it has been the subject of
widespread interpretive controversy and debate, through the full range of
our legal and political institutions.
260. For work exploring the constitutional advocacy of the labor movement, see William E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Forbath, supra note
195; Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 49
(2000); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997); and
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). On the
constitutional advocacy of the women's movement, see Siegel, supra note 146; and Siegel, supra
note 122. On the constitutional advocacy of the civil rights movement, see William E. Forbath,
Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1821 (2001); and Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
261. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's
Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 367 (1941).
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Nor is the Constitution a static document that possesses only a single,
unchanging meaning. Although the text of the Constitution has remained
relatively fixed, its import has evolved continuously throughout our history.
This is true even of technical judicial interpretations of the Constitution.
Neither the First Amendment, nor the Equal Protection Clause, nor the Due
Process Clause, mean the same thing today as they meant in 1903. As they
apply constitutional text to novel and unanticipated situations, courts
continuously reinterpret the Constitution through the lens of new
experiences and values. Policentric interpretations of the Constitution are an
important dimension of that lens. Judicial understandings of the
Constitution are constantly in "dialogue" with alternative interpretations of
the Constitution, including the interpretations of Congress 262 and social
movements. 26 As Keith Whittington has explained:
The authority to interpret the Constitution is shared by multiple
institutions and actors within our political system, and tends to flow
among them over time rather than remain fixed in a stable
hierarchical or segmented distribution. The question is less whether
we should have extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, than how
we should evaluate it and how various constitutional interpreters
should relate to one another as they engage in their common task.
... Once we recognize that extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation can co-exist with judicial review, then the normative
case for and against extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
primarily goes to the question of how much deference the judiciary
should show to other political actors in formulating doctrine and
evaluating the constitutionality of legislation and how much
deference nonjudicial actors should show the judiciary in
articulating constitutional understandings and taking political
actions.M
262. See DEVNS, supra note 120, at 233-47; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 28-29
(1994); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1993);
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 11-12 (2000) ("[T]he process of constitutional interpretation benefits
from the thoughtful participation of the elected representatives of the people in the public dialogue
about the meaning of the Constitution."). For an "institutional competition conception of
constitutional meaning," see PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 178-81 (1983). For a general account that emphasizes some of the ways
congressional constitutional "construction" differs from judicial constitutional interpretation, see
WHITTINGTON, supra note 246.
263. See Eskridge, supra note 127; supra note 260.
264. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002). Louis Fisher has argued:
The courts find themselves engaged in a "continuing colloquy" with political
institutions and society at large, a process in which constitutional principle is "evolved
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The plain historical fact is that judicial and nonjudicial interpretations
of the Constitution frequently coexist and contend for the allegiance of the
country. The unity of the Constitution is a perception sustained by intricate
webs of institutional relationships, rather than by any faux singularity of
meaning. Precisely because the Constitution has political as well as legal
dimensions, we expect it to be a site of contestation and disagreement
where Americaps confront and negotiate over competing visions of the
Nation. Judicial interpretations of the Constitution participate in this
ongoing cultural struggle. Sometimes they influence the constitutional
understandings of other actors, and sometimes they are influenced by them.
Nonjudicial constructions of the Constitution may thus importantly
affect the development of judicial doctrine. The history we have recounted
in Part III is a perfect case in point. In response to an emergent feminist
vision of the Constitution, Congress not only proposed the ERA, but in
1972 used its Section 5 power to enact the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act (EEOA), thereby extending Title VII's prohibition of sex-based
employment discrimination to the states.265  Congress announced,
"Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of
prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of
social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination., 66 Yet in 1972
the Court was still interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require that
sex-based classifications receive only rational basis review.267 In the end,
the Court not only approved the EEOA as an exercise of Section 5
conversationally and not perfected unilaterally." It is this process of give and take and
mutual respect that permits the unelected Court to function in a democratic society.
LOUiS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 273
(1988) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 240, 244 (1962)).
Neal Devins has also emphasized political aspects of constitutional dialogue:
Most landmark Supreme Court decisions ... cannot be understood without paying
attention to the politics surrounding them. First, justices pay attention to a case's social
and political context when crafting their decisions. Second, political responses to a
decision often serve as a benchmark for measuring the correctness of Supreme Court
fact finding. Third, political judgments shape Court doctrine, especially decisions
concerning the constitutional grounds on which to base legislative or administrative
initiatives. Fourth, the willingness of governmental actors to support or resist judicial
decision-making contributes to the ultimate meaning of Court action. And fifth, once
the Supreme Court has decided a case, a constitutional dialogue takes place between the
Court and elected government, often resulting in a later decision more to the liking of
political actors.
DEVINS, supra note 120, at 7.
265. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972).
266. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141; see also
S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7-8 (1971) (emphasizing the Committee's view that discrimination against
women is just as serious as other forms of discrimination by discussing parallels and correlation
between racial discrimination and discrimination based on sex).
267. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,
466 (1948).
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power, 268 but it also modified its own understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause to conform to the vision of Congress.269
We can learn a good deal from this story. The EEOA was an outgrowth
of the constitutional mobilization that we described in Part III. That
mobilization, in turn, was importantly oriented toward the goal of changing
the law of the Constitution. Although the First Amendment ensures that all
Americans can express their beliefs about the Constitution, the activists of
the 1960s and 1970s came together not merely to speak and to persuade, but
positively to alter the American constitutional order. This objective
endowed their activism with focus and direction. The enforcement model,
which would deprive Congress of the authority to speak the law of the
Constitution as it did when enacting the EEOA, would have stripped this
activism of its very telos. It would have eviscerated the political sources of
the Court's own constitutional innovation and development.
Once the EEOA was enacted, moreover, Congress and the Court each
continued to act on a different understanding of whether the Constitution
prohibited sex discrimination. 270 This did not produce constitutional chaos
or anarchy, however, in part because our constitutional culture uses a wide
variety of techniques for managing and dissipating the cognitive dissonance
and institutional conflict that disagreement about the Constitution's
meaning might engender.271 The prevalence of these techniques no doubt
reflects the value to our constitutional order of tolerating interpretive
heterogeneity. During the 1970s, for example, the discrepancy between Rj
and R, created a rich and complex constitutional environment that would
eventually become an important resource for the Court's efforts to reshape
its own equal protection jurisprudence. The institutionally divergent
constitutional perspectives of Congress and the Court proved to be
generative and constructive.272
If the Court has particular strengths in explicating the Constitution as a
rule of law, Congress is especially well-situated to respond to changes in
constitutional culture.273 Congress's advantage in this regard follows from
its political accountability, which over the course of the nation's history has
often made it more attentive than the Court to the evolving constitutional
268. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
269. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
270. Congress had first employed its Section 5 authority to prohibit sex-based discrimination
in the momentous Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000(a) (2000)). On Congress's use of its Section 5 power to
enact the Civil Rights Act, see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 447.
271. See infra notes 304-312 and accompanying text.
272. See Siegel, supra note 122, at 350-51 (discussing the various ways that such interpretive
heterogeneity can strengthen the constitutional order); see also supra note 126.
273. For an important discussion of the ethical and jurisprudential distinctions between the
Constitution as interpreted from the perspective of the Court and the Constitution as interpreted
from the perspective of Congress, see WEST, supra note 197, at 308-15.
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aspirations and ideals of the American people-even the aspirations and
ideals of relatively disempowered groups of citizens. That is why Congress
was able to sense the country's changing ideas of sex equality long before
the Court. Congress's ability to deploy its Section 5 power to translate these
ideas into constitutional terms proved helpful and instructive to the Court's
efforts to grapple with the question of gender.
This history suggests that the dynamic tension between judicial and
legislative enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment is important to
maintain because the Court's understanding of constitutional law must
remain in touch with the constitutional aspirations and ideals of the
American people.274 When judicial doctrine grows too detached from the
constitutional culture of the nation, a crisis is likely to emerge, as during the
time of Dred Scott or the New Deal.275 That is why the Constitution creates
institutional structures that ensure that the political and legal dimensions of
our Constitution remain roughly interlocked.2 76 There are numerous
structural devices that facilitate communication between the political and
legal dimensions of the Constitution. Joint legislative and judicial
enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments is one such mechanism.
Just as courts possess forms of authority that legislatures do not enjoy,
so too Congress possesses forms of authority that courts can never achieve.
Congress can draw on its distinctive capacity democratically to elicit and
articulate the nation's evolving constitutional aspirations when it enforces
the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the institutionally specific ways
that Congress can negotiate conflict and build consensus, it can enact
statutes that are comprehensive and redistributive, and so vindicate
constitutional values in ways that courts cannot. The special authority of
Congress allows it to endow the nation's constitutional commitments with
practical life in legislation that is not constrained by the institutional
274. This point carries especial force for the equality norms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For an account of these norms as rooted in evolving social practices, see Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2000).
275. We do not mean to imply that the Court must follow these aspirations and ideals if its
legal conclusions dictate otherwise. We need only make the milder point that the nation's political
apprehension of the Constitution is relevant to the Court's legal understanding. We discuss in
detail the relationship between the two in Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 25-26.
276. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 123, at 1068 ("Partisan entrenchment through
presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V
amendment."); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 285-91 (1957) (arguing that "the policy views dominant
on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States," and examining cases in which the Court has held federal
legislation unconstitutional to confirm this contention); Robert C. Post, Sustaining the Premise of
Legality: Learning To Live with Bush v. Gore, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
96, 102 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) ("By specifying that the president shall appoint justices,
rather than the reverse, the Constitution signifies that the political choice collectively made by the
American people should inform the Court's vision of law.").
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limitations associated with Article III courts. The FMLA itself illustrates
just how deeply legislative constitutionalism can differ from judicial
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The distinct political dimensions of legislative constitutionalism enable
Congress to articulate constitutional aspirations in a manner that
consolidates constitutional values, and hence that enhances the likelihood
that judicial interpretations of the Constitution will receive the political
allegiance that is frequently necessary for their full legitimation. As we
have shown elsewhere, for example, even so profound a constitutional
vision as Brown v. Board of Education277 was not "firmly law" until it was
able to inspire the political support of Congress and the President. 78
Similarly, the vibrant legislative constitutionalism of the Ninety-Second
Congress helped to ensure the legitimacy of the Court's new constitutional
doctrine of sex equality.
The affirmative case for authorizing Congress independently to
interpret the Constitution in the context of Section 5 power is therefore that
our Constitution has both political and legal dimensions that must remain
linked to each other in order to maintain the democratic accountability of
our constitutional order. This linkage is necessary not only to avoid
constitutional crises but also to facilitate the legitimacy and wisdom of the
Court's legal interpretations of the Constitution. As Part III demonstrated,
Congress's authority independently to interpret the Constitution in the
exercise of its Section 5 power provides an important focus for forms of
political mobilization that tie the Constitution to the nation's evolving
commitments and purposes. Explicit recognition of this authority would
give members of Congress confidence in the legitimacy of their efforts to
use Section 5 power to enforce R,, and thus not only to reflect democratic
constitutional aspirations, but also to offer significant evidence to the Court
about the developing constitutional culture of the United States.
C. The Case Against Policentric Constitutional Interpretation
The major objection to the policentric model of interpretation sounds in
separation of powers. Authorizing Congress to enact Section 5 legislation to
enforce its independent interpretation of the Constitution is said to threaten
"'the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' 279 The nature
of this threat, however, is quite obscure.
277. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
278. Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 30-3 1; see also Cox, supra note 183, at 94.
279. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Scalia,
supra note 119, at 854.
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No one doubts that Americans of all political perspectives constantly
advance interpretations of the Constitution or that Americans in all stations
of life continuously mobilize to advocate for these interpretations. Popular
mobilization on behalf of a constitutional vision is ordinarily considered
evidence of healthy political engagement rather than as a threat to judicial
authority. We do not regard the continual streams of constitutional
interpretation that percolate through American culture as inconsistent with
the judiciary's ability to maintain the Constitution as law. Congressional
interpretations of the Constitution, by contrast, are more controversial
because they have the force of law and hence seem to pose a direct
challenge to the Court's ultimate control over constitutional meaning.
In this Section we argue that the mere fact that Section 5 legislation
seeks to enforce an understanding of the Constitution that differs from the
Court's does not threaten principles of separation of powers. We
emphasize, however, that under the policentric model Section 5 legislation
remains subject to judicial review, so that it can be challenged if it threatens
individual rights or other rule-of-law values. In Section IV.D we discuss the
circumstances in which courts may invalidate such legislation.
The potential inconsistency between policentric constitutional
interpretation and judicial review was first and perhaps most forcefully
articulated by the second Justice Harlan in his dissent in Katzenbach v.
Morgan.280 Harlan famously charged that if Congress were permitted to
employ its Section 5 power in a way that effectively defined "the
substantive scope of the" Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could also
"exercise its § 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court. '281 Harlan's
objection, however, has no application to the model of policentric
constitutional interpretation.
Justice Harlan's separation-of-powers objection fails because the
proposition that Congress has power to enforce R, does not logically or
practically imply that courts must enforce R, or, differently put, that courts
cannot enforce Rj. To the contrary, it is only on the assumption that
Congress and the Court must enforce the same understanding of the
Constitution that Section 5 legislation poses any potential threat to judicial
protection for individual rights. Thus it is only if one accepts the premise of
the enforcement model that judicial approval of Section 5 legislation binds
courts to congressional understandings of Rj.
Under the policentric model, by contrast, judicial interpretations of the
Constitution are institutionally distinct from legislative understandings.
Courts are therefore free to exercise their interpretive autonomy to decide
280. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 668 (emphasis omitted),
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whether to reject the normative understandings that inform R, or instead to
accept these understandings and incorporate them into Rj. So, for example,
even if the Ninety-Second Congress believed that the Equal Protection
Clause required legislation to provide childcare in order to allow women to
become fully participating members of society, the Court need not itself
recognize any such affirmative entitlement in litigation to enforce Section 1
rights. Conversely, the fact that Congress has employed its Section 5 power
to enact explicit legislative classifications based upon race should not
preclude the Court from independently determining whether such
classifications violate the Court's own interpretation of the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause.
282
If the policentric model does not impair the institution of judicial
review, it is not clear why it would pose a threat to the values protected by
separation of powers. Principles of separation of powers do not require that
the "branches of Government 'operate with absolute independence' ;213
they instead guarantee "'that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government.' 284 Policentric constitutional interpretation
would violate separation of powers only if it undermined the capacity of
courts to perform their assigned function of adjudication.
It is almost certainly the case that policentric constitutional
interpretation, as such, will not have this effect. We know this because we
have lived in a world of independent congressional interpretive authority
for more than 130 years, as can be seen in the history of Congress's
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Amendment
prohibits "slavery" and "involuntary servitude... within the United
States." Section 2 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." The Court has been quite circumspect in
declaring what rights it will itself enforce pursuant to Section 1, so much so
that it has repeatedly refused to decide "whether the Thirteenth
Amendment.. accomplished anything more than the abolition of
slavery." 285 Yet the Court has expansively interpreted Congress's power to
282. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny
of classifications based on race in federal law is necessary to ensure that constitutional rights have
not been infringed). In our view, the failure of Adarand does not lie in the Court's refusal to defer
to Congress, but rather in the Court's misapprehension of the Fifth Amendment.
283. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 707 (1974)).
284. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
285. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 n.17 (1982); see also
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1981) (leaving open the question whether
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment "by its own terms did anything more than abolish
slavery," "because a review of the justification for the official action challenged in this case
demonstrates that its disparate impact on black citizens could not, in any event, be fairly
characterized as a badge or incident of slavery"); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439
(1968) ("'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth Amendment 'abolished slavery, and
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enact legislation regulating the "badges and incidents of slavery." '286 Such
legislation, which includes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 enacted during
Reconstruction,287 goes far beyond anything that could plausibly be
justified as enforcing the Rj that the Court has attributed to Section 1.
In defining Congress's authority under Section 2, therefore, the Court
has pointedly observed that Senator Trumbull of Illinois, the Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee that recommended the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Senate in 1864, was "surely... right" to argue that under Section 2
Congress would
have authority, by appropriate legislation, to carry into effect the
article prohibiting slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate
legislation is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for
Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think
proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.288
cstablishcd universal freedom.' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 20. Whether or not the
Amendment itself did any more than that-a question not involved in this case-it is at least clear
that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that
clause clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.' ]bid. (Emphasis added.)"); cf Arnold v. Bd.
of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 315 n. 12 (1 lth Cir. 1989) ("[It appears that when only the [Thirteenth]
amendment itself is concerned, absent any statute, the amendment is given a very narrow
interpretation as to what constitutes the badges and incidents of slavery."); Flowers v. TJX Cos.,
No. 91-cv-1339, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 1994) ("The Supreme
Court has narrowly construed the direct, self-executing meaning of the [Thirteenth]
Amendment."); Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[C]ourts have declined
to hold that the [Thirteenth] Amendment itself reaches forms of discrimination other than slavery
and involuntary servitude.").
286. The phrase "badges and incidents of slavery" originated in the Civil Rights Cases. 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883). The Court has used the phrase at least once in the context of judicially
enforceable rights under Section 1. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). Most
frequently, however, the phrase denotes the measure of congressional power under Section 2. See,
e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 390 n.17; Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
226-27 (1971); cf Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Appellees contend
that there is no direct private right of action under the [13th] Amendment because Congress acting
under § 2 is the creator and definer of 13th Amendment rights. While it is true that suits attacking
the 'badges and incidents of slavery' must be based on a statute enacted under § 2, suits attacking
compulsory labor arise directly under prohibition of § 1, which is 'undoubtedly self-executing
without any ancillary legislation' and '[b]y its own unaided force and effect... abolished slavery
and established universal freedom."' (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20) (second and
third alterations in original)); Holland v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 794 F. Supp. 420, 424
(D.D.C. 1992).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) (2000) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same ight in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
42 U.S.C. § 1982 also provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
288. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440. Jones glossed Trumbull's remarks in terms of the same "rational
basis" methodology that the Court had employed four years earlier in South Carolina and
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2035
The Yale Law Journal
In none of the Court's decisions expansively interpreting congressional
authority under Section 2 has the Court made any effort to apply the
enforcement model by connecting the rights established in congressional
legislation to rights that the Court was itself willing to enforce in Section 1
litigation.289 Congress has thus been free to establish Re, and it has done so
at least since 1870. The Court has explicitly blessed this practice since
1968 .290 Throughout this long period there has been no discernible
impairment of separation-of-powers values.
A similar point can be made about the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. During the period (roughly) between Morgan and Boerne,
Congress aggressively exercised independent constitutional interpretive
authority, and yet the capacity of the judicial branch to perform its assigned
functions was never impaired. Congress was able to exercise such authority
because the Court during that period explicitly deferred to Congress's
Morgan: "Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determinc what arc the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation. Nor can we say that the determination Congress has made
is an irrational one." Id. at 440-41. Jones, like South Carolina and Morgan, went on to describe
Section 2 enforcement in terms of the test of McCulloch v. Maryland. Id. at 443-44. But Jones,
unlike South Carolina and Morgan, made no effort whatsoever to connect the R, in the statute it
was considering (§ 1982) to the R that the Court was willing to enforce in applying Section 1.
Indeed, Jones expressly refused to address the question of what Rj a court would enforce under
Section 1. Id. at 439.
289. Typical in this regard is the Court's decision in Palmer v. Thompson, in which the Court
refused to conclude that the decision of a Southern city to close a swimming pool that had been
ordered desegregated violated Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment:
Finally, some faint and unpersuasive argument has been made by petitioners that
the closing of the pools violated the Thirteenth Amendment which freed the Negroes
from slavery. The argument runs this way: The first Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 552, (1896), argued strongly that the purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment was not only to outlaw slavery but also all of its "badges and
incidents." This broad reading of the amendment was affirmed in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968). The denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools
with white people is said to be a "badge or incident" of slavery. Consequently, the
argument seems to run, this Court should declare that the city's closing of the pools to
keep the two races from swimming together violates the Thirteenth Amendment. To
reach that result from the Thirteenth Amendment would severely stretch its short
simple words and do violence to its history. Establishing this Court's authority under
the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and
cities of the country would grant it a law-making power far beyond the imagination of
the amendment's authors. Finally, although the Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy
collection of words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the operation of
swimming pools throughout the length and breadth of this Nation, the Amendment does
contain other words that we held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could empower
Congress to outlaw "badges of slavery." The last sentence of the Amendment reads:
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
But Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a city's opening or closing
of swimming pools or other recreational facilities.
403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971).
290. See Jones, 392 U.S. 409.
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judgment about whether R, were actually attempts to enforce Rj.29 1 This
deference ceded to Congress such broad discretion that as a practical matter
there was simply no way to know whether Congress was enforcing Rj or
instead enforcing Rc.29 2
The result was a doctrinal structure that, as Justice Stewart asserted in
his opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, effectively empowered Congress "not
only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter
of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the
clause., 293 A decade later, then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Rome on
identical grounds, arguing that judicial deference effectively ceded to
Congress the power to "'determine as a matter of substantive constitutional
law what situations fall within the ambit' of the Equal Protection
Clause.294
There was truth in Stewart's and Rehnquist's dissents. Although during
the period from Morgan to Boerne the Court asserted a formal supremacy
in the interpretation of the Constitution, 29 5 it in fact tolerated a wide range
of Section 5 legislation effectively enforcing distinct legislative
constructions of the Constitution.296 The Court did not regard this
legislation as a threat to its authority. Indeed, virtually the same Court that
decided Cooper v. Aaron297 also decided Katzenbach v. Morgan, which tells
us that the Court itself saw no inconsistency between, on the one hand,
judicial supremacy over interpretations of judicially enforceable rights
lodged in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, on the other hand,
291. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
292. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) ("[1]t is enough that we perceive a
basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's
English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in
Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); see also City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("Congress could rationally have concluded that.., it
was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.").
293. 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
294. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon, 400 U.S. at
296 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also id. at 219-20 ("The result
reached by the Court today can be sustained only upon the theory that Congress was empowered
to determine that structural changes with a disparate impact on a minority group's ability to elect a
candidate of their race violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.").
295. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (finding that the Court must be "supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution").
296. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(3) (2000);
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13,981(a); Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694, 694; Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000(a));
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154; Civil Rights Act of 1968, S. REP. No. 90-721, at 7 (1967),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1843.
297. 358 U.S. 1.
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allowing Congress effectively to exercise independent constitutional
interpretive authority for the purpose of enacting Section 5 legislation.
Certainly no one now suggests that the Warren Court was somehow
compromised in its ability to perform its judicial functions by the Section 5
jurisprudence of Morgan. We take this as powerful evidence that, contrary
to the Court's reasoning in Boerne, the mere fact of independent
congressional interpretive power in the enforcement of the Reconstruction
Amendments works no adverse effect on the judicial power of the United
States.
The separation-of-powers objection to congressional enforcement of R,
thus does not hold. Our constitutional order is not harmed by legislative
constitutionalism, and it may well be strengthened by it. It might be argued,
however, that the same reasons that would lead courts to recognize
Congress's authority to enforce R, when Section 5 legislation is challenged
as inconsistent with separation of powers might also lead courts to defer to
R, when courts interpret constitutional provisions safeguarding individual
rights, and that such deference would undermine essential rule-of-law
values. But this argument fails, because the policentric model specifically
contemplates that courts will enforce their own interpretations of Rj, even
when Congress is exercising its Section 5 power to enforce R,. A fortiori
the model does not imply that courts must or should defer to congressional
interpretations of the Constitution when the Court is called upon to protect
individual rights. Under the policentric model, courts may consider R, as
they interpret the Constitution, but courts remain autonomous in judgment
and must ultimately enforce their own understandings of Rj.
Courts typically address the relationship between legislative and
judicial judgment when they formulate the substantive contours of a judicial
right. Courts establish constitutional rights to define and protect their
understanding of constitutional principles, 298 and these principles normally
entail a vision of how rule-of-law values should be coordinated with
political judgment. Each of the notorious three tiers of scrutiny within equal
protection doctrine, for example, purports to establish a different
relationship between political judgment and the rule of law, and these
distinct relationships are in turn justified by reference to the principles that
the Equal Protection Clause is understood to safeguard. An analogous point
can be made about the distinction between content-neutral and content-
based regulations of speech within First Amendment doctrine: Courts defer
to legislative judgments far more readily for content-neutral regulations
than for content-based regulations, and this difference is justified by
298. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 1 (1995).
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reference to the constitutional principles protected by the First
Amendment.
299
When courts theorize the substance of rights, therefore, they also
theorize the relationship between judicial and legislative judgment. The
nature of this relationship will reflect diverse factors, which may include
the character and importance of the constitutional values protected by the
right, the connection between the right and democratic processes, the
distinct functions and competencies of courts and legislatures, and so forth.
The model of policentric constitutional interpretation represents our best
account of how such factors should be analyzed when courts are called
upon to evaluate separation-of-powers challenges to the exercise of Section
5 power. Asking courts to respect Congress as a body that engages in
constitutional deliberation when enacting Section 5 legislation may incline
courts to respect Congress's constitutional judgments in other contexts, but
the argument we have advanced does not require it. Our analysis has no
necessary implications for how the relationship between judicial and
legislative judgment ought to be analyzed in the context of specific rights.
D. Policentric Constitutional Interpretation and
Constitutional Validity
The model of policentric constitutional interpretation does not imply
that all Section 5 legislation is constitutional. The model asserts only that
Section 5 legislation should not be deemed unconstitutional merely because
it enforces R, as distinct from Rj. The model leaves open any and every
other reason to find Section 5 legislation unconstitutional.
The most obvious reason for striking down Section 5 legislation is that
it violates constitutional rights. The model of policentric constitutional
interpretation attributes to Section 5 legislation the same structural
relationship between power and rights as that which obtains for every other
form of federal legislation. Courts assessing a federal statute normally ask
two logically distinct questions: (1) Does Congress have the power to enact
the statute? (2) Does the statute violate any constitutional rights? Thus
Congress may have power to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause,
but the existence of this power does not settle the question whether the
statute violates a distinct constitutional provision like the First Amendment.
The same structure of analysis applies to the model of policentric
constitutional interpretation. The model asks, first, whether Congress has
the power to enact Section 5 legislation. The answer to this question turns
on whether Congress intends to enforce its understanding of Section 1 of
299. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, and not upon whether Congress has correctly
anticipated how courts will enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The model thus addresses the question of power through
ordinary techniques of statutory interpretation. The model then asks a
second and logically distinct question, which is whether Section 5
legislation violates any rights that courts will enforce against Congress. The
source of congressional power is not generally determinative of this
question. If legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause violates
the First Amendment, so will that same legislation if enacted under
Section 5.300
The Court sometimes invalidates federal statutes not because they
violate rights, but because they infringe what the Court has called
"'essential postulates"' that define "the structure of the Constitution. ' 0'
One such postulate is federalism, which the Court has used to strike down
statutes that Congress would otherwise have power to enact. An objection
to the policentric model might be that independent congressional authority
to interpret the Constitution might transform Section 5 power into a vehicle
of unlimited power, capable of imposing boundless burdens on states. If
one were inclined to fear such an outcome because one did not trust the
political safeguards of federalism,30 2 then the policentric model might seem
unacceptable. It is therefore important to stress that nothing in the
policentric model prevents the Court from using postulates of federalism in
appropriate circumstances to strike down a statute that Congress would
otherwise have power under Section 5 to enact. Although we defer until
Part V a full analysis of how the values of federalism ought to be integrated
with the prerogatives of Section 5 power, we note at this point that
requiring the Court explicitly to justify such holdings by articulating the
scope and nature of these values in fact would work a positive improvement
over current doctrine.
A second constitutional postulate that can invalidate legislation is
separation of powers. The model of policentric constitutional interpretation
holds that separation of powers is not violated by the mere fact that
Congress has chosen to enforce R,, as distinct from Rj. This does not imply,
300. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) ("[N]either
Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) ("[T]he Constitution is filled with
provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these
granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that
violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.").
301. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
302. But see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 228-33 (2000).
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however, that Section 5 legislation is otherwise exempt from the
requirements of separation of powers. The policentric model would apply
these requirements according to the same logic we have already considered.
Statutes that Congress otherwise has power to enact would be scrutinized to
determine if they are so incompatible with principles of separation of
powers as to be unconstitutional. If Congress were to use its Section 5
power to enact a statute containing a one-house veto, for example, the
policentric model would not insulate the legislation from constitutional
review.
30 3
There are questions of separation of powers, however, that seem
distinctive to the particular context of Section 5 legislation. There is no
gainsaying the potential for friction when Congress gives the force of law to
one understanding of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (Re) and the
Court gives the force of law to a different understanding (Rj). A strict
theory of departmentalism might hold that no variance between judicial and
congressional understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment could ever
violate separation of powers, because each branch enjoys plenary
constitutional authority to interpret the Constitution "independently.'3I 4 But
we disagree. The policentric model recognizes that there are times when
interbranch disagreements can erupt into confrontation and hostility that in
fact might threaten the principles of separation of powers. From the
perspective of the Court, separation of powers might well prohibit
congressional legislation that directly undermines or erodes judicial
authority to interpret the Constitution.
The essential premise of the policentric model is that judicial authority
is not threatened by the mere fact that Congress and the Court differ in their
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such differences are
endemic and have persisted since the enactment of the Reconstruction
Amendments. The potentially adverse effects of such differences are
usually muffled by the ambiguity, equivocation, indirection, and deference
that ordinarily characterize the relationship between judicial and
congressional interpretive authority. Both the Court and Congress normally
seek to defuse potential tension that may arise from the policentric nature of
constitutional interpretation.
In the period between Morgan and Boerne, for example, the Court
articulated doctrine that systematically blurred the distinction between
statutory and constitutional rights. The thrust of this doctrine, which we
have elsewhere called the "Katzenbach approach," affirmed Section 5
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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legislation without ever squarely resolving the question of how R, were
related to R. As we have observed:
During the period between Brown and Boerne, Congress
responded to the Court's encouragement by using its Section 5
power to enact civil rights statutes that transformed the
enforcement of antidiscrimination norms into a major responsibility
of the national government. The Court, in turn, systematically
refused to clarify the status of this legislation, reserving the
question on so many occasions that its decisionmaking appears to
have been deliberate. For ease of nomenclature, we can call this
apparent policy of maintaining ambiguity about the constitutional
status of statutory norms the "Katzenbach approach.,
30 5
The ambiguity of the Katzenbach approach dampened whatever tension
might possibly result from two competing legal understandings of
constitutional rights.
During this same period Congress also sought to avoid direct
confrontation with the Court. It enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, using both its power under Section 5 and its power under the
Commerce Clause, thus blurring the exact parameters of its Section 5
power.30 6 The Court subsequently participated in this equivocation by
holding that the specifically constitutional reasoning of Geduldig v.
A ie1o 307 applied directly to Title VII of the Act,30 8 seeming to conclude that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination on the
basis of sex for Title VII because it was not discrimination on the basis of
sex for the Equal Protection Clause.
Congress disagreed with this interpretation, responding swiftly and
decisively to amend Title VII by enacting the PDA to provide that
discrimination based upon pregnancy was discrimination based upon sex
for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.309 But because the Court had
already upheld Congress's efforts to use its Section 5 authority to impose
the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII directly upon states,31 0 the
PDA effectively legislated an understanding both of Title VII and of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The PDA revealed an important disagreement
305. Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 38 (footnotes omitted).
306. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). For a discussion,
see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 447 & n.22.
307. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
308. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
309. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); see also Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (recognizing that by enacting
the PDA, Congress sought to establish that the exclusion of disabilities caused by pregnancy from
an employer's disability plan constitutes discrimination based on sex).
310. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also supra notes 265-269 and
accompanying text.
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between Congress and the Court about the constitutional meaning of sex
discrimination. Yet Congress defused the potential tension of this difference
by characterizing the PDA as a simple statutory amendment,3 1' thus
allowing the logical inconsistency between judicial and congressional views
of Section 1 rights to remain politically latent. This discrepancy between
Congress's and the Court's understanding of the constitutional nature of sex
discrimination persists to this day without causing perceptible damage to
either institution.
312
The story of the PDA illustrates how policentric constitutional
interpretation can proceed in the American polity without threatening either
the perceived unity of the Constitution or the authority of the Court. The
indirection and ambiguity that envelops the PDA is not unusual. Since the
days of the Warren and Burger Courts, the relationship between
congressional and judicial understandings of constitutional rights has been
messy and confused. Even in the absence of ambiguity, moreover, overt and
persistent congressional efforts to enforce R,, in flat contradiction to Ri,
have not harmed either the perceived unity of the Constitution or the
authority of the Court. That is the lesson of congressional legislation
enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.313 The only
plausible sense in which such legislation has injured the authority of the
Court is the tautological sense in which the Court's authority is defined as
including the prerogative to monopolize constitutional interpretation. The
history of Section 2 legislation demonstrates that no other separation-of-
powers values are necessarily at stake in simple congressional enforcement
of R,.
We do not mean to deny, however, that Section 5 legislation can
sometimes cause conflict between the Court and Congress that is so
corrosive as to damage either the perceived unity of the Constitution or the
authority of the Court. We agree that such conflict can raise legitimate
separation-of-powers concerns. Consider, for example, the case of City of
Boerne v. Flores,314 the decision that first prompted the Court to formulate
the enforcement model. Boerne was an exceptional case because it
concerned the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),3 5 which could be read as a direct congressional challenge to the
Court's competence in performing its core task of adjudicating
311. See supra note 216.
312. The contemporary Court still stands by Geduldig. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993).
313. See supra notes 284-290 and accompanying text.
314. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
315. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
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constitutional rights.316 "The very purpose of RFRA was to overturn a
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that interpreted the meaning and reach
of the Free Exercise Clause."3"7 Unlike the PDA, which avoided a frontal
confrontation with the Court by posing as a simple statutory amendment,
RFRA threw down a symbolic gauntlet to the Court.
Such stark defiance is quite rare in American politics, and it raises
distinctly different questions than does a simple divergence between
Congress and the Court about the meaning of the Constitution. Whether one
views Boerne as rightly or wrongly decided, it raised issues of separation of
powers that were simply not present in statutes like the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 318 or amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,31 or Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,320 all of which the Court has recently struck
down as inconsistent with the enforcement model. Before the Rehnquist
Court's recent decisions, no one at any time understood these statutes as in
any way directly challenging the Court's capacity correctly to interpret the
Constitution.
There is a world of difference between Section 5 legislation that
directly impugns and erodes judicial authority, and Section 5 legislation
that simply enforces an understanding of the Constitution that is distinct
from the Court's. Although the former may raise issues of separation of
powers, the latter does not. The distinction is important to keep in mind. It
implies that although the simple divergence of Rj from R, does not harm
judicial authority in a manner that would violate separation of powers,
Congress can nevertheless enact Section 5 legislation enforcing R, that does
damage this authority, that in particular cases the damage might be so
extensive as to violate separation of powers, and that the question of
316. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 469 (1994). Neal Devins has
observed:
Congress's consideration of the RFRA focused exclusively on protesting the wrongness
of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, a 1990
Supreme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Congressional hearings
showcased witnesses from religious and other interest groups, nearly all of whom
attacked Smith... and calling upon the Justices to reverse it. In the end, with virtually
no interest group opposition to the measure, Congress gave shortshrift to fact-finding in
order to do precisely what RFRA's interest group sponsors asked for, that is, repudiate
Smith.
Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1196-97 (2001).
317. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett and Protection for Civil Rights,
53 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1211 (2002).
318. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
319. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. II1 1997); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
320. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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whether any particular Section 5 legislation is unconstitutional on these
grounds depends upon a specific case-by-case assessment.
E. Policentric Constitutional Interpretation and
the F4LA Family Leave Provisions
The enforcement model forces us to justify the constitutionality of the
FMLA as an exercise of Section 5 power by reference to the forms of
antidiscrimination law that courts will enforce. In Section II.B we
demonstrated that the FMLA can be justified in this way. The history
recounted in Section III.C shows that concerns about stereotyping and the
disparate treatment of family caregivers in the workplace helped to
motivate and structure the statute. But Section III.C also suggested that a
narrow focus on such concerns obscures important aspects of the FMLA's
history, which has its roots in the ambitions of second-wave feminism to
create a constitutional principle of "true equality of opportunity" 32 1 that
would restructure the relationship between work and the family so as to
ameliorate the relative disadvantages of women.
To the extent that these considerations played a role in Congress's
decision to enact the FMLA, Congress drew on its Section 5 power to
enforce an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that diverged in
part from understandings which the Court has enforced in its recent
Section 1 cases. Especially since Washington v. Davis,322 the Court has
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause primarily to prohibit disparate
treatment based upon sex. It has not viewed the Clause as a vehicle by
which to restructure the relationship between work and family, even if such
restructuring would promote equal opportunity to participate in the basic
activities of citizenship. Although this disparity might be fatal under the
enforcement model, it is of no concern under the model of policentric
constitutional interpretation. The policentric model precisely celebrates
Congress's independent view of the Clause, which it regards as a living and
necessary link between the law of the Constitution and the aroused
constitutional beliefs of the American public.
The policentric model asks only if Congress intended to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the FMLA.323 This question is easy
321. NOW STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, supra note 132, at 161-62.
322. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
323. This point suggests the possibility of a third model of Section 5 power, which we may
call the model of institutional differentiation. Under this model courts would retain control over
the character of constitutional rights that can be protected by Section 5 power, but courts would
interpret Fourteenth Amendment rights differently depending upon whether they were being
enforced by courts or by Congress. Using the model of institutional differentiation, for example,
the Court might hold that even though judicial enforcement of Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a showing of purposeful discrimination, congressional Section 5 power can
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because Congress announced this intention in the very text of the statute.324
The policentric model does not seek to discipline Congress's constitutional
views by assessing them in light of the Court's jurisprudence; it does not,
like the enforcement model, seek to force congressional legislation to abide
by institutional norms and procedures that make sense only in the context of
Article III courts. By the same token, however, the policentric model does
not require the Court to enforce Congress's views of the Fourteenth
Amendment in adjudication. That Congress may exercise the prerogative of
a legislature to remove conditions in the workplace that disproportionately
harm women in order to achieve a constitutional ideal of equal citizenship
does not imply that the Court must similarly enforce this ideal in litigation
involving Section 1.
The policentric model does not insulate the FMLA from constitutional
review. To assess the constitutionality of the FMLA, therefore, we must ask
whether the family leave provisions of the FMLA violate any constitutional
rights. The answer to this question is plainly negative. If these provisions
were inconsistent with constitutional rights, they would be unconstitutional
as an exercise of Commerce Clause power as well as of Section 5 power.
The policentric model also asks whether the family leave provisions of
the FMLA violate any constitutional postulates powerful enough to
invalidate otherwise constitutional exercises of congressional power. One
such postulate is separation of powers. In our view the relevant inquiry is
whether the family leave provisions of the FMLA gravely erode or impugn
the ability of courts to perform their constitutionally assigned role. The
mere fact that these provisions enforce R, does not imply that courts must
also enforce R, in litigation under Section 1. Courts remain free to define Rj
in ways that either incorporate or exclude Congress's understanding of the
Constitution. The family leave provisions of the FMLA do not pose any
unique or special difficulties sounding in separation of powers; they do not
directly challenge the Court's competence or authority, as RFRA might be
regarded as having done.
prohibit state action that causes a disparate impact on protected groups. For a discussion of this
point, see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 468-73. If the Court were to accept the model of
institutional differentiation, it would decide whether the R, created by the FMLA were a
constitutionally appropriate means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, given the forms of
institutional differentiation that distinguish legislative from judicial constitutionalism. We regard
the model of institutional differentiation as superior to the enforcement model because it
acknowledges the functional differences that distinguish courts from legislatures. We regard the
model of institutional differentiation as inferior to the model of policentric constitutional
interpretation, however, because it maintains judicial control over the scope of Section 5 power,
and it therefore prevents Section 5 legislation from mediating between the legal and political
dimensions of the Constitution in ways that promote the democratic accountability of our
constitutional order.
324. 29 U.SC. § 2601(b)(5) (2000).
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Applying the policentric model to the family leave provisions of the
FMLA illustrates the almost willful perversity and arbitrariness of the
enforcement model. The family leave provisions of the FMLA have been
on the books for almost a decade, and to date no one has noticed even the
slightest impairment of the federal judicial function. This point remains
unaltered even if it is argued that the FMLA raises more general concerns
about Congress's power to enact statutes enforcing R,. Even if the FMLA is
added to Title I of the ADA, and to the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act, and to the civil remedy provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act, and indeed to the long line of federal civil
rights legislation enacted under the Section 5 jurisprudence of the Warren
Court and now awaiting execution under the enforcement model, what
becomes clear is that for decades we have been living under a regime in
which Congress has deployed its Section 5 power to enforce R,, and that
there has been no apparent negative impact on federal judicial power.
Considered without the ideological premise of juricentrism, it seems to us
highly implausible to claim that the family leave provisions of the FMLA
are inconsistent with fundamental principles of separation of powers.
The matter is somewhat different if we ask whether the family leave
provisions of the FMLA are inconsistent with the postulate of federalism.
These provisions do indeed impose serious burdens on the states. The
question is whether these burdens are sufficient to render the provisions
unconstitutional. This question is never explicitly addressed under the
Court's present construction of the enforcement model. We argued in Part
II that considerations of federalism are instead incorporated silently into the
application of the congruence-and-proportionality test. By eliminating that
test, the policentric model would require the Court directly to face this
issue.
We wish to be clear that the policentric model does not itself contain
any implications about the relationship between Section 5 legislation and
federalism. The model addresses only issues of separation of powers. The
model would thus not require the Court to ignore the effects of Section 5
legislation on the values of federalism. But because the model would
abandon the congruence-and-proportionality test, and because it would
substitute a rather easy and clear set of tests for the establishment of Section
5 power, it would require the Court explicitly to articulate and defend the
conclusion that particular Section 5 statutes, which are otherwise legitimate,
so compromise essential principles of federalism as to be unconstitutional.
If the Court believes that the family leave provisions of the FMLA are
unconstitutional because of their impact on federalism, the question is
whether the Court will so find covertly under the enforcement model, or
overtly under the policentric model. The primary effect of the policentric
model will be to prevent the Court from smuggling its federalism analysis
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into an enforcement model that is meant to safeguard separation of powers.
We believe that this would improve the Court's doctrine, and it is to that
subject that we now turn.
V. FEDERALISM AND POLICENTRIC CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
The rationes decidendi of the Court's recent decisions limiting Section
5 power almost entirely concern the requirements of the enforcement
model. They have barely mentioned federalism. There is an off-hand
reference in Boerne to the "vital principles necessary to maintain separation
of powers and the federal balance,"32 but not much else. Nevertheless the
context of the Court's decisions has powerfully implicated issues of
federalism. There are two such issues. The first arises because Section 5
legislation abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the Court
believes protects "dual sovereignty" as "a defining feature of our Nation's
constitutional blueprint., 326 The second arises because the breadth of
Section 5 has the potential to endow Congress with a general police power,
which would, in the Court's view, "obliterat[e] the Framers' carefully
crafted balance of power between the States and the National
Government."
327
It is not surprising, therefore, that many commentators have taken the
Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence to address primarily issues of
federalism rather than of separation of powers. 328 If the enforcement model
is indeed theoretically incomplete, so that its application must be
supplemented by extrinsic principles, the circumstances of the Court's
recent Section 5 decisions strongly suggest that the Court has used values of
federalism to inform judgments that purport to rest entirely on separation of
powers. The Court has used these values implicitly to set the baseline by
which the Court determines whether R, are congruent and proportional to
Rj.
325. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
326. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002). For recent
decisions of the Court dealing with Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999); and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For cases discussing Section 5
power in the context of the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
327. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000). For a discussion of how federalism
functions in the Morrison opinion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 473-509.
328. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative " Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 454-59 (2002); Sylvia A. Law,
In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U.
CtN. L. REV. 367 (2002).
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The Court's Section 5 decisions implicate roughly two distinct
principles of federalism. The first involves the independent integrity of
states as sovereign entities. The Court reads Eleventh Amendment
immunity as safeguarding the "sovereign status of the States... together
with the dignitary and essential attributes inhering in that status," which
serve to secure "the founding generation's rejection of 'the concept of a
central government that would act upon and through the States' in favor of
,a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people.' 329 The second principle of
federalism requires Congress to remain within its enumerated powers, so
that the "distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local"
is not lost.
330
As we have elsewhere argued, we do not believe that these two
principles should carry much weight in the context of Section 5 legislation
designed to enforce civil rights.3 3 1 We are of the view, however, that if the
Court is to vindicate these values in its Section 5 jurisprudence, there are
better and worse ways in which it may do so. In this Part we discuss how
values of federalism may best be implemented in Section 5 doctrine by a
Court that cares deeply about their importance.
The fundamental difficulty is that the Court's contemporary doctrine
incorporates principles of federalism in an essentially arbitrary manner.
Virtually any Section 5 statute can potentially compromise values of
federalism. Whether this tension ripens into a conclusion of
unconstitutionality depends upon the extent to which particular Section 5
statutes impair principles of federalism. The congruence-and-
proportionality test gives the Court the flexibility necessary to make such a
determination. It allows the Court to conclude that R, that too greatly impair
federalism values are not tailored closely enough to Rj. The upshot of this
doctrinal structure is that the Court can use values of federalism to define
the scope of Section 5 power without ever explicitly articulating these
values or the precise degree of their impairment. In the name of
implementing the enforcement model, the Court is actually able to pursue a
federalism agenda that is silent and commensurately without accountability.
The structure of the Court's contemporary Eleventh Amendment
doctrine creates especially powerful incentives to transform the
congruence-and-proportionality test into an unaccountable instrument of
federalism. The Rehnquist Court has revived the Eleventh Amendment as a
primary guarantor of state sovereignty. It has held that Eleventh
Amendment immunity cannot be abrogated by congressional legislation
329. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997)).
330. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
331. See Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 486-513.
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enacted under Article I powers, like the Commerce Clause, but only when
Congress acts pursuant to its enforcement authority under the
Reconstruction Amendments.33 2 Legislation that is a valid exercise of
Section 5 power is said automatically to trump Eleventh Amendment
immunity and hence to override the federalism values protected by that
immunity:
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by
appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on
state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it
exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of
the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by
their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think
that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation"
for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts.
333
The result of this doctrinal structure is that once the Court finds that
legislation is authorized by Section 5, it can no longer protect the
federalism value of state sovereignty safeguarded by the Eleventh
Amendment. The national prerogative of Section 5 power overrides this
value, no matter what impact Section 5 legislation might have on states. For
a Court committed to protecting state sovereignty, this doctrinal structure
creates enormous pressure to find some doctrinal pathway to shield states
from overly burdensome Section 5 legislation. The obvious solution is to
use the congruence-and-proportionality test as a tool for this purpose. A test
articulated to safeguard separation of powers is thus employed to protect
federalism values, even though the test neither names nor evaluates the
variables that are relevant for assessing relevant issues of federalism. The
test does not even require a court to consider the actual impact on states of
Section 5 legislation.
This is not healthy doctrine. A Court committed to protecting state
sovereignty ought to do so in an informed and nuanced way, without
hijacking doctrinal formulations designed for completely different
332. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976).
333. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (Rehnquist, J.) (citation omitted).
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purposes. Analytic clarity as well as accurate decisionmaking suggest that
the question of federalism be conceptually distinguished from the question
of separation of powers. This can be achieved if the postulates of federalism
are conceived to function in the context of Section 5 legislation as they do
in other areas of federal law, as limitations on otherwise legitimate
congressional power. We shall call this the "states' rights" view of
federalism. The best example of the states' rights view of federalism is
then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery.
334
At issue in Usery was a federal statute applying requirements
concerning minimum wages and maximum hours to state employees.
Although the Court freely conceded "the breadth of authority granted
Congress under the commerce power" to enact the statute,335 it conceived
the postulates of federalism as "an affirmative limitation on the exercise" of
congressional commerce power, analogous to the limitations on this power
imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 336 The statute, "while
undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause," would have to
surmount the "constitutional barrier" raised by its direct regulation of "the
States and subdivisions of States as employers. ,33 7 Usery thus sketched an
approach that foreshadowed the Court's contemporary understanding of
federalism as one of the "'essential postulates"'338 of the Constitution that
function to limit what would otherwise be valid extensions of national
power.
Applied to the question of Section 5 legislation, the states' rights view
of federalism would separate the question of Congress's power to enact
Section 5 legislation from the question of whether a statute's impact on the
postulates of federalism is so damaging as to render the statute
unconstitutional. The Court's peculiar opinion in Garrett seems to be
groping toward some such approach, for it basically finds that Congress is
without power under Section 5 to enact Title I of the ADA insofar as it
applies to state entities that enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, even
though Congress might well have Section 5 power to enact Title I as
applied to cities and counties, which do not receive such immunity.3 If the
334. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
335. Id. at 840-41.
336. Id. at 841.
337. Id.
338. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,322 (1934)).
339. In holding that Congress had failed to demonstrate a pattern of state transgressions that
would justify the enactment of Title I, Garrett considered evidence only of transgressions by "the
States themselves," which would not include evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by "units
of local governments, such as cities and counties," that do not receive Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001). The strange
implication of this reasoning is that Congress might well have had Section 5 power to enact Title I
as applied to units of local government. Thus at least one circuit court has concluded that
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scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity is taken as a measure of the
essential concerns of federalism, the implicit message of Garrett seems to
be that Congress has Section 5 power to enact Title I except where its
application to states so especially violates basic postulates of federalism as
to render it invalid.
If the Court insists upon limiting Section 5 power based upon this
solicitude for federalism, we believe that it should do so by making the
implicit message of Garrett explicit. The question of the existence vel non
of Section 5 power is distinct from the question of the constitutionality of
that power when exercised to burden core concerns of federalism. The
Court can distinguish these questions either by holding that Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not automatically trumped by valid Section 5
legislation, or by holding that Section 5 legislation is always to be measured
against its impact on the essential postulates of federalism. We believe it is
reasonable to require the Court to articulate and defend the concerns of
federalism it believes are so significant as to justify overruling otherwise
valid federal civil rights legislation. This is no doubt a difficult task. The
Court attempted it in the years after Usery, and its effort collapsed in
confusion. 340 But it is a challenge that ought to be squarely faced by a Court
determined to limit congressional power on federalism grounds.
Distinguishing the question of Section 5 power from the constraints of
federalism would allow the Court to apply the model of policentric
constitutional interpretation without fear that it would lead to the oppression
of the states or to the loss of indispensable aspects of their sovereignty. The
Court could protect the values of federalism it thought essential, while
nevertheless authorizing Congress to participate in the formation of
constitutional culture through the enactment of Section 5 legislation
reflecting a legislative vision of constitutional meaning. Even if the Court
were to strike down such legislation on federalism grounds, the recognition
of Congress's authority to articulate its underlying constitutional beliefs
would still contribute to the ongoing dialogue between Congress and the
a determination that a statute is not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not necessarily mean that the statute is not a valid exercise of Congress'
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to local government entities not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
analysis of whether Congress has the power to enact legislation requires inquiry into
constitutional violations by these entities in addition to entities entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.), opinion substituted, 278 F.3d 1020, 1032 n.7
(10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002); see also Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d
974, 982 n.60 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This narrowing of the analysis in Garrett means that Title 11 of the
ADA could still be a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power, but simply not provide the basis for a
use of that power to abrogate .... ").
340. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Court that in the past has proved so important for the development of our
understanding of the Constitution.
We can also apply this analysis to cases in which the Court has used the
congruence-and-proportionality test to protect the second value of
federalism that we have identified-the preservation of the national
government as one of enumerated and limited powers. This value was at
stake in United States v. Morrison,34 1 in which the Court struck down a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)3 42 that
created a civil cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence
against their abusers.343 Conceding that a "voluminous congressional
record" had established a pattern of violations of Rj because of "pervasive
bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated
violence," 344 the Court nevertheless ruled that VAWA established R, that
were not congruent and proportional to Rj, because VAWA created a cause
of action that was "directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals
who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.
VAWA did not impose any burdens on states, but it did expand the
scope of Section 5 power to private individuals, which in the Court's view
threatened to obliterate "the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power
between the States and the National Government." 346 The Court in
Morrison thus used the congruence-and-proportionality test to allay its fear
that Section 5 power might potentially expand the federal government into
an entity of virtually unlimited power. Although this fear has little to do
with separationi of powers, it does express a major theme of the Court's
federalism jurisprudence, articulated most clearly in the Court's Commerce
Clause cases.347
Whereas the value of federalism that seeks to shield states from overly
burdensome federal legislation articulates a relatively definite principle, the
concerns at issue in a case like Morrison are less concrete. The case
summons a diffuse fear that the federal government is somehow about to
overspill its proper boundaries. There is no "precise '"348 definition of these
boundaries; there is no clear account of the "distinction between what is
341. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
342. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
343. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (1994).
344. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20,
345. Id. at 626.
346. Id. at 620.
347. In Morrison, the Court also held that the provision of VAWA establishing the civil
cause of action was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Court stressed that it had to
interpret the limits of Commerce Clause power in a way that would not "effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government." Id. at 608; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
348. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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truly national and what is truly local., 349 There is no effort to analyze bow
such a distinction might correspond to the realities of governance in
America today.350 Instead there is an indistinct but urgent apprehension that
the Court must draw "real limits" that have "substance" and that it must be
able "to identify" an "activity that the States may regulate but Congress
may not. ,
351
The cases in which the Court has expressed concern to prevent
Congress from acquiring a general police power thus do not propose an
exact account of the nature of federal authority; instead they forcefully
assert the necessity of imposing judicial limits on that authority. This focus
is evident in Morrison, which does not offer a carefully articulated
explanation of the nature of Section 5 power. Morrison seems rather to
argue that if the Rs established by VAWA are not identical to Rj, Section 5
power might lead to an unstoppable slide into boundless federal authority. It
is striking that Morrison, in contrast to Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, makes
no effort to announce or apply the remedial or prophylactic principles. It
does not ask whether the cause of action created by VAWA could redress
or prevent the violations of Rj documented in the legislative record. Instead
Morrison seems simply to hold that because Rj require state action, and
because the RS created by VAWA do not involve state actors, VAWA is
beyond Congress's Section 5 power.
352
The model of policentric constitutional interpretation poses a much
deeper challenge to the methodology of Morrison than it does to the Court's
decisions involving Eleventh Amendment immunity. This is because
Morrison does not overtly appeal to the states' rights view of federalism,
but seems instead to summon a tradition in which federalism is conceived
as a zero-sum game where every act of the national government beyond its
349. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18. For a discussion, see Judith Olans Brown & Peter D.
Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 30-32, 55-66 (2000); Sally F.
Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 132-37 (2002); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (2001); Peter M. Shane,
Federalism 's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45
VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000); and Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "'Federalism Whether
They Want It or Not ": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil
Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 926, 958, 965-73
(2001).
350. See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966) ("No important activity of
government in the United States is the exclusive province of one of the levels, .. not even the
most local of local functions, such as police protection and park maintenance.").
351. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
352. There is considerable ambiguity about the extent to which Morrison meant to announce
a general rule prohibiting Section 5 legislation from reaching private actors, as distinct from
announcing a holding that the particular provisions of VAWA at issue in the case were not
congruent and proportional to the Rj disclosed in its legislative record. See Post & Siegel, supra
note 74, at 503-09.
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constitutionally allotted power constitutes ipso facto an intrusion on the
domain of state authority. We shall call this tradition the "zero-sum" view
of federalism. The zero-sum view locates the essence of federalism in
judicial restraints that limit national authority to the enumerated powers
allocated to the federal government in the Constitution. Because the
policentric model authorizes Congress to define its own Section 5 power, it
would appear incompatible with the "judicially enforceable outer limits" '353
to national power that the zero-sum view identifies with federalism itself.
On closer analysis, however, the policentric model is not incompatible
with the zero-sum view of federalism. This is because the logically
fundamental question within the zero-sum view is the proper definition of
federal power. So long as the national government is exercising power that
has been actually allocated to it by the Constitution, the zero-sum view does
not regard it as violating principles of federalism. If our argument is correct
that the best interpretation of Section 5 power is that Congress is authorized
to enforce its own interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
congressional exercise of such power is not inconsistent with the zero-sum
view of federalism.
Because the zero-sum view of federalism requires as its logical first
step a precise definition of the exact scope of national power, it is apparent
that even Morrison itself does not truly exemplify it. Morrison lacks any
clear account of the proper extent of Section 5 power. This failure is
characteristic of the Section 5 jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, which
has never specified the nature of Section 5 power in a manner adequate to
the requirements of the zero-sum view. 354 Morrison obscures this failure by
seeming to adopt the simple line that R, must be identical to Rj, a line that
draws surface plausibility from the premise of the enforcement model that
Section 5 power must enforce only Rj.
353. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
354. The congruence-and-proportionality test does not formulate the nature of Section 5
power in a manner that is compatible with the zero-sum view. The test instructs courts to
invalidate Section 5 statutes establishing R. that are not "closely enough" tied to Rj. If the test is
deployed to protect values of federalism, but see supra note 77, the standard of "closely enough"
can plausibly be defined only in terms of the impact of R, on federalism. In such circumstances,
therefore, the test explicitly appeals to the states' rights view of federalism. The congruence-and-
proportionality test can therefore define the scope of congressional power in a manner that
satisfies the requirements of the zero-sum view of federalism only if it measures the relationship
between R, and Rj in terms of criteria that are independent of the effects of R, on federalism. The
only plausible candidate for such a criterion is the impact of R. on the values of separation of
powers, which is to say the enforcement model. We argued in Parts 1I and IV that this
understanding of the congruence-and-proportionality test is analytically incoherent, because it
fails to account for how institutional differentiation distinguishes legislative from judicial efforts
to articulate and enforce rights, and that this understanding of the test is also normatively
misguided, because it assesses the effect of R. on separation of powers in terms of the divergence
between R, and Rj rather than in terms of the impact of R, on the actual functioning of the judicial
branch.
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We know, however, from cases like Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, that
this is an inaccurate definition of Section 5 power, even under the
enforcement model. Indeed, if Section 5 authorized Congress only to enact
R, that were the same as Rj, almost every Section 5 statute enacted during
the twentieth century would be unconstitutional. Since this is not a plausible
position for the Court to adopt, and since it is therefore clear that Congress
can enact R, that diverge from Rj, it follows that Morrison does not appeal
to the zero-sum view of federalism. It does not seek to confine Congress to
the power actually allocated to it by the Constitution. The case instead
reflects a states' rights view, because it restricts otherwise existing national
power in order to safeguard values of federalism.
The importance the Court attaches to locating some "real" limit on
Section 5 power, however, suggests a second reason why adherents of the
zero-sum view might decide to reject the policentric model. The model
creates a form of federal authority in which Congress seems to be the judge
of its own power, and in which national authority appears to be unlimited
by the Court. Whatever advantages the policentric model might otherwise
offer, therefore, those committed to the zero-sum view might nonetheless
repudiate it, because they would regard endowing Congress with authority
independently to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as having the
unacceptable implication of authorizing Congress to exercise a general
police power, which would violate an essential principle of federalism.
The difficulty with this objection is that it rests on a false premise. Even
if the policentric model were accepted, the states' rights version of
federalism would still permit the Court to strike down Section 5 legislation
that trenches too dramatically on essential postulates of federalism. The
Court could still impose judicially enforceable outer limits on Section 5
power. It could still strike down Section 5 legislation that unduly burdens
states or that threatens to undermine "the Framers' carefully crafted balance
of power between the States and the National Government. 355 When
carefully examined, the Section 5 decisions of the Rehnquist Court actually
use the states' rights view of federalism, rather than the zero-sum view, to
establish just such limitations. Morrison itself tacitly deploys the states'
rights view to strike down legislation that might well otherwise have been
valid under the account of Section 5 power advanced in Kimel and
Garrett.
3 56
Even if the Court in Morrison had adopted the policentric model,
therefore, it could nevertheless have held that R, established by Section 5
legislation must address state actors, rather than private parties. But under
355. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
356. For a discussion of how Garret; appeals to the states' rights view, see supra note 339
and accompanying text.
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the policentric model Morrison could not have used an inaccurate account
of separation of powers to disguise an unexplained commitment to
federalism. The opinion would instead have had to articulate and defend the
position that the postulate of federalism prohibiting Congress from
exercising a "general police power of the sort retained by the States" 357 also
bars Section 5 legislation from regulating private parties.
No doubt this would be an exceedingly difficult position to defend. Not
only does Congress routinely exercise such power in its Commerce Clause
legislation, but there is no particular reason to believe that extensive
congressional authority to prohibit private discrimination will generalize
into a plenary police power. The events of the Second Reconstruction
transformed the regulation of private discrimination into a national concern,
just as the events of the Great Depression transformed relationships of
private employment into a national concern. 58 Authorizing Section 5
legislation to address these distinctly national concerns does not obviously
translate into plenary police power.
Although we regard the federalism values at issue in Morrison to be
weak and ultimately indefensible, the Court evidently disagrees. It so
strongly believes in these values that it is willing to use them to limit
congressional power. We contend that in such circumstances it is especially
important that the Court conceive federalism according to the states' rights
approach, as a limitation on otherwise legitimate Section 5 power. The
Court ought to be put to the test of explicitly articulating and defending the
values of federalism that it believes are significant enough to circumscribe
Section 5 power. Perhaps the Court in Morrison might have contended,
along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, that VAWA contravenes postulates of
federalism because it constitutes a federal intrusion into the family.359 Or
perhaps it might have believed that, despite the nearly forty-year history of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of the 1964, regulating private
discrimination is inconsistent with proper limitations on federal authority.
Whatever reasons the Court might ultimately develop, they ought to be
explicitly articulated and defended. They ought to be persuasive enough to
357. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
358. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 74, at 486-502.
359. Speaking for the Judicial Conference of the United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist
objected to the provision of VAWA struck down in Morrison on the ground that the "new private
right of action [is] so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes." William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3; see also Judith Resnik, The
Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 269, 269-77 (2000). The Conference of Chief Justices announced its
opposition to VAWA on the ground that "the federal cause of action... would impair the ability
of state courts to manage criminal and family law matters traditionally entrusted to the states."
Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83-84 (1993).
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withstand clear and crisp formulation, and they ought not to be allowed to
masquerade as principles of separation of powers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past six years the Rehnquist Court has developed an innovative
and compelling account of Section 5 power. It has drawn upon separation
of powers principles to claim that Congress may not independently
"interpret" the Fourteenth Amendment in the course of exercising its
undoubted power to "enforce" the provisions of Section 1. In the nineteenth
century the Supreme Court was far too weak ever to claim such a monopoly
of interpretive authority over Congress, and it therefore used principles of
federalism to circumscribe Section 5 power. In the mid-twentieth century
the Warren Court worked collaboratively with Congress, deferring to
exercises of Section 5 power in such a way as to allow each branch of the
federal government to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment without binding
the other. The Warren Court understood Section 5 as a structural device that
would integrate legal and political constitutionalism. But the contemporary
Court is no longer willing to tolerate political enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it has unabashedly asserted a prerogative to
act as "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.,
360
The theoretical engine of the Rehnquist Court's recent Section 5
decisions is the enforcement model, which we have attempted to define and
evaluate. The model has powerful appeal because it draws on rule-of-law
values affirmed in Cooper v. Aaron3 6 1 to restrain Congress in the exercise
of its Section 5 power, although, as we demonstrate, the model extends
Cooper in ways that are inconsistent with the actual jurisprudence and
practice of the Warren Court itself. The enforcement model is theoretically
confused because it requires courts to distinguish between Section 5 statutes
that interpret and Section 5 statutes that enforce constitutional rights, yet it
cannot explain when legislative rights are sufficiently similar to judicial
rights as to count as "enforcing" them. The model is accordingly
susceptible to abuse because extraneous concerns like federalism or a
hostility to civil rights can implicitly drive decisions in ways that are never
openly named or defended.
More fundamentally, we argue that even if judges could distinguish
between enforcement and interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
imposing the restrictions of the enforcement model would impair the well-
being of our constitutional order. The model presupposes that Congress's
efforts independently to articulate constitutional meaning are contaminated
360. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
361. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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with politics and hence that they threaten to corrupt the Court's own
obligation to declare constitutional law. We recount the rise of modem sex
discrimination jurisprudence to demonstrate just how false this
presupposition is.
Classifications based upon sex now receive elevated scrutiny in judicial
decisions enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment because citizens mobilized
to create a new constitutional norm of sex equality; because Congress
responded to this mobilization with lawmaking, including Section 5
legislation; and, finally, because the Court was able to learn from these
events about a better way to interpret the Constitution. The enforcement
model would have deprived Congress of the confidence and authority to
enact legislation expressing its evolving understanding of the equal
citizenship principle. The model would have deflated the possibilities of
citizen mobilization and pro tanto deprived the Court itself of the ability to
declare judicial doctrine adequately grounded in the developing
constitutional culture of the nation.
Because we believe that such grounding is essential to constitutional
legitimacy, we have advanced an alternative model of Section 5 power,
which we have called the model of policentric constitutional interpretation.
The model draws on the nation's experience during the period between
Morgan and Boerne, when the Court itself established a doctrinal regime
that combined strong judicial protections for constitutional rights with far-
ranging legislative authority to enact Section 5 legislation. The advantage
of the model is that it would permit Congress to serve the function of
articulating popular understandings of the Constitution and yet it would not
impair in any way the Court's ability to safeguard constitutional rights. The
account of Section 5 power we propose thus draws on the distinctive
strengths of our tradition. It preserves both the nation's rich legacy of
legislative constitutionalism and the judicially enforced constitutional rights
on which we have come to depend.
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